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INTRODUCTION TO BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AIMS AND SCOPE 
Jammu and Kashmir became the 15th State in the Union 
of India, when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of 
Accession on 26th October 1947. The hereditary rule of 
Maharaja came to an end on 31st October 1951, when the 
constituent State Assembly met for the first time. In 
February 1954, the constituent Assembly ratified the 
State's accession with India. But on 30th October 1956, it 
passed a clause defining its relationship with India. The 
constitution was adopted by the Assembly on 17th November 
1956 and enforced on 26th January 1957. 
For about seven years, the State has been on the top 
slot following the emergence of separatist movement. 
Everybody intends to read and know about the role of 
political parties in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The present study contains in the form of annotated 
bibliography, resembles together some of the significant 
literature dealing witf, the Party Politics in J&K. Although 
the bibliography is selective in nature but exhaustive and 
an attempt has been made to cover all^ '"'^ *^ '^ ^^ "aspects of the 
politics of J&K. 
I am confident that the bibliography will be useful to 
all those who have some interest in the politics of Jammu 
and Kashmir. 
The bibliography is divided into three parts: 
Part one deals with the description of the work. 
Part two is the main part consisting of an annotated 
list of 213 articles on the subject. 
Part three however, deals with indexes. 
LIBRARIES VISITED : 
The primary sources were consulted in the following 
libraries :-
i. Govt. District Library Doda, J&K. 
ii. Rambir Singh Library, Parade Ground, Jammu Tawi. 
iii. Maulana Azad Library, Muslim University, Aligarh. 
iv. Coaching and Guidance Centre Library, Muslim 
University, Aligarh. 
V. Kashmir House Library, Shajahan Road, Delhi. 
vi Some Local and House Libraries of Aligarh. 
METHODOLOGY 
The procedure followed in preparing the bibliography 
was as follows : 
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i. The secondary sources 'Guide to Indian Periodical 
Literature' and 'Index India' were consulted in Maulana Azad 
Library, A.M.U. to find out the location. 
ii. The relevant bibliographical details were noted on 
5"x7" cards following ISI standards. 
iii. On completion of the abstracts, subject 
headings were assigned. 
iv. The subject headings are arranged in an 
alphabetical sequence (letter-by-letter). 
V. In the end, two separate alphabetical indexes are 
given-Author Index and Title index providing reference to 
various entries by their respective numbers. 
vi. Alphabetical list of periodicals with their 
frequency and place of publication is also given. 
SUBJECT HEADINGS 
Attempt has been made to give Co-extensive subject 
headings as much as possible and allowed by Natural 
language, if more than one entry comes under the same 
subject heading, these are arranged alphabetically by author 
(s) name (s). 
Vll 
STANDARD FOLLOWED 
Care has been taken to follow strictly the rules and 
practice of Indian Standard for bibliographical references 
(IS: 2381-1963) for each entry of the bibliography. The full 
names of periodicals and months has been given instead of 
abbreviated forms. Thus it gives unifomity for the 
bibliographical references throughout the bibliography. 
ARRANGEMENT 
The bibliographical part has been arranged 
alphabetically according to subject headings. The items of 
bibliographical reference for each entry of periodical are 
arranged as follows : 
a) Name (s) of the author (s) 
b. Full stop (.) 
c) Title of the article including subtitle, if any 
d) Full stop (.) 
e) Title of periodical (underlined) 
f) Full stop (.) 
g) Volume number 
h) Comma (,) 
i) Issue number 
V l l l 
j) Semi-Colon (;) 
k) Year of publication 
1) Comma (,) 
m) Month of publication with date, if any 
n) Semi-colon (;) 
o) Inclusive pages of articles 
SPECIMEN ENTRY 
PUNJABI (Riyaz). Kashmir : Challenge and opportunity. 
Politics India. 1,2; 1996, August; 26-8. 
EXPLANATION 
This article is taken from 'Politics India' which is 
titled 'Kashmir: Challenge and opportunity', written by 
Riyaz Punjabi in the issue number 2 of the 1st volume for 
the month of August of the year 1996 on the pages 26 to 28, 
against this entry the serial number is given. 
ABSTRACT 
The entries in the bibliography contain abstracts 
giving the essential information about: the articles. 
Attempt has been made to prepare indicative abstracts, so 
that in most of the cases users needs are fulfilled with 
abstract itself. 
IX 
INDEXES 
The index part contains the author index and 
the title index in alphabetical sequence. Each index entry 
is followed by the entry number. It is hoped that they will 
be found very useful in consulting of the bibliography. 
ALPHABETICAL LIST OF PERIODICALS/NEWSPAPERS SCANNED 
S.No. Name of Periodical/ 
Newspaper 
Frequency Place of 
publication 
1. Blitz Weekly 
2. The Competition Master Monthly 
3. Competition Refresher Monthly 
4. Competition Success Review Monthly 
5. 
6. 
The concept Monthly 
Current Political & Legal Monthly 
Perspectives 
7. Current Topics Monthly 
8. Daily Excelsior Daily 
9. Democratic World 
10. Echo of Islam 
Mumbai 
Chandigarh 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
Islamabad 
Allahabad 
Ambala Cantt, 
Jammu Tawi 
Fortnightly New Delhi 
Bi-Monthly Tehran 
11. Economic and Political 
Weekly Weekly Mumbai 
12. The Economist Weekly London 
13. Far Eastern Economic 
Review Weekly Hongkong 
14. Frontline Bi-Weekly Chennai 
15. The Hindu Daily Delhi 
16. The Hindustan Times Daily New Delhi 
XI 
17. The Illustrated Weekly 
of India 
18. Indian Express 
19. India Today 
20. Islamic Future 
21. Janata 
22. Kashmir Times 
23. Link 
24. Mainstream 
25. Mountain Valley Kashmir 
26. Muslim India 
27. The Muslim World Lg.ague 
: .-Journal 
28. National Herald 
29. Nation and the World 
30. News from India 
31. Newsweek 
32. New Wave 
33. Organiser 
34. Outlook 
35. Patriot 
36. The Pioneer 
37. Politics India 
Weekly 
Daily 
Mumbai 
New Delhi 
Fortnightly New Delhi 
Monthly Riyadh 
Weekly Mumbai 
Daily Jammu Tawi 
Weekly New Delhi 
Weekly New Delhi 
Monthly Srinagar 
Monthly New Delhi 
Monthly Makkah al-Mukarramah 
Daily Delhi 
Fortnightly New Delhi 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Daily 
Daily 
Monthly 
New Delhi 
New York 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
Delhi 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
Xll 
38. Pratiyogita Kiran 
39. Radiance 
40. Rashtriya Sahara 
41. Salook 
42. The Sentinal 
43. The Statesman 
44. Suargam 
45. Sunday 
46. The Telegraph 
47. Time 
48. The Times of India 
49. The Tribune 
50. Trumpet 
51. United India Pride 
52. The Valley Reporter 
53. The week 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Monthly 
Daily 
Daily 
Weekly 
Weekly 
Daily 
Weekly 
Daily 
Daily 
Delhi 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
New Delhi 
Guwahati 
Delhi 
Jammu Tawi 
Calcutta 
Calcutta 
New York 
New Delhi 
Chandigarh 
Fortnightly Delhi 
Weekly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Jammu Tawi 
Srinagar 
Kottayam 
PKViY - OHE 
INTRODUaiON 
INTRODUCTION 
1. HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
The State of Jammu & Kashmir which had earlier been 
under Hindu rulers and Muslim Sultans, becane part of 
Mughal Empire under Akbar. After a period of Afghan rule 
from 1756, it was annexed to the Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab 
in 1819.Tn 1846, Ranjit Singh made over the territory of 
Jammu & Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh as a part of 
Amritsar Treaty signed after the battle of Sabroon. British 
supremacy was recognised until the Indian Independence Act 
1947, 
When all the states decided to accession to India or 
Pakistan, Kashmir asked for stand-still agreements with 
both. In the meantime, the state became the subject of an 
armed attack from Pakistan and the then Maharaj Hari Singh 
acceded to India on 26th October, 1947 by signing the 
Instrument of Accession. India approached the U.N. in 
January 1949. Another round of war between India and 
Pakistan in 1965 was followed by the Tashkant Declaration 
in January 1966. 
Following the liberation movement in the former 
eastern wingj Pakistan attacked India in December 1971. 
It was followed by the Shimla Agreement in July 1972 and a 
new line of control was delineated bilaterally to replace 
the cease fire line between the two countries in Jammu & 
Kashmir. 
The Maharaja Hari Singh's son Karan Singh take over 
as Regent in 1950 and on the ending of hereditary rule on 
17th October 1952, sworn in as a Sardar-i-Riyasat. On his 
father's death on 26th April 1961 Karan Singh was 
recognised as Maharaja by the Indian Government, but he 
decided not to use the title. 
1.1 Administration 
The Constitution of the State came into force in 
part on 17th November 1956 and fully on 26th January 1957. 
The Constitution provides for the bicameral legislature -
i) the Legislatve Assembly, and ii) the Legislative 
Council. 
The State comprises 14 distrT^ .^ -s of which 6 each 
fall in Jammu and Kashmir regions and two in Ladakh region. 
The Jammu & Kashmir government and the Centre have agreed 
in principle to grant autonomy to the Leh area of the 
Ladakh district. 
1.2 Districts 
S.No. District H.Quarter No. of Area Population 
seats (Sq.km.) (1981 Census) 
(L.A) 
1. Anantnag Anantnag 10 3,984 656,351 
2. Badgam Badgam 05 1,371 367,262 
3. Baramulla Baramulla 10 4,588 670,142 
4. Doda Doda 06 11,691 425,262 
5. Jammu Jammu 13 3,097 943,395 
6. Kargil Kargil 02 14,036 65,992 
7. Kathua Kathua 05 2,651 369,123 
8. Kupwara Kupwara 05 2,379 328,743 
9. Ladakh Leh 02 45,110 68,380 
10. Poonch Poonch 03 1,674 224,197 
11. Pulwama Pulwama 06 1,398 404,078 
12. Rajauri Rajauri 04 2,630 302,500 
13. Srinagar Srinagar 10 2,228 708,328 
14. Udhampur Udhampur 06 4,550 453,636 
Total 87 101,387 59,87,389 
2. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1947 
On the Kashmir issue, the positon of India is frozen 
in time. Within months of partition of the sub-continent in 
1947, India and Pakistan went on for a war to settle the 
issue. The war ended with a division of the province 
between the two antagonistic, post-colonial states, but the 
Kashmiris continued to see ^'^<^ mselves as one people. 
Professing different faiths - Islam, Hinduism and Budhism -
the three religious sub-communities of Kashmir historically 
have lived in peace with each other. At partition, 
Kashmir's fate was decided. 
The Raja of Kashmir Hari Singh signed the Instrument 
of Accession on 26th October 1947, just five days later, 
talking to Mohammed Ali Jinah in Lahore. Lord Mountbatten 
explained him the elements of Kashmir policy. This 
consisted of trying to persuade the Maharaja to institute a 
progressive government, ascertain the will of the people 
and then accedeto the dominion of the people's choice. 
Mountbatten's brief came from the Congress itself. 
Instead of putting any pressure on Hari Singh or tempting 
him to accede to Indian Union, the Congress and the Indian 
government consistently advised the Raja to decide the 
issue of accession in accordance with the wishes of the 
people. This was never done, no plebiscite was held on 
whether Kashmir should become part of India or Pakistan or 
remain independent. 
The people of Kashmir were never consulted and that 
initial mistake has never been corrected. Even today, 
Mountbatten's pledge remains unfulfilled. The real will of 
the people is yet to be ascertained. The Kashmir problem 
has both domestic and bilateral causes. Internally, it is 
related to the failures as well as the success of Indian 
endeavours. Externally, Kashmir is linked to the larger 
sub-continental struggle between India and Pakistan. It 
reflects the growing and larger crisis of India's political 
institutions. India's position is that Kashmir problem was 
solved with the accession - that the legal issues governing 
Kashmir were settled when it became a part of India and has 
participated in general and assembly elections since then. 
2.1 Party Politics 
Democracy is one of the most widely advocated forms 
of government. But the growth of modern democracy cannot 
take place without certain conditions. Among the conditions 
a healthy, democratic and stable party system occupies a 
unique place, even though it is an extra-constitutional 
growth. The party system not only democratises politics but 
it also makes responsible government responsive. 
Political systems, or even sub-systems, of 
developing states are the consequence of a historical 
growth like those of the advanced states. Certain changes 
occur in response to the changes that take place as a 
result of the mental evolution of people within a 
territorial jurisdiction and those resulting from 
interaction. A political sub-system is visualised only if 
it operates through a homogeneous social unit, with the 
peculiarities of representing the same culture within a 
broad framework of an overall system. 
Kashmir represents a political sub-system which has 
its own peculiar position and style . Since its inception 
in 1947, this political sub-system with its parliamentary 
institutions within a democratic set up, had very little 
interaction between the system and the people. However, 
since 1975, and especially after the elections of 1977 to 
the state legislature a new style of interaction has 
emerged between the institutions and the people. In 1956, 
the Jammu and Kashmir State adopted a new constitution and 
became a peculiar state within the Indian Constitutional 
and political system, under Article 370 of the Constitution 
of India. During the State's accession to India, something 
new was handed over to the new administration of the State 
consisted of Government, Movement, Institutions and 
Promises. For purposes of civil administration the State 
was divided into major divisions - Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh. 
2.2 Politics and Body Politics 
The ascendancy to power in post-1947 resulted 
consequently in cementing personal relations of the Sheikh 
Abdullah with the Nehru fmaily. At the same time, in 
government, first as Chief Emergency Administrator in the 
State and later as Prime Minister, the Sheikh was 
influenced by new emergency elite amongst Muslims and other 
sections of Kashmir society. The new emerging elite did not 
only comprise of Bakhshis, Karas, Burzaz but also Begs, 
Kochaks, Bachas and many others from different areas of the 
State including fatr^  flung areas of Gurez and Karnah. The 
petty capitalist class and others representing Maharaja's 
elite were absorbed in the new one, some of them loosing 
their foothold. 
Kashmir represents a different sociology at the 
rural and urban levels. During 1947-53, the Sheikh's 
ascendancy provides a dichotomy of political attitudes and 
behaviours. Rural people were more orthodox and tradition-
bound than the urban. Consequently the social status 
determiend the political behaviour. The slogan "Land to 
Tiller" during this period by the National Conference 
determined the party's influence. However, the educated 
class, by virtue of the politics of the Sub-continent, 
willy-nilly, did not subscribe to the decision of the 
National Conference in respect of Accession. The society. 
especially in Kashmir became alienated from the political 
elite and in rural areas a new class of vested interests 
emerged on the basis of personal relations and personal 
gains. 
There was the lack of clear political objectivity 
amongst the Muslims of the State during 1947-53. Most of 
them thought in terms of accession to Pakistan, placing 
thus great limits on the effectiveness of those who 
intended to perform a political role. Even their role was 
doubted after 1947. The dominant National Conference worker 
or agent could make a headway only if he was related to a 
social structure that safeguarded him against the social 
wrath. Consequently, he had to develop such personal 
relations with the governing hierarchy which formally 
defended him against the opposed forces. The Pirs, who 
prior to 1947 had chaks or jagirs or were included in the 
elite, being a dominant educated class, stealthly joined 
the service class and secured their position which depended 
formerly either on lands, money lending or religious 
leadership. However, other educated members of other strata 
of Muslims, started getting a foothold in the bureaucracy 
immediately after. This attraction for other stratas, 
however, became more pronounced during Bakhshi's rule, 
starting from 1954 onwards. 
2.3 Non-Communal Politics 
Two great virtues reflecting on the personality of 
Kashmir sociology are non-communal politics and tolerance. 
This secular identification, however, does not mean that 
Kashmiris leadership represents different communities in 
general even those villages having K.P's in domicile do not 
find Pandits in National Conference cadre or any other 
party. Though the Congress has some members, yet does 
represent other communities only in name. 
During freedom struggle Sheikh Abdullah commanded 
sincere personal and political allegiance even to the 
extent that his name was believed to be carved on the 
leaves of the trees. Though this type of allegiance was 
shattered during the periods 1947-53. It touched new 
heights again during the periods 1947-19 Si. 
The National Conference, while representing a total 
political life before 1947, in essence promised a political 
life for Kashmiris only in the sense of majoritarianism. In 
the post-1947 period, the majoritarianism was being 
replaced by the slogans of socialism, secularism and 
democracy. All these slogans had nothing to do with the 
common man in Kashmir either during the National Conference 
rule or the Congress rule. 
The dichotomy which Kashmir socoiology presents is 
the political alienation of Kashmiris. Kashmiri believes 
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politics to be normless, elections to be a fraud and the 
character of political loyalty a matter of expediency. 
Kashmiris gave to the leadership of political groups a high 
degree of freedom in determining matters of strategy. 
Because of this tactics many political activists in the 
post-independence turned rebellious or were driven to the 
gallows. Though these rebels in the valley were not in a 
position to bring a revolution leading to de-accession, yet 
non-participation in political issues was aggra\ated First 
an outstanding front rank leader Mohiuddin Kara fell out of 
the National Conference and started Political Conference. 
Later Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq started Democratic National 
Conference. Later militant organisations Alfateh, JKLF, HM, 
etc. came into existence. Some other political parties 
which came into existence are Muslim League, Awami Action 
Committee, Muslim Conference, Jamaat-e-Islami, Peoples 
Conference, Awami League, etc. The C.P.M. and C.P.I, also 
re-organised their parties and a few Naxalites also were 
induced in Kashmir politics. Even the Communists were 
divided on their loyalties to India or Pakistan. 
Consequently, political literature of Kashmir introduced 
the Muslim Communist and Hindu Communist. 
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2.4 Satyagraha Movement 
In 1953, the Election Commission, Auditor General 
and Supreme Court of India's jurisdiction did not extend to 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Governor of the 
State was called Sardar-i-Riyasat and was elected by the 
State Assembly members only, and the Chief Minister as 
Prime Minister. The state had a different flag which 
continues to have even now. There are two flags at the 
Government Secretariat buildings both in Jammu and 
Srinagar. Most of the Central Laws were not applicable in 
J & K as per the situation in 1953. Custom duty was charged 
on the goods being imported to the J & K state and a 
special permit was required for the entry as well as exit 
from the State. In other words, J & K was virtually an 
independent republic within republic of India. Mirza Afzal 
Beg, who was Chairman of Committee on fundamental rights, 
while speaking in Kashmir Constituent Assembly announced 
"Kashmir will be an independent republic within the Union 
of India. There will be no President in the republic of 
Kashmir and separate National Assembly, as also a separate 
judiciary". All this was because of Article 370 and Delhi 
Agreement. 
In this way Sheikh Abdullah and his National 
Conference tried to run the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 
which was termed as separatist politics by some leaders of 
Praja Parishad in Jammu. 
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At this time some elements in the State particularly 
in Jammu under the leadership of Pt. Prem Nath Dogra rose 
to the occasion and resolved to oppose the politics of 
Nehru-Sheikh combine for disintegration of the country. 
Praja Parishad submitted a memorandum to Rashtrapati on 
June 19, 1952 and stressed the need for firm and final 
accession of the State to India. When no heed was paid to 
the behaviour of the State Government, Praja Parishad 
started Satyagraha, demanding full integration of J & K 
with the Indian Union, abrogation of Article 370, full 
application of Union Constitution to the State, abolition 
of custom duty and permit system. Pt. Prem Nath Dogra, 
Shyam Lai Sharma alongwith 200 volunteers offered first 
Satyagraha on 23rd of November, 1952. The movement was 
symbolised by the slogan "Ek Desh Main Do Vidhan Do Nihan 
Do Pardhan, Nahin Challenge, Nahin Challenge". 
The intensity of the movement affected most of the 
families in the region. Leaders of the movement used to 
carry Indian National Flag, photo of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, 
and copy of the Indian Constitution with them while 
offering Satyagraha. At National level, the movement was 
supported by Jan Sangh under the leadership of Dr. Shyama 
Prasad Mukherjee. 
Dr. Mukherjee declared at Delhi, "l will go to 
Kashmir without permit. I am a member of Parliament. I need 
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no permit to enter my own country". Subsequently, after 
touring throughout Haryana, Punjab, he entered into the 
Kashmir on 11th May 1953 with the permit. He was arrested 
at Ravi Bridge by the J & K Police and his death was 
announced on June 23, 1953. Senior leaders l^ 'k© Rafi Ahmad 
and Maulana Azad were sent to Kashmir but Sheikh Abdullah 
ignored their advice. Pandit Nehru ordered the arrest of 
Sheikh Abdullah on August 9, 1953, when he felt Sheikh of 
becoming unmanageable with his clear signals of separating 
the State of J & K from the dominion of India. 
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3. ELECTIONS IN J & K SINCE 1951 
The first election in J & K after independence and 
its accession to India was held in October 1951 to a 
Constituent Assembly which was to draft the State's 
Constitution and also to serve as the Legislature until the 
next elections. 
All the 75 seats were won by the ruling National 
Conference led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. As many as 73 
of its candidates were returned unopposed when nominations 
closed on August 30. In two other constituencies, the NC 
defeated Independents. The elected Assembly drafted the 
State's Constitution and the Government produced by it is 
responsible for extending several provisions of the 
Constitution of India to the State. Successive State 
Governments, elected likewise, accelerated the process 
reducing Article 370 to a husk. In August 1953 Sheikh 
Abdullah was unconstitutionally dismissed from the Prime 
Ministership and put in prison. His successor, Bakhshi 
Ghulam Mohammad rigged the polls in 1957 and 1962 to New 
Delhi's satisfaction and his own personal gain. 
The elections of 1957 were the first after the 
adoption of the State's own constitution. This time, NC 
led by Bakhshi won 68 out of 75 seats. The seven seats that 
the opposition bagged were in Jammu region. In 1962, 
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Bakhshi won 70 seats and lost three to Praja Parishad in 
Jammu region. It was after these elections that Nehru 
wrote to Bakhshi saying, "it would have helped your 
credibility, if you had managed to lose a few more seats". 
In the next elections, in 1967, Congress led by G.M 
Sadiq won 61 seats with 53 percent votes polled. This time 
too, the nomination papers of 118 opposition candidates 
were rejected, affecting 39 out of 75 constituencies. It 
was for the first time that the National Conference lost 
the elections. This time, the credit for rigging the 
elections and also of 1971 Lok Sabha elections, goes to 
G.M. Sadiq. The Plebicite Front was banned and 
demoralised. 
On March 22, 1959, the Plebiscite Front gave up its 
boycott of polls. Sheikh and Beg, now free, decided to 
contest elections which were due in April and requested 
their postponement by a letter dated April 3, 1969. The 
EC's Secretary K. S. Rajagopalan, cited Sheikh's statement 
to allege that he intended to use the polls for disrupting 
the sovereignty and integrity of India and rejected the 
request though the Plebiscite Front's candidates were 
ready to take the prescribed oath. 
In the 1972 elections, the National Conference did 
not participate and the day was carried by Congress. In 
1977, the National Conference under the leadership of 
Sheikh Abdullah bagged 47 seats followed by 13 by the 
Janata Party. The State again went to polls in 1983 and the 
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National Conference secured an absolute majority. The 
National Conference - Congregr% (i) alliance secured 
absolute majority in the elections of 1987. 
There is no serious challenge to the fairness of the 
Lok Sabha polls in the State in 1.977, 1980 and 1984 or the 
Assembly polls in 1977, and 1983. But against the record 
since 1951, the rigging of 1987 elections to the State 
Assembly proved to be the proverbial last straw on the 
Camel's back. Sacked in July 1984, Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
could return to power in November 1986 only after he had 
agreed to share power with the Congress (T). The shot-gun 
marriage ex^ icted its toll. In the elections to the State 
Assembly held in 1987, the National Conference won 39, the 
Congress (I) 24, the MUF 4, the BJP 2 and Independents 4 
seats. 
After a long gap of about nine years, the 
Parliamentary elections were held in the State in May 1996. 
The elections were boycotted by National Conference, All 
Party Hurriyat Conference. In such circumstances Congress 
(I) swept the elections by bagging 4 seats out of the total 
of 6 seats followed by Janata Dal one and BJP one. 
The Parliamentary elections were followed by 
Assembly elections in the record four phases in September 
1995. National Conference gave up its demand of autonomy as 
a pre-condition for its participation in the election, on 
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the assurance of H.D. Deve Gowda's Government for 
of 
discussing the issue/granting maximum autonomy to the State 
with the elected representatives of the State. In this elec-
tion, National Conference secured absolute majority for the 
formation of the government. The final party position in 
the elections is as follows; 
Total Seats 87 
Elections held 87 
National Conference 57 
BJP 08 
Congress (l) 07 
Bahujan Samaj Party 04 
Janata Dal 05 
Panthers Party 01 
CPI (M) 01 
Congress (T) 01 
Awami League 01 
Independents 02 
One independent candidate later joined in the 
National Conference, thereby increasing the tally of 
National Conference up to 58. 
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4. PROMINENT POLITICAL PARTIES 
Since the day of India's independence and Kashmir's 
accession to the dominion of India, there has been a 
number of political parties in the past, some of which 
presently in existence in the State are given as under: 
4.1 National Conference 
4.2 All Party Hurriyat Conference 
4.3 Awami League 
4.4 Indian National Congress 
4.5 Bharatiya Janata Party 
4.6 Janata Dal 
4.1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
National Conference has a fifty year old set-up and 
ruled the state for about 30 years. Headed by Chief 
Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the party has been prime 
target to militants throughout the years of turmoil. About 
50 of its leaders and workers fell to the bullets of 
militants, the number includes various former ministers 
and legislators. Dr. Farooq Abdullah is a strong 
campaigner but indifferent administrator, behind whom all 
non-Congress secular parties have rallied in the 
elections of 1996. 
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4.1.1 Pre-Independence Period 
National Conference was earlier known as Muslim 
Conference. But the name was transformed into National 
Conference after Party's Working Committee meeting on 28th 
June 1938 at Srinagar, the resolution for the 
transformation of Muslim Conference into National 
Conference was passed. The first session of the party was, 
however, held in the end of September 1939 and among other 
things, it ratified the documents known as the National 
Demand. The Party thus began to carry out its activities on 
the lines of Indian National Congress. Till today, National 
Conference is one of the most popular and very well 
organised political parties of the J & K State. 
The J & K Constitution of 1939 superseded the 1934 
constitution with little reforms. By the end of 1943, 
Maharaja inaugurated some more constitutional reforms in 
the State and the elected members were appointed as 
ministers. But the National Conference leadership regarded 
these reforms as half-hearted measures. They were 
struggling for a representative government, and were not 
satisfied with a puppet assembly and a council of ministers 
responsible only to Maharaja. In its annual session on 29 
and 30 September, 1944 at Sopore, National Conference 
approved a manifesto, 'NAYA KASHMIR' as its objective. The 
Party in its memorandum to the Cabinet Mission (1946) criti-
cised the working of the J & K Constitution of 1939. 
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In May 1946, the National Conference launched a mass 
movement known as Quit Kashmir, which challenged the 
validity of the Treaty of Amritsar, 1946. It was a struggle 
of the people in the State against autocracy. The 
government was fully prepared to wipe off the popular 
movement. Milit?»ry squads paraded the streets of Srinagar 
all day and night. Army was posted at all the important 
points. Despite all this, the movement went on and the 
National Conference proved to be the best organised party 
on non-communal lines with the nationalistic outlook, 
experienced leaders and progressive programmes of its own. 
4.1.2 Post-Independence Period 
Sheikh Abdullah took over as the head of the 
Emergency ndministration in the wake of the brutal Tribal-
cum-Pakistan invasion of J ^ K. Just after the installation 
of popular government in the State in 1948, the National 
Conference leadership devoted their attention towards 
translating the dream o^ 'NAYA KASHMIR" into a reality. The 
first major thing, the National Conference government did 
was the passage of the Big Landed Estate Abolition Act and 
transferred land to the tillers. As a result thousands of 
poor peasants were relieved from exploitation. 
In order to end the state of uncertainty created by 
^ . . . 
the Pak invasion a^ also the consequent inability of the 
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U.N. to undo it, the General Council of the National 
Conference issued in recognition of the Kashmiris right to 
self-determination, a mandate to its supreme National 
Executive for the convening of the State Assembly for the 
purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of 
the State. 
The party leadership have succeeded in giving a 
separate distinctive constitutional personality to the 
State. Because of their constant and forceful struggle the 
aspirations of Kashmiri Nationalism has been spelt out in 
Article 370 of the Constitution of India, Delhi Agreement 
of 1952, the salient features of which were: 
i) the abolition of monarchy; 
ii) the desire to have an elected head of the state; 
iii) separate flag; and 
iv) a separate emblem. 
In short, the National Conference under the 
chrismatic leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, who had ever 
symbolised Kashmiri Nationalism and Farooq Abdullah 
stressed the autonomous position ot the State within the 
Indian Polity. The National Conference under the leadership 
of Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad stood for and achieved 
ratification of the State's accession with India. The 
National Conference during 1964-1971, under the 
nationalistic leadership of G.M. Sadiq, hovrever, found ripe 
time for progressive integration of Kashtrirwith India. The 
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then National Conference Government, therefore, took many 
steps including the extension of some of the beneficial 
Union Laws to the State, the extension to the Congress 
activities and the merger of the National Conference with 
the Indian National Congress on 26 January, 1965. 
The National Conference was revived again in July 
1975 by Sheikh Abdullah. It was a logical corollary of the 
historic Indira-Sheikh accord of 1975. 
After getting an absolute majority in 1977 Assembly 
elections, the National Conference leadership tried to 
revive the pre-1953 policies of the party. Under the 
dynamic leadership of Farooq Abdullah, the Party emerged 
again as the most popular and well-organised party of the 
State. It succeeded in -securing a majority of seats in all 
the assembly elections till today. 
The party is particularly suited to evolve a 
composite personality of the State by harmonising the 
diverse regional personalities and accommodating their 
respective needs and sentiments. The party is organised on 
the basis of a federal structure with provincial committees 
for each of the three regions of the state. It also 
proposes to reorganise the internal constitutional set up 
of the State on similar lines which would provide regional 
autonomy and help further decentralise political power 
through appropriate institutional arrangements at the 
district, block and village levels. 
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4.1.3 Party Ideology, Programme and Politics 
The National Conference held its annual session on 
29 and 30 September, 1944 at Sopore and unanimously 
approved the 'NAYA KASHMIR' as the party programme and 
ideology/manifesto. The 'NAYA KASHMIR' was declared to be an 
objective of the party. Consisting of two parts 
constitutional and economic, it is radical, dynamic and 
historic document providing blueprints for the replanning 
and rebuilding of the state on secular, socialistic and 
democratic lines. Politically, it proposes to democratise 
the whole governmental structure from village panchayat 
right upto the National Assembly, linking it with the 
independence of judiciary on the one hand and responsible 
executive on the other. 
In the economic sphere, it envisages a planned 
economy on a socialistic pattern. The first part of the 
•NAYA KASHMIR'covers: 
i. citizenship; ii. national assembly; iii. council 
of ministers; iv. ruler; v. justice; vi. local 
administration; and vii. national language. 
The second part underlines the need for the setting 
up of a National Agriculture Council to execute and 
supervise the national agriculture plan, the basic 
principles of which would be: 
i. abolition of landlordism; ii. land to the tiller; 
iii. cooperative associations iv. feeding the people 
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as its primary objective; and v. people's control 
of the forests. 
It also proposes nationalisation of key industries 
on the principles of: 
i. abolition of big private capitalists; ii. state 
management of all key industries; iii. abolition of 
private monopoly - whether formal or virtual; and 
iv. constitution of a national industrial council 
for the implementation of the policy. 
4.1.4 Factionalism and Defections 
If factionalism is taken purely as a struggle for 
power, there was no factionalism as such in the National 
Conference in the 1940s, the reason being that upto 1947, 
the National Conference was leading a movement against the 
autocratic government of the Dogra dynasty. It was in the 
mid-1949 that the first breach in the National Conference 
had taken place, when G.M. Karrar, who was not given a 
place in the first Cabinet which Sheikh Abdullah formed 
under the Maharaja. He then formed a new political party, 
named the Kashmir Conference in June 1953. 
After some time, some form of factional activities 
crept in, though in a highly subdued form, the Sheikh 
Abdullah did not seem to have taken any cognizance of it. 
Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad was heading the faction. It did not 
come in the open until 1953 when Sham Lai Saraf was asked 
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to resign from the Cabinet on the ground of his having made 
a statement against the Prime Minister of the State. This 
faction ultimately succeeded in getting the Sheikh Ministry 
dismissed on 9th August, 1953 and then capturing power 
itself. 
After Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953, a new kind 
of factionalism developed in the party spearheaded by the 
pro-Sheikh faction led by M.A. Beg. But after assuming 
power at the outster of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi had been 
able to maintain dominance in the Party. 
The State's new constitution was enforced on 26 
January, 1957. The people of the State were to go to polls 
for electing the legislature under the new constitution. 
There was, however, some dissatisfaction over the selection 
of the party candidates, which led to the emergence of a 
new faction led by G.M. Sadiq. The dissention within the 
party came into open when the Sadiq faction nominated G.R. 
Roengen for the Legislative Council in late 1957. Besides 
this, Sadiq faction had also been vehemently insisting on 
the inclusion of all the members of the previous government 
of Bakhshi in the new government which Bakhshi was to form 
after the 1957 Assembly elections. But Bakhshi was not 
favourably disposed to the suggestion. G.M. Sadiq and D.P. 
Dhar also accused G.M. Bakhshi by levelling a number of 
charges against him. Later on, they resigned from the 
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working committee and defected away from the party and 
formed a new party, named the Democratic National 
Conference. However, with the intervention of the Central 
leadership, Sadiq dissolved his party and again joined the 
National Conference. 
C M . Bakhshi's resignation from the State politics 
under the Kamraj pan led again to the emergence of the same 
old intra party factionalism. With the deliberate 
subverting of the election of C M . Sadiq as the new party 
leader in October, 1963 by the Bakhshi faction again pushed 
the party into a worst kind of factional politics. Kh. 
Shams-ud-Din was, however, unanimously elected as leader of 
the Legislatve Party and thus became the Prime Minister of 
the State. 
The intra-party factionalism became more serious 
durijTig^ S^hntasj^ oKl^ Xiiri^ regijne because of the theft of the Holy 
Relic from the Hazaratbal shrine. Thus led to a large scale 
arson, loot and violence and ultimately to the handling 
over of power by Shams-ud-Din ministry to C M . Sadiq. 
Afterwards, the pro-Bakhshi faction tried to topple the 
Sadiq TTiinis try but in vaiji. 
The factional politics, however, dragp:ed on. When 
the Sadiq ministry decided to merge the N&tional C©ni"erence 
with the Indian National Congress with a view to becoming a 
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party of the mainstream national politics. Twenty pro-
Bakhshi members of the State legislature informed the 
Speaker that they would continue to belong to National 
Conference. This phase of factionalism, however, ended with 
the death of Bakhshi and the resultant disappearance of the 
faction. 
On assuming power again in 1975 after a lapse of 22 
years under the Indira-Sheikh accord. Sheikh Abdullah 
decided to revive the National Conference. In 1977 state 
assembly elections, the newly revived National Conference 
returned to power with a comfortable majority. Again, the 
factional trouble emerged in the National Conference. M.A. 
Beg, one of the most trusted and the closest lieutenants of 
Sheikh Abdullah, sponsored the candidature of his son-in-
law for the State Legislative Council. The voting pattern 
revealed that some members of the ruling party had voted 
for Beg's son-in-law. At this, Sheikh Abdullah suspected 
the bonafides of M.A. Beg. In order to test his sincerity 
towards him. Sheikh asked the members of the ruling party 
to take an oath of personal loyality and allegiance to the 
party leader, which step M.A. Beg did not approve of. 
Therefore, Sheikh relieved him from the Cabinet Ministry. 
It marked the climax of the factional crises of this phase. 
Feeling humiliated, M.A. Beg defected from the National 
Conference and formed Inqalabi National Conference. He and 
his few supporters started sitting separately in the State 
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Assembly. There was also a danger of further defection in 
the National Conference as well as the Assembly. The 
latter, therefore, moved an Anti-Defection Bill and got it 
passed by the State Assembly. 
In the last days of his life, Sheikh Abdullah 
declared his son, Farooq Abdullah, as his successor and got 
him elected to the presidentship of National Conference. 
This was resented by G.M. Shah, a Cabinet Minister and the 
son-in-law of Sheikh Abdullah, for he has considered 
himself as second in command in the party. The factional 
fight once again started in the party. This time it was led 
by G.M. Shah. 
After Sheikh's death in 1982, Farooq Abdullah became 
the Chief Minister with the blessings of the Central 
leadership. He did not include a single member of the 
erstwhile council of ministers in his ministry as most of 
them were supporters of G.M. Shah. As a result, the Shah 
faction started organising itself and looking for an 
opportunity to topple the Farooq ministry. Shah did not 
even hesitate to take the help of the Pradesh Congress 
through D.D. Thakur who was a member of Sheikh Abdullah's 
last cabinet. The climax of this factional fight came on 
22nd July 1984 when 12 members of the Assembly belonging to 
the ruling party and one independent member accompanied 
Shah to the leader of Congress (I) Legislative Party and 
pleaded that Farooq Abdullah had lost the confidence of the 
majority of the members of the Assembly. Farooq Abdullah 
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wanted that the loss of confidence be decided on the floor 
of the Assembly and if that was not somehow acceptable to 
others, that Assembly might be dissolved. Jagmohan the 
Governor at that time did not find any justification in 
accepting either of the two suggestions. Instead he 
dismissed the Farooq ministry and appointed G.M. Shah as 
the Chief Minister of the State. 
The factional politics between the National 
Conference (Farooq) and the National Conference (Khalida), 
further intensified and wriggled on until the end of the 
Shah ministry. When in the wake of the Farooq-Rajiv Accord, 
Farooq returned to power, the intensity of the fight 
lessened. 
4.1.5 Electoral Alliances 
Alliance in the electoral process refers to one of 
those pre-poll strategies that political parties and 
individual candidates adopt by which they enter into mutual 
electoral arrangement with one another in order to win an 
election. The National Conference had contested most of the 
Assembly elections without any electoral alliance. It was 
in 1977 Assembly election that there took place talks, for 
the first time, for an electoral alliance between the 
National Conference and the Janata Party. But these talks 
ultimately failed and both the parties decided to go it 
alone. 
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It was in 1983 Assembly elections, that Farooq 
Abdullah reached an understanding with Nirwaiz Maulvi 
Farooq. As a result, there emerged a clear cut political 
polarisation b'^ tween the Jammu region and Kashmir region. 
Both the parties had made deep inroads into each others 
strong-holds. 
In 1985 parliamentary elections, the leaders of the 
National Conference (K) and the Congress (l) decided to 
contest elections jointly and to field candidates for all 
the six seats. To counter the National Conference (K) -
Congress (l) alliance, Farooq Abdullah made efforts to 
forge a United Front among the opposition parties of the 
State. But when unity talks failed to mature on account of 
ideological differences among various parties and their 
divergent approaches to the major political issues, 
Farooq's mother Begum Akbar Jahan intervened and an 
alliance was forged among the National Conference (F), the 
Awami Action Committee, the People's Conference and the 
Panther's Party. 
In the wake of Farooq-Rajiv Accord, Farooq's 
National Conference made an electoral alliance with the 
Indian Ntional Congress in the March 1987 Assembly 
elections. This alliance was forged with a view to winning 
over the estranged forces and thereby bringing them into 
the mainstream. On the other hand, the National Conference 
(K) tried to seek an electoral alliance with the MUF. The 
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talks for the alliance ultimately failed and National 
Conference (K) asked all its candidates to withdraw from 
the contest because the party was not in a position to bear 
heavy poll expenses. The ruling alliance of National 
Conference (F) and Congress (l), however, secured an 
absolute majority in 76-member State Assembly. 
After a long gap of about nine years, the State once 
again has to go for polls in 1996. In May 1996, the 
parliamentary elections were held in the State. The 
National Conference decided to boycott the elections until 
its demand for maximum autonomy be accepted by the Central 
government. But the party decided to participate in 
Assembly elections to be held in September 1996. At this 
time. National Conference decided to not put up any 
candidate from Pattan and Kulgam constituencies in the 
Valley where Maulvi Iftikhar Hussain Ansari of Congress (I) 
and M.Y. Tarigami of CPI (M) were contesting respectively. 
The National Conference also left seven seats for BSP 
candidates in the Jammu region while the two parties we-e 
pitted against each other in 23 segments. 
4.1.6 Electoral Performance 
Elections in a democracy are considered a process 
politics and may be regardeed as a procedure for 
agreegating preferences of a particular choice. It is the 
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only accepted deviance to determine which party or parties 
be accorded the authority for governance for a defined 
period of time, usually of 5 years in Indian Constitution 
and the Constitution of J & K. Election is, therefore, not 
only the barometer of democracy but indeed its life breath. 
The number of seats won by the J & K National 
Conference in State Assembly elections since 1951 are as 
follows: 
Year of Election No. of seats won 
1951 75 
1957 68 
1962 70 
1977 ' 47 
1983 46 
1987 43 
1996 57+1=58 
The National Conference has broad support base. It 
has been able to get support from all communities as well as 
all working classes. It is one of the most popular parties 
in the Kashmir region of the State. But in the Jammu 
region, the Muslim-dominated belts (Doda, Poonch, Rajouri, 
etc.) have invariably supported the National Conference. 
The party however, could not get a mass support in the 
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Hindu-dominated belts of Jammu region as well in Ladakh 
which is dominated by the Budhists. 
4.2 ALL PARTY HURRIYAT CONFERENCE 
The party is a conglomerate of Jamat-e-Islami, JKLF, 
People's Confer?^nce, People's League and about a two dozen 
other groups whichhave been spearheading the secessionist 
movement. This organisation was founded on September 3, 
1993. The founding members, who took nearly nine months to 
form the organisation, after conceiving it on December 17, 
1992, have not been able to take a decisive stand on 
important issues. The founding members who met at the 
residence of Moulvi Omar Farooqma#? an agreement that there 
shold be a united forum of all political and social 
organisations in the valley. There was hardly any unity 
among the members about the principal objectives. After 
nine months of deliberations, all that could be agreed to 
was that the APHC should work for the liberation of Kashmir 
from India leaving the issue of its accession to Pakistan 
or independence to be decided at the later date. An 
executive committee was formed with Mirwaiz Omar Farooq as 
Chairman and Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Abdul Ghani Lone, 
Moulvi Abbas Ansari, S. Hamid, Ghulam Rasool and Prof. 
Abdul Ghani as members. 
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In New Delhi, the formation of the organisaf'on was 
watchefi with interest. The liberal intellectuals felt the 
ConfeTencs to help in starting discussions to find a 
peaceful solution to the problems in the State. There have 
been sporadic efforts to engage APHC members in a dialogue 
to explore a peaceful solution. All visiting delegations to 
Srinagar met its members, but return invariably with the 
feeling of disintegration in the APHC leaders among 
themselves and also under the spell of Pij^ bul Mujahideen 
and the Jamat-ee-Islami. 
It was only natural that the APHC leadership felt it 
to concentrate more on activities in New Delhi and abroad. 
It ventured out of the valley in April 1994, when a four 
member team consisting of Moulv- Abbas Ansari, Prof. Abdul 
Ghani, G.M.Bhat and Mufti Bahau'i-^ din Farooqi met senior 
officials inthe US and riembers of the Indian Press. Thisvas 
followed by APHC delegationattending the meeting of foreign 
ministers of QIC countries in Rawalpindi in September, 
1994, visiting Casablanca to attend the QIC summit in 1994, 
sending a delegation to the UN Human Rights Conference in 
Geneva in 1995, deputing Mirwaiz Omar Farooq to attend the 
meeting of the contract group of the QIC in New York and 
present its case to delegates to the United Nations and the 
Non-Aligned Movement at Cartagena. 
Within the Hurr^yat, there have been renewed efforts 
to forge unity. Shabir Shah, who was released from the 
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detention in 1994, proposed that the 36 constituents of the 
APHC should merge themselves in the organisation and have a 
common programme and a common leader, which was rejected by 
Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Later on, Shabir Shah agreed to 
attend the meetings of APHC. So did Yasin Malik of JKLF to 
forge unity among the different warring groups, but the 
efforts did not met with any success instead, they provoked 
hostility. 
4.2.1 Kashmir Awareness Bureau 
Kashmir Awareness Bureau was opened in New Delhi on 
November 5, 1995. At the inaugural function held at Pragati 
Maidan, several leaders including CPI stalwarts Inderjit 
Gupta and M. Farooqi and the present external affairs 
minister I.K. Gujrat and Subodh Kant Sahay were present and 
presented their point of view. Ved Bhasin, Editor of 
Kashmir Times, was Chairperson of the inaugural function. 
Ved Bhasim in his presidential address blamed the 
politicians of India, Pakistan and Kashmir for the present 
crisis in Kashmir. He said, "The mistakes done by the 
leaders in the past resulted in missery of common people of 
India, Pakistan and Kashmir. Today Kashmir is bleeding , 
Kashmiri youth are killed at random, and Kashmiri women are 
being subjected to molestation and even raped. Despite 
knowing the crux of the Kashmir problem, the leadership at 
New Delhi is turning blind eye to it and continue to shower 
excesses on innocent Kashmiris". 
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The opening of Kashmir Awareness Bureau office in 
New Delhi was said to be a positive step where APHC has 
opened the door for dialogue. All the national and 
political observers who attended the inaugural function 
appealed to the Government of India to observe unilateral 
cease-fire and remove all security bunkers from the valley. 
They also hoped the APHC leadership to request all militant 
organisations to observe cease-fire. 
The role of gun was lau'^ ed by everyone who supports 
the onp;oing struggle of Kashmiris. Though the international 
comminnity has been mount ing pressure on the Government of 
India to solve the Kashmir problem and avoid further 
bloodshed. All Kashmiri leaders advocated the right to 
self-determination and approved their readiness to talk 
with the Indian government provided India to forget about 
election drama and accept Kashmir to be a dispute between 
three parties - India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. 
Mohammad Yasin Malik told the gathering about the 
historical perspective of the Kashmir tangle. He said that 
if Gandhi would have been alive today, he would have 
observed fast unto death to force Indian Security forces to 
stop excesses in Kashmir. He also blamed Government of 
India for enforcing exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir 
just to give communal colour to the ongoing freedom 
struggle. He told that there are more than 25000 Kashmiri 
Pandits still living in Kashmir and are happy. 
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The setting up of Kashmir Awareness Bureau in New 
Delhi just with an aim to educate Indian masses about the 
happenings in Kashmir and mobilize their opinion in favour 
of Kashmiris cause. The Indian leaders at the helm of 
affairs as well as opposition party leaders, ar^ 
deliberately keeping the Kashmir pot boiling for achieving 
their political ends. If one takes Kashmir Awareness Bureau 
by its name, it means that its office bearers will trace 
the belts within India and launch programmes beamed at 
Indian audience which 8^ percent lives in rural areas and 
will mobilize their opinion about freedom struggle in 
Kashmir. 
4.2.2 Poll Issue 
All Party Hurriyat Conference is a strong advocate 
of right to self-determination for the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The party has always condemned the elections in 
the State and rejected any such move. The Party was also 
involved in the anti-election campaign during the 
Parliamentary and Assembly elections. Most of its leaders 
including Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Yasin Malik, Maulvi Umar 
Farooq, Shabir Shah and Moulvi Abbas Ansari were subjected 
to House Arrest during the elections. Party continues to be 
the National Conference's main opposition block, especially 
since the electoral process has polarised all the players 
in the fray along the line pro-India and pro-independence. 
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Comprising leaders from ideological hues as diverse 
as pro-secession and pro-liberation, the APHC - which lost 
its platform to the National Conference because of its 
rigid stand on a United Nations held plebicite - is 
currently being remote controlled by militant groups which 
in turn are being run by Pakistan. Caught in a situation 
of their own mailing, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Umar Farooq 
and Abdul Ghani Lone, who are in favour of dialogue, find 
themselves supporting groups which are responsible for the 
killing of their own family members and friends. 
Their likely strategy: to cash in on the mistakes 
that Farooq Abdullah is bound to make in an effort to 
re-establish their own credibility, to reactivate their 
military armed grops which are dormant at the moment to 
destabilise Farooq Abdullah and to keep their not 
so-secret channels of communication open with Mufti Syeed 
in the Congress and leaders like Mohammad Shafi Uri in the 
National Conference so as to create an atmosphere where the 
Government at the Centre acknowledges them as a lobby that 
it may have to open dialogue with. 
APHC, which consistently vouches for the separation 
of Kashmir from India and establishment of Nizarae-Mustafa 
has sharply criticised the talks between the Central Home 
Minister S.B. Chavan and the militant leaders Babar Badr, 
Bilal Lodhi, Ghulam Mohiuddin and Tmran Rahi and repeated 
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the earlier refrain that any solution to the Kashmir 
problem should be found through a tripartite dialogue among 
India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
4.2.3 Shabir Shah's Suspension 
Shabir Shah, known as the Nelson Mandela of Kashmir 
among the supporters, was expelled on charges of 
indiscipline and defying collective decisions of the party. 
Shah has also been charged with promoting himself rather 
than working for the movement, interacting with former 
Prime Minister V.P. Singh and taking part in an anti-
election campaign in Jammu during the Lok Sabha polls 
without the consent of APHC. 
Shabir Shah's expulsion was hastened by his meeting 
with US Ambassador Frank Wisner in Srinagar. The APHC 
executive had decided against meeting Wisner because of his 
alleged remarks in favour of elections in Jammu and Kashmir. 
However, Shabbir Shah defied the dictat and held a three-
hour meeting with the envoy and also hosted a lunch in his 
honour. The APHC executive took a serious view of the 
defiance and Shabir Shah was asked for an explanation. 
None was given and Shah abstained from three APHC executive 
meetings. 
Shabir Shah has openly ridiculaed the APHC 
leadership for its childish behaviour and described his 
expulsion as unfortunate from the party. According to 
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Shabir Shah, the charges levelled against him are frivolous 
and APHC, functioning like an ostrich ignoring the changes 
taking place all around. 
In fact, Shabir Shah has been striving to bring 
about unanimity within the Hurriyat Conference ever since 
his release. Acclaimed as the Prisoner of conscience by the 
Amnesty International representative, Shabir Shah called 
for the merger of all the constituents of Hurriyat 
Conference. He wanted a common programme of action to be 
evolved and the organisation to have one leader. His 
statetnents were seem as a threat by the other leaders and 
the siio-<^ estions were peremptorily dismissed by the senior 
leader/the Hurriyat Conference, Syed Ali Shah Geelani. 
The suspension of Shabir Shah from the APHC, which 
was announced on August 8, 1996, may have meant a setback 
for the political career of the People's Leage leader, but 
the greater loss has been that of the Hurriyat Conference 
itself. Evef since his release from captivity nearly two 
years ago, Shabir Shah has been trying to give some focus 
to the activities of the APHC, but all his efforts have 
been in vain. 
4.3 AWAMI LEAGUE 
Jammu and Kashmir Awami League is generally referred 
to as a Kukka Parray group. Almost reverred by the Congress 
41 
and some sections of the people for their contribution to 
the turn around in the valley, the Awami League, of which 
the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon is the military wing, is the bete 
noire of all the others. 
Awami League Chairman Mohd Yousuf Parray alias Kukka 
Parray, also known as Jamsheed Sheerazi, entered militancy 
as founder of the Pro-Pak Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen. It was at a 
time when another more fundamentalist pro-Pak outfit, the 
Hizbul Mujahideen, held sway over the region and gunned for 
Kukka Parrey's men, killing many of them. Not even 
Ikhwan's patron , Qazi Nisar, the Mirwaiz of South Kashmir 
was spared the death penalty. 
Rattled militants of the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen soon 
joined forces with the Rashtriya Rifles which protected, 
funded and armed them in return for help in fighting the 
Hizbul Mujahiideen. The Ikhwan men tipped off the security 
forces on Hizbul hideouts, guided the soldiers to their 
locations and eliminated them by the scores. People heaved 
a sigh of relief, for the Hizbul's guest militants had been 
running aback in the villages. Later on the Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimeen became Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon and its members began 
doing what the Hizbul men had become notorious for. 
The general perception is that the Awami League, 
which was formed in December last and became a registered 
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political party on August 19, 1996, is also patronised by 
the security forces. Javaid Ahmad Sha\i, who was 
vice-Chairman of Awami League dismissed it as baseless that 
the security forces are helping them. 
The plan of action of the Awami League was unfolded 
by Kukka Parrey himself when he addressed a press 
conference in Jammu during the last week of March, 1996. He 
said that his party stood for a 'clean-up operation, 
prevention of poll time intimidation and the return and 
rehabilitation of Kashimiri Pandit migrants". He also said 
that the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon would not contest the 
election, but would not stand in the way of newly 
created party, the Awami League, from contesting the 
elections. 
Many of the leaders and party-workers have become 
the target of the pro-Pak militant groups, after the 
parliamentary polls in the state. Kukka Parrey dismissed 
his party's participation in the Assembly polls when five 
counting agents of his party were gunned down by the pro-
Pak militants. But later on the assurance of Governer K.V. 
Krishna Rao that better security arrangements would be made 
in favour of Awami League leaders and their relatives and 
properties as also taking up some developmental works, 
Awami League decided to participate in the polls for the 
Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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Kukka Parrey has also described Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
as the only leader of Jammu and Kashmir having guts to 
fight with the militancy and announced his full support to 
National Conference for the restoration of peace and 
autonomy, '^ ircka Cnn for rincc for i;'':s rentont-'on cf .-^ ':: '-T^ 
r^\' ^.- '-^ :- y. Kukka Parrey's commitment to nationalist cause 
may be operating through channels which are over-
enthusiastically violent but, at the same time, the Kukka 
Parrey phenomenon of counter-terrorism holds out the age-
old message that injudiciously perpetrated terrorism gets 
defeated eventually by bigger terrorism, that peace 
sometimes is the purpose of war. Amid the cocophony of 
self- styled, self-glorified revolutionists, the question 
that concerns the common man is - who are the real culprits 
behind the suicidal orgy unleashed in the Valley? Or to put 
ka 
it poetically, "Mainkis ko Qatl/llzam Doon Zamane Mein? Har 
Ek Shakhs Farishta Dikhaayi Deta Hai!" 
4.3.1 Factionalism 
The Jammu and Kashmir Awami League led by Kukka 
Parrey got a great setback when Javed Ahmad Shah announced 
his groups merger with National Conference on October 21, 
1996. Several of its leaders have merged with Congress at 
the eve of Assembly elections in the State. There was a 
debacle between Javed Ahmad Shah and Kukka Parrey, both 
describing themselves to be the sole representatives of 
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Awami League and asserting expulsion of each other from 
the party. 
Announcing his groups merger with National 
Conference on October 21, 1996, Javed Ahmad Shah said that 
the massive mandate to the National Conference in the 
Assembly elections indicated that the National Conference 
is the overwhelming voice of the people of the Jamrau and 
Kashmir and there is no need to continue with any other 
party and the people's verdict must be respected. 
Javed Ahmad Shah was the supreme commander of the 
pro-Pak Al-Fateh in the guise of Abdul Rab Rasool. As 
Qutubdin Hayazi, he held the same rank in the Jehad Force, 
another pro-Pak outfit. When he consciously became pro-
India in June 1994, he was supreme commander Ansar-ul-Haq 
of the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon outfit.Javed advocated National 
Conference stand on the restoration of autonomy and said 
that its position on autonomy reflected the aspirations of 
the State and the Government of India should accede to this 
demand. 
Javed Ahmad Shah broke away from Kukka Parray during 
Assembly elections and withdrew from the contest in favour 
of the National Conference after a meeting with Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah. He also campaigned for the National Conference 
candidates. 
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4.3.2 Poll Performance 
A great deal of debate was organised in Jammu and 
Kashmir on the question of participation by former 
militants in the parliamentary elections. At the Centre of 
the controversy was the Awami League, the political wing of 
the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, led by Kukka Parrey. The Awami 
League fought for three parlimentary constituencies from 
the State, all from the Kashmir valley, but could not get 
the mandate from any constituency. Later on, the Party 
alleged it to be the poll ringing by Congress workers and 
demanded repoll in several assembly segments, but all in 
vain. 
The party fought the Assembly elections on the 37 
Assembly constituencies after the assurance by the Governor 
K.V. Krishna for providing better security arrangements to 
its leaders and workers. The party could win in the only 
Assembly constituency of Hajjan, from where Mohd. Yousuf 
Parrey, popularly known as Kukka Carrey was declared 
victorious. 
4.4 INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 
4.4.1 Origin 
The Congress party in fact never got success in 
establishing a base in Kashmir. The party has been 
restricted to the Jammu region or Ladakh region. The 
46 
Congress leaders and workers, like National Conference 
leaders and workers, also happen to be a target of 
militants in Kashmir in the years of turmoil. Most of party 
leaders, however, left the valley in the beginning of 
1990s. The party revived its activities with the help of 
surrendered militants. In the absence of National 
Conference, Congress party could manage to win 4 
parliamentary seats in the State. 
Congress (l) as a party of national status has never 
been accepted by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It has 
emerged in the State since 1947, but could win the 
elections for the first time in 1967, with 61 seats out of 
the total of 75" under the leadership of G.M. Sadiq, with 
53% votes polled. Congress ruled the State for about ten 
years from 1962-1972, when the NC's legend Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah was put behind the bars. G.M. Sadiq is also 
responsible for the extension of Congress activities to the 
State and the merger of the National Conference with the 
Indian National Congress on 26th January, 1965. 
4.4.2 Factionalism and Defections 
Factionalism was relatively unknown during the days 
of Jawaharlal Nehru. Party played a vital role in making 
defections in the National Conference in the 1960's when 
G.M. Sadiq merged into Congress with a view to becoming a 
party of the mainstream national politics. Another attempt 
of making defections in National Conference was after the 
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death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982, when Farooq Abdullah 
assumed the office as Chief Minister. Pradesh Congress 
helped the rival National Conference faction led by CM. 
Shah to plead Farooq's ministry of having lost the majority 
in the Assembly. The party then succeeded to topple 
Farooq's ministry and the then Governor Jagmohan sacked the 
Farooq Government and appointed G.M. Shah as Chief Minister 
of the state. 
The party, however, got a jolt when Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed joined Janata Dal in 1987. Mufti is a practical 
politician, who always likes to plunge into action. He 
knows each and every worker of Congress and has a personal 
rapport with him. He has the potential of carrying with him 
different persons with divergence of interests. However, 
Mufti resigned from Janata Dal and joined again in the 
Congress party in August 1996. 
For over the last three years, Congress has been 
beset with dissidence, with Main Bashir and Moulvi Iftikhar 
Ansari unable to agree with Ghulam Rasool Kar, the 
President of the Pradesh Congress Committee. Repeated 
efforts by Central leaders to bring the factions together 
has not succeeded. Mian Bashir, however, later joined into 
the National Conference. Moulvi Iftikhar Ansari, a bitter 
critic of the Congress, severely criticised the induction 
of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in the Congress who represents 
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those forces against Farooq Abdullah. He is of the view 
that people like Ghulam Rasool Kar and the Mufti Sayeed are 
destroying the party. He dismissed his leaving from the 
Congress but claims to support every move which will bring 
Farooq Abdullah to power. Presently Iftikhar Ansari is 
serving as a Cabinet Minister in Farooq Abdullah's 
ministry. 
4.4.3 Power Politics 
Indian National Congress repeatedly made alliances 
with several regional parties of the State to achieve 
power. It ruled the state in 1960's, when G.M. Sadiq, a 
leader of National Conference faction, merged into Indian 
National Congress. Alliance in the electoral process, 
however, refers to one of those pre-poll strategies that 
political parties and individual candidates adopt by which 
they enter into mutual electoral arrangements with one 
another in order to win an election. These alliances are, 
therefore, formed in terms of either explicit pact or 
implicit avoidance. 
In the eve of Indira-Abdullah Accord in 1975, it 
would have been advisable for the leadership of National 
Conference to carry with them the workers of Congress also. 
This was not done. On the other hand National Conference 
tried to build edifice of their popularity on the debris of 
Congress. Hue and cry was raised. Syed Mir Qasim, who had 
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after the accord been shifted Delhi and saddled into 
Central Cabinet, in his usual manner could not afford to 
take cudgles with Sheikh Abdullah. Indira Gandhi felt that 
Sheikh Abdullah was riding roughshod. She wanted to 
counter- balance him. Simultaneously, Congress culture in 
the State was feeling choked. They had no role to play. 
Sheikh Abdullah did not even allow the basic members of 
Congress to get accommodated in village panchayats or local 
bodies. Congress may not be a mass based party in the 
valley but it has a formidable worker cadres. They could 
not even play an opposition role because Mir Qasim was not 
ready to approve of the same. The Congress workers rallied 
Mufti Sayeed. The workers flocked with Mufti because in him 
they found some element of dynamisms and personal touch 
which they had experienced with Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad. 
The admirers of Indira Gandhi plead that sponsorship of 
Mufti as against Sheikh Abdullah was a requirement in 
national interest, necessitated by the approach adopted by 
National Conference within the Valley and part of Jammu. 
Mufti instinctively an opposition leader,was seen to 
be at his best when days of power go. Congress beneath the 
shadow of Sheikh Abdullah seemed to have shrunk down. 
Ostensibly, coming into power of Janata Party and Indira 
Gandhi getting defeated, seemed to mean a total extinction 
of the Congress in the State. In a close-door meeting held 
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in Srinagar, Mufti concludes the agenda of the meeting by 
the following words: 
"Gentlemen, Indira Gandhi has lost. Congress is no 
more in power. We have so far been in Congress. I want to 
know who are the people out of you to remain with Congress 
hereafter. I am the first to declare that I will work in 
Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi though she 
never comes to power". 
This turned the meeting emotional and a large number 
of Congress workers got their names registered. A programme 
of going to streets was chalked out in the same meeting, 
processions were taken and dharnas were staged on political 
issues. 
In 1985 parliamentary elections the leaders of 
Congress and National Conference (K) decided to contest 
elections jointly and to field candidates for all the six 
seats. In pursuance of that alliance, Mrs. Khalida Shah, 
the president of the National Conference (K) declared that 
her party would work in close collaboration with the 
congress. In fact, such a declaration was nothing but a, 
reaffirmation of an earlier alliance between the two 
parties forged in July, 1984 when Pradesh Congress 
legislative party had decided to extend support to 13 
members of the National Conference (K) in the State 
Assembly with a view to outsing Farooq Abdullah. 
Accordingly Congress put up its candidates in four 
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constituencies and left two constituencies of the Valley-
Srinagar and Baramulla for the National Conference (K). 
The following years witnessed many developments on 
the chessboard of the State politics. The Farooq-Rajiv 
Accord brought about a radical change in the existing power 
pattern, nullifying the older alliances and florting the 
new ones. In March 1987 Assembly elections, the Indian 
National Congress entered into electoral alliance with the 
ruling faction of National Conference. The Congress 
contested a total of 31 seats out of which 6 seats in the 
Valley, 24 seats in the Jammu and one seat in Ladakh 
region. 
The hegemony enjoyed so far by Congress and National 
Conference has been of a particular nature. The two parties 
have somehow managed to remain on the better side of power 
for most of the times ever since fifties. It was only 
during the later phase of Sheikh Abdullah's leadership and 
the earlier phase of Farooq's entry, that inter-competition 
to power politics was provided by these two parties. 
Otherwise, two parties have been acting more or less as one 
unit either by way of convenient understanding, alliance or 
merger. One of the result of such a placement of these two 
parties has been the complete control over political power. 
And such a hegemonisation of po • itics has resulted in a 
hegemonic attitude of these parties in relation to Kashmir 
politics in general and power positions in particular. 
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The emerging political scenario has no scope for 
such hegemonisation of politics by Congress and the 
National Conference either on individual basis or in a 
combined form. And it is here that we can find the 
situational difference in the power politics of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
4.4.4 Election Performance 
The electorates in the State have strong commitment 
to socialism and democracy. The commitment to secularism is 
apparent from their outright rejection of the communal 
parties. 
Indian National Congress won a landslide victory in 
1957 and maintained its dominance in the Assembly, when 
National Conference merged with Congress. The support-base 
of the Congress seems to have shifted towards BJP to a 
•great extent and BSP too. The voters do not appear to have 
changed their loyalities, instead, they have changed their 
parties. 
In the recently concluded elections, where all the 
parties were drumming up the same issues - fighting the 
gun, disarming the renegades, concentrating on development 
and creating jobs for the unemployed, Congress showed a 
poor performance with only 7 wins throughout the State. 
Congress adopted a two fold strategy in the Valley: first, 
putting up its best candidates to lock horns with Farooq's 
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key contestants and second, the core of the strategy, its 
decision to dole out tickets to surrendered militants. 
Authored by Mufti Sayeed, who recently quit the JD to join 
the Congress because Deve Gowda chose to project Farooq 
rather than him, Sayeed - who had earlier quit the Congress 
because Rajiv Gandhi signed an accord with Farooq in 1986 -
seems to have a personalised one - point agenda: to making 
the going tough for Farooq. 
The number of seats won by the Indian National 
Congress since the day it emerged in the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir is as follows. The point to be mentioned here 
is that whatever seats it won in 1967 elections, were in 
the name of National Conference under the leadership of 
G.M. Sadiq. 
Year of Election Seats Won 
1967 61 
1972 39 
1977 11 
1983 26 
1987 26 
1996 07 
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4.5 BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY 
Bharatiya Janata Party came into existence first 
time in the elections of 1987 in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. The Party coul'^  get only 2 seats in that election. 
The party repeatedly claimed excesses on the Hindus of Doda 
District. 
In 1992, when there was Janata Dal Government in the 
Centre with the outside support of BJP, BJP organised an 
Ekta Yatra led by Dr. Murli Manohar Joshi to hoist the 
Indian Flag in the Lai Chowk with the participation of 
Kashmiri Pandits and some communal leaders of Jammu. The 
Ekta Yatra of BJP was criticised a great deal by many 
political observers, which exploits the sentiments of the 
people of the country in the name of Hindu Rashtra. The 
Ekta Yatra was also termed to be fruitful for the Kashmir 
Freedom struggle and a political death of the BJP and left 
the security forces in all sorts of troubles. 
The Bhartiya Janata Party made a plea to the 
authorities in New Delhi in 1995 not to accept 
recommendations as contained in the Delimitation 
Commission's report notified by the State Government of 
Jammu & Kashmir on September 28, 1992. Instead BJP has 
demanded the appointment of a new commission for the 
purpose of redrawing the boundaries of the assembly 
segments based on population, area and nature of terrain. 
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the three principal criteria laid down by the State 
Constitution and the 1957 Representation of People's Act. 
Bhartiya Janata Party denounces the idea of maximum 
autonomy and teirmed it to encourage separatism, subversion 
and terrorism in the State. The Party made also a hue and 
cry for the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian 
Constitution by which the State of Jammu and Kashmir has 
been provided with the special status. The party has a 
strong agenda for opposing any move to restore the pre-1953 
position as demanded by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. 
After the recently concluded elections, the party is 
said to have build a strong opposition against National 
Conference. A senior leader of BJP and MP from 
Udhampur-Doda constituency. Prof. Chaman Lai Gupta said 
that almost all other parties which contested the assembly 
elections in the State are getting eager to get closer to 
the power, ignoring the responsibilities which the voters 
had entrusted upon them in the poll process. He also 
alleged Indian national Congress for opting a strange role 
for itself, where one of its senior leaders Moulvi Iftikhar 
Hussain Ansari has joined the State Cabinet. He ridiculed 
the Farooq Abdullah for his demand of pre-1953 and said the 
Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah and his associates are 
talking about to go back to 1947 and 1952 in 1996, when 
much water has flown in the rivers of this State. He 
suggested the Chief Minister to pay attention to the 
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suffering masses whose houses were collapsed and crops 
damaged due to rains, hailstorms and floods, 
4.5.1 Communal Politics and Pol I Performance 
BJP posed a challenge to the Congress and the 
National Conference in the electoral battle of 1996. The 
party vote bank is restricted to the Jammu region of the 
State because of its communal politics and anti-militarcy 
and anti-autonomy rhetoric. Having won only 2 seats in the 
elections of 1987, the BJP was expected to do well in the 
elections of 1996 and not to consider Jammu as its 
backyard. In the Lok Sabha elections of 1996, the party 
showed a good performance by achieving victory in the 
Udhampur-Doda constituency in a dramatic upswing. It bagged 
the seat but also led in as many as 19 assembly segments. 
Its trump card was obviously the Hindu vote bank. Chaman 
LaLal Gupta who won the Udhampur constituency in Lok Sabha 
was of the view that the balance of power will be in the 
BJP's hands this time. 
Only the diehard BJP optimist will take Chaman Lai 
Gupta at his word, but there is no denying that the party, 
by speaking out against militancy in Doda till now and 
subtly playing on communal sentiments. And. as the State 
BJP Chief Vaid Vishnu Dutt says, its "political investment 
in the fight against militancy is sure to bring rich 
electoral dividents". 
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Opposing the "greater autonomy" issue tooth and nail 
formed the BJP' s game plan to play up the fears of the 
people. Portraying itself as the sole protector of the 
region's interests, and by raising the old war cry of Praja 
Parishad and Jan Sangh of "save Jammu", the party hoped to 
encash the popular resentment about being discriminated 
against by the rulers of the Valley in the spheres of 
political power sharing and development. 
The BJP was in a position of advantage as it was the 
first party off the blocks. A timely selection of 
candidates and clarity in the poll planks gave the party 
extra bounce. Less torn by dissidence than the Congress, 
the party was having an edge over its rivals in the sense 
that it had a well-oiled election machinery which is flush 
with funds. 
Shiv Charan Gupta greatly criticised the National 
Conference, Congress and United Front for their favour in 
the restoration of 1952 position. He opined that the patch-
work solutions suggested by various commissions would serve 
no purpose and was strongly in favour of Elected Regional 
Councils with all the powers for the three-regions of the 
State. 
The electoral performance in the State Assembly 
elections of the BJP since it entered the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir is as follows: 
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Year of Election Seats won 
1987 02 
1996 08 
4.6 JANATA DAL 
Before 1947, National Conference was the only 
party which represents the people of Jammu and Kashmir. 
But the later decades have seen the emergence of many 
other political parties in the State. Janata Dal which 
came into existence in the late 1980's in India and at 
the same time it emerged in the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed who was a senior Congress 
leader defected from Congress and joined Janata Dal and 
became the supremo of the Party of the State. He also 
became the Home Minister of India but his rivalry with 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah and National Conference, on the basis 
of which he joined the Janata Dal, could not be ignored. 
In 1989, his daughter Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed was 
kidnapped by JKLF militants and demanded the release of 
five militants in exchange of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed. 
Although Dr. Farooq Abdullah who was the Chief Minister 
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at that time, ignored the demand, Mufti Sayeed agreed the 
demand of JKLF militants and five militants were released 
in exchange of Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed. These were the days of 
V.P. Singh's Janata Dal Government at Centre. 
Another mistake the Janata Dal Government made was 
the appointment of Jagmohan as the Governor of the State 
in 1989 which was protested by Dr. Farooq Abdullah and 
his council of minister. In January 1990, Jagmohan 
dissolved the constituent assembly of the State headed 
by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. And then begins the reign of 
terror, which was the result of repeated blunders by the 
Central Governments. All the political parties and their 
leaders were on run to safer places and left the innocent 
people to face the consequences. There was no political 
activity throughout these years. 
In 1996, when the Parliamentary elections were to 
be held in May, all the political parties revived their 
activities. 
Janata Dal supremo V.P. Singh and Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed visited the State of Jammu and Kashmir and met 
with several political leaders including Shabir Ahmad 
Shan and promised to solve the problem of the State. 
Janata Dal contested the parliamentary elections from all 
six constituencies but could succeed from Anantnag 
constituency only in the shape of Mohd. Maqbool Dar. 
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When Mufti Mohammad Sayeed again joined in 
Congress in August, 1996, with his allies several leaders 
of the Party joined into the National Conference 
including Abdul Qayoom and his allies. Abdul Qayoom was 
the President of Janata Dal of Jammu and Kashmir. Later 
on, Dhan Raj Bargotra was elected as the President of the 
State of Janata Dal and Mast Nath Yogi as the General 
Secretary of the State Janata Dal. 
4.6.1 Vote Trends 
State general secretary, Janata Dal Mast Nath Yogi 
appealed to the voters on September 19 to undermine and 
ignore all those parties and organisations who are 
responsible for the tragedy in the State. Janata Dai's 
Manoj Yaday while calling the people of the State to 
accept the realities and establish accountability for the 
past turmoil and disaster told them to think twice before 
choosing parties and candidates. 
The economic package announced by H.D. Deve Gowda 
was seem to attract the voters to the party but the 
result in the assembly elections declined this perception. 
The United Front Government's Common Minimum Programme 
has also guaranteed the maximum autonomy to State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. The United Front Government and the 
Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda announced three economic 
packages which include construction of Udhampur-Baramulla 
Srinagar railway line, to start work on Dul-Dasti Hydro 
61 
Power project, to open Mughal Road, Agricultural 
University to Jammu, waiving of loans upto 50,000 rupees, 
project for water supply to Leh, enhancing tourist 
facilities in Leh and Kargil and construction of an 
airport at Kargil. Janata Dal has not much support base 
in any region of the State, where National Conference 
represents the largest support base throughout the 
Valley, Jammu and Ladakh. 
4.6.2 Poll Performance 
As has already been said that the party has fought 
only parliamentary elections in 1996 in which it has 
achieved the Anantnag constituency . In the Assembly 
elections of 1996, the party contested from all the 87 
constituencies, but could not get to its expectations.The 
party could win only five seats in the elections. In the 
previous elections the party have not fought any seat. 
5. CONCLUSION 
On the Kashmir issue, the position of India is 
frozen in time. Both India and Pakistan went on for a war 
twice to settle the issue. From the very day of Jammu and 
Kashmir's accession to India on 26th October 1947, the 
issue remained unsolved till today. Lord Mountbatten's 
pledge to consult the people of the State for the 
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ratification of the accession, although was accepted, but 
was never being adopted. Political parties, particularly 
National Conference which was the only party representing 
people of the State played an important role. 
The constant ignorance of the basic issue of right 
to self determination, installation of the non-elected 
governments by the Centre, corruption and unemployment 
gave rise to the separatist movement. Whenever, there is 
a political turmoil in the State, thie Central governments 
offered different packages but after the situation 
becomes clear, the Central government has forgotten their 
promises. The extension of Central laws in 1956 was also 
a folly and violation of Article 370 and Delhi Agreement. 
Although, the elections to the Lok Sabha and 
Legislative Assembly have been held, but to contain the 
problems of separatist mvoement, unemployment and to 
bring back the migrants to the Sate would not be easy for 
the State government. This time, too. Centre has promised 
for an economic and political package and to grant the 
maximum autonomy to the State. 
Giving autonomy to the State may curtail the 
current state of uncertainty to some extent. But the 
ultimate and lasting solution to the problem would be to 
settle the issue according to the wills of the people of 
Kashmir. All political parties of the state and that of 
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national parties should realise the mood of the people. 
To include the true representatives of the people in any 
dialogue for the solution of the problem would be a wise 
and appreciated step. Otherwise, the current crisis, if 
contained at present, may rise again and may be more 
difficult to contain with. 
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the Lok Sabha polls for the abrogation of Article 
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Concludes that the insistent demand for abrogation of 
Article 370 to be a design to weaken the Centre when 
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Kashmir. Daily Excelsior. 31, 133; 1995, May 14; 4. 
Comments on the Prime Minister's statement in 
the Lok Sabha about the suggestion made by some 
opposition parties regarding the grant of more 
autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. The question of 
granting more autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir to become 
a poll issue during the forthcoming assembly 
elections as discussed along with the dismissal of 
Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 when he disapproved the laws 
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after independence under the leadership of Jawaharlal 
Nehru. Hi'<>hlights BJP's stand for the abolition of 
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Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh on October 
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the concessions they seek from the Centre should be 
acceptable to the people in the rest of the country 
and pass muster with Parliament. It goes to the 
credit of Dr. Farooq Abdullah and the National 
Conference for not pitching their demand for azaadi 
kind of autonomy but summoned the moral courage to 
agree to fight the elections on the plank of 
autonomy. 
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258; 1996, September 16; 13. 
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Front government and Congress and BJP, where Hurriyat 
was not attracted by it since it still outwardly 
looks forward to separation. Criticises Jagmohan of 
strengthening the integrative links with Kashmir at 
the moment when fatigue setting is amongst the 
militants. Highlights Sheikh Abdullah as leading the 
defence of Srinagar during the tribal invasion of 
Pakistan when Maharaja left the state. The credit 
goes to Sheikh Abdullah if Pandits, who suffered 
grieviously during the militancy, lived safely 
through the subcontinental holocaust of partition. 
Suggests the Central leadership to recognise the 
Kashmir's special position to have better 
relationship in future and there should be no fear of 
creating a Sheikhdom of an autonomous Kashmir but the 
people must live in a way that their language, way of 
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Every incumbant Prime Minister after Indira 
Gandhi deemed it politically expedient to promise a 
fresh dose of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. The 
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insurgency since 1989 is unmistakably Pakistan 
sponsored and has nothing to do with autonomy. 
Demands will be raised to scrap the laws extended to 
the state since independence as the National 
Conference vociferously seeking tb*^  restoration of 
1952 position and says any such tampering of laws 
turn the clock back and further alienate Kashmiris 
from the Union of India. Concludes with the stress on 
economic rather than political freedom to win back 
the people's confidence in the Indian polity as a 
welfare state. 
15. SARAF (Pushp). Greater autonomy for J-K a mere 
slogan. Indian Express. 64, 243; 1996, July 7; 9. 
Describes the slogan of greater autonomy for 
J&K used by leaders in the valley and outside for 
temporary gains. The promise of the maximum autonomy 
by the United Front government in its common minimum 
programme is a vague assurance. Highlights the 
rejection of NC to Burkino Faso Package promised by 
Narasimha Rao and insisted on the restoration of 
pre-1953 dispensation which means the implementation 
sets 
of Delhi Agreement. Narsimha Rao/the clock back by 
promising the restoration of nomenclatures abolished 
by Sadiq Government in the State on April 10, 1965. A 
resolution ensures the state-level political parties 
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State Assembly and be brought before the all-party 
meeting for its approval. Such a resolution may 
encourage the state-level parties to whole-heartedly 
participate in the Assembly elections. 
16. SUBRAMANIAN (NV). Future lies in the past. Sunday. 
22, 45; 1995, November 12-18; 16. 
Most of the Kashmiri politicians laugh at the 
suggestion that things will be better in Kashmir wheh 
provided with greater autonomy and that Farooq 
Abdullah is the right person to sell the idea. 
Discusses pre-1953 position where only defence, 
foreign affairs and communication remains with India. 
Reports the 1952 Delhi agreement between Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah which brought some changes. 
According to Rao and Chavan the negotiations on 
autonomy be conducted with the elected government. 
Farooq Abdullah denies to go to the polls without an 
autonomy package/without Abdullah and his National 
Conference any election in Kashmir will have far less 
meaning than even now. 
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The failure of Indian Governments to provide 
succour to the suffering Kashmiris has begun to hurt 
now. Describes the statement of Robin Raphel, not 
recognising the 1947 Instrument of Accession signed 
by the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir which has made it 
an integral part of the Indian Union. India's Kashmir 
policy is wrong from the r\a^ one of freedom. The 
Congress party manoeuvred to keep power in its hands 
or in the hands of its puppets in Kashmir through 
rigged elections. Criticises the Congress rulers of 
Delhi and J&K for dividing Kashmiri Pandits and 
Kashmiri Muslims to give a communal twist to their 
political struggle in the State. Concludes that the 
BJP has made no sense in con-ing over the new 
economic policy for Kashmir. 
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18. ASIF (AU). Empty Package. Nation and the World. 3, 
100; 1995, December 1; 8, 10, 12. 
Crisises the package announced by Prime 
Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao for Kashmir on the name of 
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Party Hurriyat Conference, National Conference, 
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Sena, RSS. Also gives a brief overview of the 
establishment of Kashmir Awareness Bureau by All 
Party Hurriyat Conference in New Delhi. Discusses the 
speeches delivered by different Kashmiri leaders in 
33-group confederation held at Pragati Maidan, New 
Delhi. Contains a cacophony of different political 
personalities regarding elections to be held soon in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Inderjit Gupta asserts that the 
feelings of the people of Jammu and Ladakh 
is also to be taken into account as azaadi has 
different connotation for them. 
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Excelsior. 31, 294; 1995, October 23; 4-5. 
Reports that Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao 
repeatedly holding talks with Dr. Farooq Abdullah and 
the later repeatedly demanding restoration of 1953 
status to the J&K. Sheikh Abdullah started the 
process of separatist politics for which the nation 
is now paying through its nose. The Praja Parishad 
under the dedicated leadership of Pt. Prem Nath Dogra 
submitting a memorandum to Rashtrapati on June 19, 
1952 stressing the need for firm and final accession 
it ' WZ^-^S^v . ^ 
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of the State to India. The mass movement of 
Satyagraha under the leadership of Pt. Prem Nath 
Dogra was symbolised by the slogan 'Ek Desh Main Do 
Vidhan Do Nihan Do Pardhan, Nahin Challenge, Nahin 
Challenge *. 
20. SHARMA (Satish). Implication s, imperatives and hopes 
from Delhi Agreement-1952. Daily Excelsior. 31, 302; 
1995, November 1; 4. 
Examines the Instrument of Accession and Delhi 
Agreement-1952 and reports that the State-Centre 
relationship was forged when the Ruler of J&K State 
and Union Government of India discussed on very clear 
terms and conditions. The support of all the sections 
of the State's population should be devised for 
action of NC leadership supporting the accession of 
J&K to India on the basis of Instrument of Accession 
signed by the Maharaja . The division in NC on 2nd 
July 1984, encouraged and patronised by Congress (I) 
resulted into dismissal of duly democratic elected 
government of Dr. Farooq. Dr. Farooq-Rajiv Accord of 
1987 under which adequate economic prosperity for J&K 
was pledged, like other Agreements and Accords was 
thrown into dustbins as soon as the political aims 
of Central ruling party were accomplished. Concludes 
that the implementation of agreed clauses of 1952 and 
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1975 may help Dr. Farooq Abdullah to reativise among 
his alienated masses. 
21. SOZ (Saifuddin). 1952's terms are the way out in 
Kashmir. Times of India. 158, 228; 1995, October 18; 
13. 
Criticises the Central Government for not 
allowing the political initiatives towards a 
resolution of the crisis in Kashmir since the second 
half of 1992. The mood in the Valley is decidedly 
against violent strips and the situation obtained in 
Kashmir currently constitutes a unique opportunity 
for Delhi for -ff; negotiated settlement. There are 
disputes between the people of the State and the 
Union of India on the quantum of autonomy which could 
be settled down only if India appreciates a workable 
solution laid in the Delhi Agreement of 1952. It 
would be a risky gamble of organising elections 
without any political settlement of the crisis in 
Kashmir. Concludes the restoration of autonomy within 
the framework of the Delhi Agreement of 1952 offers 
the basis for a political transformation in the 
State. 
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22. SIDHVA (Shiraz). Kashmir: Cut and thrust. Frontline. 
12, 22; 1995, November 3; 20-24. 
Describes the campaign of divide-and-rule 
policy by the Government which is being aided by the 
Kashmiri militants and politicians themselves. 
Amanullah Khan declared the reorganised political and 
militant set-up of JKLF headed by Shabir Ahmad 
Siddiqui. Syed Ali Shah Geelani is keen to promote 
Malik by his unwillingness to include Shabir Ahmad 
Siddiqui in the Hurriyat. Hurriyat decided to put up 
a United Front for right to self-determinination and 
Shabir Ahmad Shah calls Azaadi only a permanent 
solution. Points out the Centre's eagerness to 
install a Stte Government under Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
before the announcement of the parliamentary 
elections. A senior Home Ministry official says 
political solution before elections would not be 
meaningful and acceptable. 
, , , ELECTIONS.t-OK SABHA, 1996 
23. BAWEJA (Harinder) . Electoral fai'ce in Kashmir. Muslim 
India. 14, 162; 1996, June; 271-2. 
The electoral fe rce unfolded just when several 
former militant leaders initiated talks with the 
Indian government. Describes the threats of the 
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security forces which forced voters to the polling 
booths to cast their votes. The contestants are being 
mostly from the surrendered militants, Congress, BJP 
and Janata Dal. Evaluates the unexpected high turn 
out of voters in Baramullah and Anantnag. States that 
the voters did not come out to give their mandate for 
the return of peace and democracy but only because of 
the fear of gun. Concludes that the rigging of 1987 
elections saw the advent of gun in Kashmir and 
forcing voters into booths may hardly contain the 
insurgency. 
24. BAWEJA (Harinder). Jammu and Kashmir: Exercise in 
opportunism. India Today. 21, 8; 1996, April 30; 
92-3. 
The threat of violence looms as the government 
goes ahead with its plans to hold Lok Sabha polls in 
the State. Highlights the killing of the entire 
family of a militant belonging to the Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimoon and attacks on the three leaders of the 
Forum for the Permanent Resolutiuon of Kashmir who 
recently held talks with Union Home Minister S.B. 
Chavan. According to Professor Abdul Ghani Bhatt if 
the majority stays away, that means the voters are in 
favour of their right of self-determination. The 
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contest has been reduced between the Congress (I), 
the BJP and Parrey's Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon, with the 
NC keeping out of the polls. The win of Parrey's 
surrendered militants will be the filling of 
political vacuum by lumpen elements which may 
undermine the relevance of Dr. Farooq Abdullah and 
his National Conference. Analyses the party position 
in the 1989 elections. 
25. ELECTIONS IN J&K: A new beginning. Salook. 1, 6; 
1996, July; 5-12. 
The people of J&K have demonstrated their 
unflincling faith in democracy by overwhelmingly 
rejecting theorocracy blended with fundamentalism. 
Asserts that the main upshoot of elections would be 
hopes for holding Assembly elections which have 
greatly brightened. Analyses the votershaving polled 
invalid votes and poll percentage in all the six 
parliamentary constituencies and in all the assembly 
constituencies of the State. National Conference is 
actively reconsidering its decision for boycotting 
the polls. APHC seems to be indulging in some type of 
introspection. Highlights the announcement of 
Congress (I), Janata Dal, BJP, Panthers Party and 
other to participate in the Assembly elections as and 
when held. CM. Shah and Bhim Singh asserts that no 
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force was being used to coerce voters and they 
voted of their own will. 
26. ENCOURAGING SIGNS in J&K. Hindu. 119, 86; 1996, April 
10; 10. 
Comments on the response in Jammu ahd Kashmir 
for participation in the elections to six Lok Sabha 
seats which is fairly encouraging. Criticises the 
boycott decision announced by All Party Hurriyat 
Conference and National Conference. The active 
participation of Panthers Party, Congress (l) and BJP 
in the successful conduct of the poll will pave the 
way for holding elections to the State Assembly. 
Analyses the party position in all the six seats. The 
participation of 110 candidates in all the seats is 
an interesting thing. The Government is not 
understimating the potential of militants to disturb 
the polls but is prepared to meet any threats. 
Concludes that the poll is politically significant 
after a long gap. 
27. HARI OM. Election 1996: Opportunity to win Kashmiris. 
Kashmir Times. 49, 97; 1996, April 8; 4-5. 
Describes the decision of holding Lok Sabha 
elections in J & K alongwith the rest of India, 
against many reservations expressed repeatedly with 
i&4 
regard to certain mainstream and regional political 
formations. Discusses the 1946 Quit Kashmir Movement 
with Kashmiris confronting police, attacking all 
symbols of the Government and demanding the 
dethronement of Maharaja Hari Singh and establishment 
of the popularly-elected government. Criticises the 
State's accession to the Indian Dominion on October 
26, 1947 and appointing Sheikh Abdullah as the 
Emergency Administrator for the State. Highlights 
the dismissal of the Sheikh government by Karan Singh 
at the behest of Pandit Nehru in August 1953, 
followed by Sheikh's arrest. 
28. J&K ELECTIONS. New Wave. 25, 43; 1996, June 9; 3. 
States that the people of Jammu and Kashmir 
have given a powerful body blow to the cult of 
terrorism spawned by Pakistan's all powerful ISI in 
the recent Lok Sabha elections. The electorate 
preferred secular parties to brands of communalists 
and the polls were peaceful throughout the state with 
excellent security arrangements. Describes the decks 
to be clear for installing an elected Assembly which 
may address itself to people's problems and undertake 
developmental work. One of the tasks before the new 
assembly would be to compile facts concerning the 
inhuman activities of ISI merceneries, hundreds of 
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whom are still stranded in Pak occupied Kashmir. 
Concludes that the political battle is being won in 
J&K if the menace of.terrorism still remains. 
29. KASHMIR POLLS. Patriot. 33, 338; 1996, March 26; 4. 
Describes the talks of Home Minister with some 
prominent militant leaders promises too much at the 
level of speculations. The three point agenda of 
militant leaders is believed to prepare the ground 
for the woefully lacking confidence in J&K. Arjun 
singh points out the Kashmir issue to be national 
problem and calls for a national consensus requiring 
the participation of all political parties. BJP asks 
Chavan to explicate what he meant by unx^onditional 
talks with militants. All militant leaders who hold 
talks with Chavan dismissed the electoral exercise in 
the State. Concludes that the polling in the three 
Lok Sabha constituencies in Kashmir valley leads to a 
spot of trouble from armed bands. 
?0. KASHMIR POLLS pass off peacefully. National Herald. 
28, 77; 1996, May 25; 4. 
Comments on the Central and State government of 
having reason to be satisfied at *-h.e peaceful and 
unexpectedly high turnout in the Lok Sabha polls in 
the two constituencies of Raramulla and Anantnag. The 
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vot-ers have ignored the caV eiven by the ^11 Party 
Hurriyat Conference to boycott the elections and the 
threats held out by the Pro-Pakistani militants to 
disrupt the polls. Discards the allegations of the foreign 
media of the voters being forced to the polling stations 
by the seci^rity forces from their houses* These 
allegations should obtain some sensational footage and 
discredit Tndia Concludes that the successful holding of 
parliamentary elec'-ions will embolden the Covernment to 
hold Assembly elections to be due. 
1. WAYAP ''Kuldip). Tiodgy tactics in f^ashmir. Nation and the 
World. 6, 114; 1996, July 1; 1«-20, ??. 
•^omments on ^he crude use of violence by the 
security forces on the one hand and the militants on the 
other which converted 'Kashmir into a blood stained 
tragedy, '^riticises the way of forcing the voters to 
polling booths and all that the Rashtriya Rifles wanted to 
see was an ink mark on people s fingers. Fvaluates the 
sarkari militants role who also took part in the 
elections. Discusses the attempt on the lives of Abdul 
Ghani Lone and ^yed Ali ^hah Geelani, Highlights that the 
Deve Gowda government undertaking on more autonomy will be 
responseless if the Kashmiris come to believe their 
leaders to be eliminated physically not politically. 
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3'', POLL PTRO^FSS in J^K off to a good start. National 
HeraTd. ?8, 3^; 19^6, April 10; 4. 
<"omments on the threads of disruption of the 
poll process by the All Party Hurriyat Conference and 
pro-Pakistani militants. Oives a brief overview of 
the Congress, RJP, the Janata Dal, the Panthers Party 
and the Awanii League congesting in the elections. 
Some leaders of National Conference are participating 
in t-he elections and defying the party directives of 
boycotting the elections. Presents a view of the 
Hazratbal shrine and the killing of the JKLF faction 
leader Shabir Siddiqi. The Rtai-e government is very 
much aware of the challenges to be faced for free and 
fair conHiict of the elec'^ions (Governor ^ v. Krishna 
•Rao has appealed to the candidates and parties to 
enthuse the voters for a heavy turnout-. 
33. POSJTTVF SI^NS. Statesman. 1.37, 110; t9Qfi, May "^ ;^ 8, 
comments on the justified scepticism about the 
voter turnout and apprehensions about the security 
environment. The surfeit of candidates tends to 
suggest that the appetite for democracy is not 
entire'ly extingtiished in the State. Tt- is surprising 
that no one n^ the va''ley seems to be missing the 
National '"onference or the Hurriyat-. The Hurriyat 
leaders insistence on inc''uding Pakistan as a party 
to the dispute may not be taken as seriously as 
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before. Describes the low voter turn-out in the valley-
coupled with a high migrant Pandit vote to result in 
victory for the BJP which would once again accentuate 
the religious divide and lend credibility to pro-
Pakistani elements. It would be first harbingers of 
peace in the Valley if the campaign and polling would 
be peaceful. 
34. SIDHVA (Shiraz). Guns and votes: A loss of 
credibility. Frontline. 13, 11; 1996, June 14; 122-5. 
Describes the holding of elections in Anantnag 
and Baramulla districts, where pro-Pakistani militants 
held sway even two years ago. The holding of assembly 
elections by July will provide only a government in 
the State but the problem will persist until the basic 
issue of Kashmir's status remain unresolved. Farooq 
Abdullah's party has gained tremendous support from 
Kashmiris for his decision to stay away from the 
parliamentary polls, but his colleagues are afraid of 
the NC and the Congress a hard time in the vally, if 
the Awami League joins hands with the Bharatiya Janata 
Party. Hurriyat Conference is campaigning door-to-door 
and advising people to invalidate their votes by 
putting more than one mark on the ballot paper. 
Professor Abdul Ghani Bhatt asserts that a dialogue 
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between India, "Pakistan and Kashmiri people is 
ultimate solution at the end. 
35. THEATRE OF the absurd. Valley Reporter. 2, 13; 1995, 
December; 1. 
Discusses the idea conceived in Home Ministry 
to hold elections in Kashmir, where the ground 
realities are always against any process ,->7hich negates 
the sacrifices Kashmiris exhibited for the popuular 
demand of the right of self-determination. The bandh 
on the day of the visit of the Election Commission's 
team to the State is the sufficient proof that 
elections and selections have no takers in Kashmir. 
Criticises the gigantic presence of the Indian troops 
and import of hundreds of thousands of more which 
indicates the plans of New Delhi to drag people to the 
election booths. Describes Kashmiri's as mature enough 
to understand the compulsions of the Narasimha Rao's 
government to cash situation in Kashmir for the 
parliamentary elections in India to held in the 
mid-1996. Suggests New Delhi to heed to the 
aspirations of thirteen million people who exhibited 
sacrifices for achieving honour, dignity and justice. 
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36. VASUDEVA (PK). Pak propaganda exposed in J&K. Patriot. 
34, 41; 1996, May 11; 4. 
Comments on the statement of Riaz Khokhar that 
all the elections in Kashmir in the past, present and 
future would be rigged. Criticises APHC for opposing 
the polls in Jammu and Kashmir. Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
states to not participate in the polls till the 
restoration of pre-1953 status to the state. The main 
players in the fray would be Congress, BJP and Awmai 
League. Suggests that the new government should 
waste no time in holding Assembly elections in the 
State to prove to the world Pakistan's false 
propaganda. Awami League's 11-point manifesto anounced 
at a public rally in Srinagar promises to restore 
peace and usher in prosperity with financial aid from 
the Centre. 
37. WITHOUT GUN, song and ballot. Economist. 338, 7953; 
1996, February 17; 27. 
Discusses the willingness of some Kashmiri 
militant leaders to talk to the Indian government 
about restoring peace in the troubled state of J&K. 
Highlights Hurriyat's allegation about these militant 
leaders to be called as stooges. The leaders are 
courageous for seeking peace as any Kashmiri 
deviating from the line of self-determination seems in 
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danger of being killed by the militants. Kukka Parrey 
raised an anti-militant force of 1400 armed men with 
the help of Indian army and muscled into the territory 
held earlier by militants. The elections to the 
Kashmir state Assembly are likely to set a political 
alternative to the Hurriyat and induce one or two 
Hurriyat leaders to contest at the last minute. 
, , , , , • /. , HAZRATBAL CRI5ES 
38. PILLAI (Ajith) and MASOOD HUSSAIN. Hazratbal crisis: 
Bloody cleanup. Outlook. 2, 15; 1996, April 10; 22-3. 
All shades of political leaders in Srinagar 
describe the killing of 23 militants in the Hazratbal 
complex as a mindless massacre. All Party Hurriyat 
Conference, after the March 24 shootout, dismissed the 
entire incident as a drama enacted by India to wriggle 
out the elections in Kashmir. Abdul Ghani Lone asked 
as to why the authorities entertained the militants in 
houses at the complex. Alleges Basharat Raza for 
terrorising the neighbourhood and insisting on the 
appointment of the staff in the Kashmir University as 
per his directions. Concludes that the March 30 
operation may cast its shadow on polls in Kashmir. As 
the National Conference has decided to boycott 
elections, the exercise in the valley could well be 
the fa -ce. 
y2 
, PANDITS 
39. HARI OM. Pandits and electoral politics in J&K. Daily-
Excelsior. 31, 361; 1995, December 30; 4-5. 
Suggests the Central government to consider 
patiently and sympathetically the rational aspirations 
of the Kashmiri Pandits, who have vacated the valley 
in early 1990 in the wake of eruption of sectarian 
and seccessionist violence. The Centre did well by 
introducing certain important changes in the J&K 
Representation of People's Act in order to provide for 
at 
postal ballot and voting arrangement/the refugee camps 
housing Pandits. Habba Kadal and Zadibal are the only 
constituencies which have invariably returned the 
Pandits to the legislative assembly upto 1972. Asserts 
that the Pandits have been deprived of their 
democratic privilege in 1976 when J&K delimitations 
commission altered the demographic landscape of the 
Habba Kadal and Zadibal constituencies at the behest 
of Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg. 
, , , , STATE ASSEMBLY 
40. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: A high risk gamble. India 
Today. 18, 6; 1993, March 31; 71, 4. 
Describes the centre's steps to re-start the 
democratic process. Discusses the appointment of 
is General K.V. Krishna Rao as the new governor which/the 
political set up between Rajesh Pilot and Dr. Farooq 
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Abdullah. Certain youths who took the guns first in 
the Valley were election agents for the Muslim United 
Front in 1987. Dr. Farooq Abdullah wants to include 
Pakistan in the talks for any meaningful and lastin>t 
solution. The effect of Pilot's talks with opposition 
parties of J&K resulted in targetting of kin of 
politicians in the strife torn Jammu & Ka-dimir. The 
political process in the state is a farce. JKLF 
President Yasin Malik says that anything other than 
independence for they would be lynched by their own 
people for having raised hopes in the first place. 
41. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir elections: The Centre's 
pipe dream. India Today. 19, 20; 1994, October 31; 
43, 46. 
Describes Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao's 
determination to hold elections in Jammu & Kashmir to 
be a short sighted decision that could backfire 
politically. Faced with threats from militants and a 
likely boycott by political parties, the election 
process may run into trouble before it even takes of. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah demands greater autonomy and an 
economic and political package as a pre-condition to 
participate in the elections, Syed Ali Shah Geelani 
and Professor Abdul Ghani Lone, released last 
fortnight in anticipation of an election, rejected any 
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possibility of elections. Professor Abdul Ghani Lone 
states that even angels will not contest and leave 
alone devils and the centre is making only noises 
because of the UN General Assembly's session. A 
Central home ministry official discloses the Prime 
Ministers keenness that the election will take place 
and ignore the ugly realities. 
42. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Normalcy is a pipedream. 
India Today. 17, 16; 1992, August 31; 52-6. 
Discusses the statement of P.V. Narsimha Rao 
that the situation in J&K will establish the path for 
a democratically elected government and restore 
normalcy. Explains Dr. Farooq Abdullah's stand on not 
taking part in the elections. Describes the region as 
unsafe for politicians. Abdul Ghani Lone, S.A.S. 
Geelani, Maulana Abbas Ansari and Professor Abdul 
Ghani Bhat urged nothing less than the right for self-
determination will be acceptable. Criticises the Union 
Home Minister S.B. Chavan's claim of qualitative 
change in the atmosphere which will be helpful in 
holding elections. Girish Chandra Saxena wants to 
create the right psychological climate in which the 
electoral process could get adequate response from a 
sizeable section of the people. Also gives the 
interviews of Dr. Farooq Abdullah and Mushtaq Ahmad 
Zargar, chief of the dreaded Al-Umar Mujahideen. 
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43. BIDWAI (Praful). False move on J&K. Frontline. 12, 11; 
1995, June 2; 111-3. 
Criticises Narasimha Rao's statement of April 
28 in the parliament that his government to be 
inclined to hold elections to the Jammu & Kashmir 
Assembly by mid-July. It is a constitutional 
obligation to hold elections by July 17, when the 
five-year term of President's rule expires. Besides 
providing People's League, JKLF and Hurriyat's no to 
elections. Shah agrees to participate in elections to 
be held under United Nation's supervision and for the 
purpose for identifying the people's true leaders. 
Farooq Abdullah is also against the holding of 
elections before a proper autonomy package to be 
delivered. Concludes that the government should begin 
an open-ended, broad-based, sincere dialogue with the 
valley militants as well as political leaders with an 
open mind, generosity, modesty and respect for the 
popular will. 
44. GOVT KEEN to hold elections. Democratic World. 21, 13; 
1992, August 31; 6. 
Discusses the statement of P.V. Narsimha Rao 
about fixing a time-frame for holding elections in J&K 
to be decided keeping in view the law and order 
situation and revival of political activity in the 
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State. Rao claims the government is not treating the 
problem in Punjab and Kashmir merely as a law and 
order one. The efforts for successful conduct of 
elections would be made in Kashmir as in Punjab. The 
security forces are maintaining a strong vigil on the 
line of Actual Control with Pakistan to plug the 
inflow of weapons and subversive elements into India. 
Continued aiding and abetting of terrorism in Kashmir 
by Pakistan and attacks on Indian diplomats are 
serious hindrances in improving Indo-Pak relations. 
45. HAZRA (Indrajit). Pulling wool over Kashmir. News from 
India. 2, 22; 1995, May 29; 5-6. 
Expresses the announcement of assembly polls in 
J&K as to project the version by the Centre that every 
thing nearing back to shipshape in the sad and failed 
marriage with the state. The National Conference and 
the Congress are firmly in oblivion in the State. 
Criticises Governor K.V. Krishna Rao's statement 
asking the militants to come forward to face the 
ballot instead of trying to stall and disrupt the 
political process for revival of democracy. 
H-Lghlights the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 
Government by the Congress in 1953 when repression and 
corruption took over and trust in the Indian 
government and its democracy quickly evaporated. 
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Discusses the regional autonomy promised by Jawaharlal 
Nehru in 1952. The promise of elections is an act of 
public reassurance of nothing being rotten in the 
democratic nation. 
46. MALLA (Vijay). Jammu and Kashmir: Moves and 
countermoves. Rashtriya Sahara. 3, 4; 1995, Augusts; 
49-51. 
Discusses the efforts made by the government to 
initiate electoral and democratic process in the 
state. Governor K.V. Krishna Rao is determined to hold 
elections to find out a durable solution to the proxy 
war leashed out by Pakistan in the valley and Doda 
district. All Party Hurriyat Conference's leadership 
condemns elections by saying that they sacrificed 4000 
lives not for the sake of elections. Barring few 
pockets in Doda district, the Government f?(cp?-s no 
problem in Jammu division and Ladakh division. Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah and National Conference have sought 
the opportunity to assert their hold on the masses and 
the success in the proposed elections by the end of 
the year will prove to be disastrous for ISI. 
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47. RAMAKRISHNAN (Venkatesh). Talking of elections: But is 
J&K ready for them? Frontline. 11, 22; 1994, October 
22 - Nov 4; 27-30. 
Describes the Central government's talks about 
the democratic process to be revived with elections to 
Sate assembly in March 1995 after a gap of seven long 
years. Discusses the release of three Hurriyat leaders 
Yasin Malik, Abdul Ghani Lone and Syed Ali Shah 
Geelani who opposed any such exercise. Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah and other leaders of National Conference 
demands an economic package and political autonomy to 
the state existed before 1953. The leaders of Panun 
Kashmir and Kashmiri Pandit Sabha demands to clarify 
their status after polls. Ved Bhasin asserts that 
polls will strengthen communal polarisation. 
Bawahuddin Farooqui, says that all the central 
government want by elections is to block Pakistan from 
raising the issue of human rights violations and the 
larger political problem. 
48. RASHEED AHMED. Testing the waters. Sunday. 22, 23; 
1995, June 4-10; 34-5. 
Comments on the centre's decision of giving up 
the idea of holding Assembly polls in Jammu and 
Kashmir by the middle of July. Describes the meeting 
of T.N. Seshan, while he visited Kashmir, with several 
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political parties except All-Party Hurriyat Conference, 
kept away from the meeting. National Conference 
represented by a four-member delegation led by party 
general secretary Bashir Ahmad Kichloo opposed to the 
polls and suggest the Centre to accpetto honour Delhi 
Agreement and restore Kashmir's pre-1953 position. 
Except the Congress, which favoured the idea of 
holding polls soon and without any preconditions, all 
other parties opposed to the exercise. Abdul Qayoom, 
says that conducting polls in Kashmir by importing 
election machinery from outside the valley would 
further strengthen the impression that New Delhi 
treats J&K as its colony. 
49.RASHID AHMAD. Balloting in winter. Sunday. 22, 42; 
1995, October 22-28; 62-4. 
The announcement of Gen. K.V. Krishna Rao that the 
state administration, election machinery and security 
forces are ready to hold the polls in Jammu and Kashmir 
indicates the Centre's intention to hold elections. The 
militancy in the State has hardly been contained and all 
the political parties declined to participate in the 
proposed polls except Ghulam Rasood Kar who supports 
Narsimah Rao's plan for elections. Criticises Kar's public 
meeting in Bandipora and Hawal in Pulwama, organised by 
the surrendered militants with the assistance of security 
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forces. Mian Bashir Ahmad and Molvi Iftikhar Husain 
Ansari asked for Kar' s removal from the post of the 
State Congress President. Briefly discusses the 1952 
position, a demand of Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his 
party as a precondition to participate in the 
elections. The dissident Congress leader and Rafiq 
Sadiq criticised Narsimha Rao and G.R. Kar for 
favouring polls and relying on militants to conduct 
the elections. 
50. RASHID AHMAD. Ballot offensive. Sunday. 22, 18; 
1995, April 30-May 6; 10-11. 
Highlights the Centre's keenness on holding 
elections in the troubled state of J&K, but it remains 
to be seen whether the guns will fall silent. Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah is the best bet of the centre and his 
party is ready to participate with a sound political 
and economic package provided, the State is allowed to 
revert to its pre-1953 position. BJP expects the 
postal votes of Kashmiri pandits to go in its favour. 
The Janata Dal and the National Frort says a government 
formed at this juncture will be unreprepresentative. 
Discusses the threat given by separatist parties and 
their leaders including All-Party Hurriyat Conference 
to call a complete boycott if the government ventures 
for elections. The election is a gamble of Narasimha 
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Rao and any debacle in the Kashmir elections could 
boomerang with disastrous consequences for the Prime 
Minister and his party. 
51. SURJEET (Harkishan Singh). Changes in Kashmir. News 
from India. 2, 28; 1995, July 10; 4-6. 
The Prime Minister and other Government 
spokesmen are constantly harping on holding Assembly 
elections in the State. States that immediately after 
independence, Pakistan succeeded in occupying the 
territory called Azad Kashmir and credit goes to the 
manoeuvres of Mountbatten who adopted a resolution by 
the UN calling for plebiscite in Kashmir. The Hurriyat 
leaders are being allowed to join the OIC meet even 
after their declartion that they belong to Kashmir and 
have nothing to do with India. In the prevailing 
situation the elections possibly may turn to be 
farcical as happened in 1987 and further contribute to 
the mass alienation. Concludes that let the whole 
world knows Kashmir not to be concerning the 
Congress (I) or the Government alone, but of the whole 
nation, of all parties and patriotic people. 
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, , , , , 1987, ALLIANCE,CONGRESS, 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
52. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. Erosion behind apparent Alliance 
victory. Link. 29, 35; 1987, April 5; 12-3. 
Although March 23rd Assembly poll produced 
widely predicted material outcome in favour of ruling 
Alliance of Congress and National Conference, the 
preliminary analysis of voting pattern especially in 
Kashmir valley reveals major erosion of the Alliance 
support base with Islamic fundamentalists emerging as 
its greatest beneficiaries. Highlights that the MUF 
made deep inroads into Alliance support base in most 
parts of the Kashmir valley and its most significant 
achievement came from Sopore constituency vhere 
Jamaat-e-Islami leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani defeated 
law minister in the outgoing government Abdul Ahad 
Vakil. BJP like Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir valley has 
managed to wrest two prestigious seats from the 
Congress. Overze?!iou«? officials have to do a lot with 
unenviable track record of the state in conduct of 
past elections and never influenced so obvious and so 
widespread as one comes across these days. 
53. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. Ideological battle in the valley. 
Link. 29, 32; 1987, March 15; 9. 
The election scene is more lively in Kashmir 
valley than in Jammu region right from t^ *^  start of 
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campaigning. Expects the fierce ideological battle in 
the valley. Muslim United Front, has made its maiden 
poll appearance, posing an unexpected major challenge 
to the ruling alliance of National Conference and the 
Congress. Congress party's internal friction with its 
candidates has mostly left them to fight their 
individual election battle, unlike in the past when 
particularly in Jammu region th« organisation worked 
as a well oiled machine. Evaluates the presence of 
rebel factor in more than one dozen constituencies. 
The direct confrontation between alliance nominees and 
its indirect rebel phenomenon which may result from 
either messing up Congress nomination or curious seat 
sharing arrangement between the two parties causing 
resentment on either side. 
1996 
54. BOSE (AC). Ballot proof state. Telegraph. 15, 67; 
1996, September 12; 13. *" 
Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir held 
after nine years have failed to enthuse the 
electorate. The Lok Sabha elections in the valley and 
Doda is neither free nor fair where the question was 
raised about to vote or not to vote. Highlights that 
in the name of providing security, entire villages and 
neighbourhoods being cordoned off and people being 
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warned to vote and without the ink mark on their 
fingers would be dealt with. Describes that the 
National Conference contesting in alliance with BSP as 
set t-n sweep the valley, as APHC continued its 
boycott. Concludes that the assembly elections may 
only alter the pattern of the problems but not herald 
the dawn of peace. 
55. ELECTION IN Jammu and Kashmir. Pratiyogita Kiran. 1, 
11; 1996, October; 33 -4, 49. 
Discusses the dialogue between S.B. Chavan and 
nine Kashmiri militant leaders, which resulted in the 
formation of Forum for permanent resolution of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Describes the recent scenario of United 
Front Government intending to have a tie up with NC 
for the Assembly polls in the hope of getting few 
seats in alliance with Farooq Abdullah which they 
might not win on their own. The welcome of Assembly 
polls in J&K by all mainstream political parties where 
APHC dismissed them is another military exercise to 
further aggravate the Kashmir problem rather than to 
solve it. Comments on India's links with J&K and 
Shabir Shah's suspension from APHC and United Front's 
determination to go ahead with polls process. The poll 
pattern with the participation of National Conference 
may get a change and Congress may not enjoy the same 
degree of success as in the parliamentary elections. 
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56. NEXT STEP in J&K. Times of India. 159, 190; 1996, 
August 10; 10. 
The holding of assembly elections after a big 
gap of nine years is a necessary first step towards 
concretising the idea of maximum autonomy to the state 
promised in the Common Minimum Programme. Describes 
the keenness of the left parties on an alliance with 
the National Conference led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. 
Others inspired by V.P. Singh would prefer to keep the 
options open for a future alliance with the Hurriyat, 
which commands a substantial support in the valley. 
Comments on the suspension of Shabir Ahmad Shah from 
APHC for merely talking to V.P. Singh. The situation 
on the eve of the elections in J&K looks quite 
messy with all the political divisions. Concludes 
that ^ven if the past track record of Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah leaves much to be desired, the previously 
reluctant NC finally comes round to contesting the 
assembly elections. 
57. SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE. Hindu. 119, 217; 1996, September 
10; 10. 
The large number of voters participation in the 
polls is an indication of people's support for the 
democratic process set in motion by the Government. 
H.D. Deve Gowda's economic package for Kashmir has 
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served a confidence building measure. The sizeable 
participation is really significant in J&K in spite of 
the consistent propaganda by some militant outfits 
including APHC urging the people to boycott the polls. 
Describes the surrender of a large number of 
terrorists on the eve of elections which made the task 
of the administration in conducting the poll less 
onerous. Concludes by justifying the Election 
Commission's reading of the situation as most 
conducive for conducting elections in the State. 
58. SPAETH (Anthony). Calm in the chaos. Time. 148, 11; 
1996, September 9; 20-22. 
The people of a former stronghold of the pro-
independence militant Baramulla shouting slogans are 
not against India but in favour of political 
candidates. Describes the demand of APHC leaders to 
allow Kashmiris to decide their future once and for 
all in a referendum. . Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda 
managed to persuade top Kashmiri leaders to 
participate in elections to revive a State 
assemblyshuttered in 1990 by announcir\g a handful of 
ambitious development schemes and promised substantial 
political change. Dr. Farooq Abdullah is the State's 
premier politician and his National Conference is the 
probable winners in the assembly balloting. Several 
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Kashmir leaders including Mustafa Kamal, suggested the 
Centre not to betray Kashmiris now, otherwise the 
turmoil will begin again. Farooq Abdullah considers it 
to be a Herculean task to put the government back on 
the rails with unflinching support from the Centre. 
, , , GOVERNER'S APPPOINTMENT, 1990, 
ASSEMBLY DISSOLUTION 
59. IMPERATIVES IN Kashmir. Mainstream. 28, 18; 1990, 
February 24; 1-2. 
The dissolution of the Jammu Kashmir Assembly 
on February 19 by Governor Jagmohan is not only 
inevitable but desirable. The government of the 
National Conference-Congress (l) coalition under the 
Chief Ministership of Dr. Farooq Abdullah was 
providing a happy hunting ground for the pro-Pak 
infiltrators to openly exploit the growing discontent 
among the people in the Valley. The resign of Farooq-
Cabinet is a political gimmicik at the behest of his 
mentor, Rajiv Gandhi. Asserts that the general 
elections will be held within six months of the 
dissolution of the Assembly under the J&K 
constitution. Concludes that all responsible sections 
of the national polity has to take into account the 
Kashmir crisis as they view it in the background of 
Pakistni intransigence. 
lOH 
, CRITICISM 
60. KHUSHWANT SINGH. Kashmir cauldron. Nation and the 
World. 2, 4; 1991, October 1; 8-9. 
Discusses the appointment of Jagmohan as 
Governor of Jammu and Kashmir on 18 January 1990 
after a lapse of six years. Criticises the searches 
condcuted under the orders of Farooq Abdullah. 
Subsequent firing on an unarmed procession with the 
delegated authority of Jagmohan has changed the 
scenario in the valley of Jhelum. Gives a brief 
overview of Kashmir's accession to India instead of 
Pakistan on its own free will in 1947. Jagmohan is a 
puppet of the Central Government for abrogating 
Article 370 which gives Kashmir special status. 
Concludes by reminding an Urdu couplet pertinent to 
Kashmir that even if angles want to come, they must 
seek permission to enter into Kashmiris homeland. 
,_ , , , , NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
61. CHAKRAVARTTY (Nikhil). Jagmohan's appointment and 
Farooq. Mainstream. 28, 16; 1990, February 10; 7, 33. 
The Farooq-Congress (I) coalition ministry in 
J&K was neglecting its basic elementary duty of 
keeping the state in conditions of political stability 
whcih provided the pro-Pakistan forces with an upper 
hand. Evaluates the well-planned kidnapping of Union 
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Home Minister Mufti Sayeed's daughter, in the first 
week of December. Discusses the appointment of 
Jagmohan as the new Governor. Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
protested to tender his resignation to the President 
of India against the installation of Governor Jagmohan 
who sacked his minsitry in 1984. Rajiv Gandhi asserts 
that Jagmohan's appointment was made on the insistence 
of RSS Chief Deoras. 
, , , KASHMIRIAT 
62. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashftiir: Losing control. India 
Today. 18, 10; 1993, May 31; 37-44. 
Describes that the current situation is a 
result of centres ignorance about Kashmiriyat, the 
special identity and way of life of Kashmiris. The 
turbulan ce of 1986 led to G.M. Shah's dismissal was 
followed by a nine-month period of effective 
governance and anti-corruption measures under governor 
Jagmohan. Discusses the policies of different parties 
in office since 1960. Highlights G.M. Sadiq's reign 
of mid-60's and of mid-80's. Discusses the new 
strategies to find a way out of the rebellion movement 
at length. Pilot is willing to talk to Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front to win the support of some of 
them to join hands with Farooq Abdullah for starting a 
political process. Concludes that the leaders of the 
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Kashmiri independence movement including Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah were largely fuelled by the desire 
to preserve Kashmiriyat which is their special 
identity and way of life and politics. 
, , , PEACE PROCESS 
63. CHOUDHARY (Sukhbir). Fresh move towards peace in the 
Valley. Sdook. . 1, 3; 1996, April; 29-32. 
Discusses the dialogue between Union Home 
Minister S.B. Chavan and nine former hardcore 
militants on 15th March 1996 at New Delhi to resolve 
the Kashmir issue. It is a diplomatic victory for 
India whose government tried to initiate a political 
process in the valley from the last two years, but 
failed due to fear psychosis injected by the 
terrorists. Dr. Farooq Abdullah and APHC leaders 
criticised S.B. Chavan for inviting the leading 
militants to New Delhi for peace parleys and lend 
their support to the move. Highlights the pro-Pak 
elements led by Jamaat-e-Islami who are on their run 
with Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon hot on their chase. The 
people who have suffered much deserves a period of 
peace and order. 
Ill 
64. DHAR (ON). Battle of ' renega<Jes' . Hindu.119, 90; 1996, 
April 15; 10. 
Highlights the move for a dialogue with some 
erstwhile militant leaders in Kashmir by the Central 
Government. It is a beacon of light in the surrounding 
darkness. Provides the statements of Babar Badar, 
Bilal Lodhi, Yasin Malik and Union Home Minister S.B. 
Chavan. The tussle for supremacy among the surrendered 
militants is easily understandable. Presents Bilal 
Lodhi and Imran Rahi's statementdecrying the Central 
Government's decision to hold elections for six Lok 
Sabha seats frotn J&K. Kukka Parrey and Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah described it as the latest strategy of 
militant leaders to mislead the Government and the 
people. Concludes by raising some questions whether 
the dissident militants remain steadfast in their 
resolve to end bloodshed and violence or cave into the 
h;=»fdcore outfit's pressure. 
65. MARWAH (Ved). Strategies to end militancy in J&K. 
Times of India. 159, 79; 1996, April 3; 8. 
The hardcore militant groups and their 
sponsors, both in the country and outside, will not 
allow peace talks or holding of elections to take 
place unchallenged. The talks between some militant 
leaders and the Union Home Minister S.B. Chahvan is a 
big step forward which reflects the changed ground 
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reality. Criticises the exploiting of Kashmir issue 
for dubious electoral gains and demands that all 
political parties and militant groups must be involved 
in the negotiations. The decision of Imran Rahi and 
Bilal Lodhi are reasonless to keep away from 
discussions with the highly publicised central team in 
Srinagar, as both took part in the talks with S.B. 
Chavan in New Delhi. The peace process must be taken 
further. Concldues that the government and all other 
political parties must demonstrate a unified will and 
determination to pursue peace. 
66. MATJEE (javed). Finding few takers. Rashtriya Sahara. 
3, 12; 1996, April; 20. 
Evaluates the one-hour meeting between militant 
commanders of the valley with the Home Minister S.B. 
Chavan at New Delhi when both sides expressed their 
satisfaction over talks turning it as a good start. 
Discusses the rejection of talks by the All-Party 
Hurriyat Conference which claims that the ultimate 
solution lies in tripartite talks between India, 
Pakistan and the Kashmiris. Dukhtarane-Millat Chief 
Asia Indrabi reacts by saying the four commanders 
involved in talks are traitors. Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon 
chief Jamsheed Sheerazi alias Kukka Parrey also 
condemned the negotiations. Interesting feature of 
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negotiations looks in the resentment of various 
pro-India circles like National Conference which 
believes to be displeased on negotiations. 
67. NAYAR (Kuldip). Futile exercise on Kashmir. Radiance. 
31, 17; 1996, March 31-April 6; 12-3. 
Evaluates the holding of a 45-minute talks 
between few militant leaders and Narsimha Rao and Home 
Minister S.B. Chavan. Discusses the three points made 
at the meeting which includes the disarming of the 
renegade militants supplied with weapons by the 
government authorities. Highlights the thmght that the 
government arms some people to fight militants as 
repugnant to democratic norms. Criticises the Centre 
that ice has been broken in the absence of young 
popular leaders like Yasin Malik and Shabir Ahmad Shah 
and without contacting any viable organisation. 
Hurriyat has to face the fact that the status of 
Kashmir is not challengeable. 
68. OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS. Statesman. 137, 8; 1996, February 
25; 8. 
Comments on the willingness of four former 
commanders of militant outfits to talk to the 
Government without conditions. The qualification is 
significant which implies the problems to be sorted 
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out between the Kashmiris and the Centre without 
bringing Pakistan into picture. Highlights the three 
elements of authenticity which includes people fed up 
with violence, Pakistan's losing credibility in the 
valley and Hurriyat dominated by pro-Pakistani Jamaat 
-e-Islami open to challenge. Presents Hurriyat's 
attitude for not recognising either the growing 
conflict among militant groups or the discontent among 
ordinary Kashmiris. The discussions are likely to get 
stuck around the obstacle of the refusal to lay down 
arms or to give up the right to self-determination. 
69. SINHA (Aditya). Successful beginning. Pioneer. 6, 75; 
1996, March 18; 11. 
Describes the talks between Home Minister S.B. 
Chavan and nine hardcore militant leaders as a 
watershed development for the six year old armed 
separatist movement in J&K. The militant leaders are 
using the term freedom fighters for themselves which 
encompasses their incarnation as armed insurgents and 
their present role as political negotiators. 
Highlights the demand to restrain the security forces 
harassing and victimising innocent people and stop all 
offensive actions, release all detenues and disarm 
renegade militants like Kukka Parrey. States the 
upsurge in Farooq Abdullah's popularity when he 
decided to boycott the aborted Assembly elections only 
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because it seemed to most people that he would provide 
a breakthrough to the deadlock in the situation and 
would help steer a course towards normalcy for the 
valley. Babar Badar considers the dialoogue to be a 
process not a conclusion. 
70. SWAMI (Parveen). For democratic change: The need for 
popular government in Kashmir. Frontline. 13, 14; 
1996, July 26; 44-5. 
Stresses the need of negotiations between the 
Centre, the Forum for Permanent Resolution (FPR) 
formed by former insurgents Babar Badar, Bilal Lodhi, 
Imran Rahi and the National Conference. Efforts should 
be made to incorporate active insurgents and the right 
wing of Hurriyat Conference in the process. Mulayam 
Singh Yadav says that a bill on maximum autonomy will 
be forwarded in the coming session of Parliament to 
make it a reality. Indrajit Gupta says that no bill 
has been drafted and no decision was taken on the 
context of maximum autonomy. Farooq Abdullah is 
demanding for the restoration of 1952 status and the 
institution of an enquiry into the Hurriyat 
Conference's hawala transaction, including the alleged 
embazzlement of Rs 88 crores sent by Saudi Arabian 
sponsors for the reconstruction of The Charar-e-
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Sharief shrine. Mohamrad Maqbool Dar has more concern 
in securing a position in the Cabinet than campaigning 
for peace in the valley. 
71. TAVLEEN SINGH. Govt, has to convince Kashmiris to 
bring peace. News from India. 2, 24; 1995, June 12; 7, 
11. 
Highlights Yasin Malik's statement against the 
chance of elections within the framework ofthe Indian 
Constitution in J&K. Discusses Rao's policy of holding 
elections in the valley as he did two years ago in 
Punjab. Kashmir is being taken away from India by Home 
Minister S.B. Chavan and Rajesh Pilot by contradicting 
each otherpublicly both in India and abroad. The 
government is concentrating on convincing the world 
about Kashmir to remain with India instead of trying 
to convince Kashmiri's of its case. Suggests the 
Government to examine why security forces still have 
not managed to restore even law and order. 
, , , SEPARATIST MOVEMENT 
72. BHANDARE (Namita). Breaking the stalemate. Sunday. 21, 
17; 1994, April 24-30; 34-5. 
Criticises the government for always speaking 
with one voice on Kashmir that the militants agitating 
for azaadi are misguided souls by evil Pakistanis and 
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as the moment the political process be restored in the 
state, its residents would come to their senses and 
realise that their future lies in India. The leaders 
of the All-Party Hurriyat Conference set down with 
Kashmiri pandits and other non-Muslims from Jammu and 
Leh to sort out the best way to break the stalemate. 
S.B. Chavan is pushing for an election on the advice 
of Governor K.V. Krishna Rao. Briefly discusses the 
1987 elections of the state assembly when Muslim 
United Front led by Professor Abdul Ghani Lone has 
alleged them being rigged. The Centre is seriously 
toying with the idea of sending Karan Singh as the 
Governor of the State. 
73. MAZUMDAR (Sudip). Kashmir: Voting under ambush. News 
Week. 128, 12; 1996, September 16; 22. 
G.R. Naz is a profile in courage who put his 
life on the line among the pro-Pakistan separatists of 
Kashmir. H.D. Deve Gowda is calling for elections for 
the state assembly by promising railroads, airports, 
and new industries for Kashmir as well as maximum 
autonomy for its government. Awami League leader Yusuf 
Parrey claims there to be no jihad for which he has 
joined the movement to protect Islam. The Forum for 
Permanent Resolution of Jammu and Kashmir is backing 
the elections as necessary for a democratic process. 
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Expresses the call for a boycott of the vote by APHC. 
Asserts it to take more than election to recapture the 
Kashmiri's dream who remember their state being known 
mainly because of its beauty. Comments upon the front 
runner leader Farooq Abdullah who has to venture out 
only with the protection of platoons of bodyguards. 
74. MR CHAVAN'S Guests. Statesman. 137, 11; 1996, March 
17; 8. 
Comments on the agreement in New Delhi between 
the Government and militant leaders to work together 
to eliminate the gun culture in the Kashmir valley and 
to restore peace through confidence building measures. 
Chavan is a good judge of character but in the event 
of allegations by the Pakistani foreign office and the 
APHC about the four negotiators having little popular 
support, the already hawala striken Rao Government 
has to pay a heavy price on the eve of the elections. 
Chavan has alienated APHC in April 1994 when APHC sent 
a delegation to New Delhi to seek an assurance about 
Congress (l)-National Conference alliance will not be 
revived and Chavan refused to meet it. It is difficult 
for Chavan's guests to launch an effective counter-
offensive even if they are having a large following in 
the valley. 
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75. TAVLEEN SINGH. PM sleeps while Kashmir burns. News 
from India. 2, 44; 1995, November 6; 3, 7. 
Criticises P.V. Narsimha Rao for having a 
policy of criminal neglect towards Kashmir. The 
Ministry of External Affairs seems to be quite 
unconcerned and paying no attention to foreign 
hostages being taken by foreign militants in Kashmir. 
Narasimha Rao's way to ride out the storm by becoming 
as immobile as a yogi in a trance has ridden out 
Hazratbl, Charar-e-Sharief, hostage crisis, bomb 
blasts in Jammu, massacres, human rights violations 
and daily death tolls being rising steadily in J&K. 
Rao comes out of his yogic trance and recognise a few 
political realities,one of them is elections in 
Kashmir. Concludes that such a kind of approach is 
responsible for India's stumble from crisis to crisis 
without ever finding out whether the government even 
analysed. 
, , , , HOSTAGES 
76. BHATTACHARJEA (Ajit). Kashmir: Future of India at 
stake. Kashmir Times. 47, 236; 1995, August 26; 4. 
Discusses the firmness and sophistication of 
New Delhi in dealing with the hostage crises in Jammu 
and Kashmir. Provides a brief look ofthe abduction of 
Mufti's daughter Dr. Rubaiyah Sayeed in 1989 when 
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besides Dr. Farooq Abdullah's advise to hold out, the 
Centre agreed to free five militants, taken out in 
procession in Srinagar. Criticises the appointment of 
Jagmohan as Governor of State by the V.P. Singh 
Government which made the things worse. Shabir Shah and 
Yasin Malik asserts to distance themselves from armed 
militancy, but threats to their lives forced them to 
curtail their public activities. Evaluates the erosion 
of Kashmir's right to autonomy being widely recognised 
and promised when joining India in October 1947. Also 
evaluates the erosion of Delhi agreement between Sheik 
Mohammad Abdullah and Jawahar Lai Nehru in 1952, which 
kept the state outside the purview of Article 356. It 
will take foresight and determination to regain the 
valley's confidence and not only the future of Kashmir 
but that of India hangs in stake. 
, , , TERRORISM, DODA 
77. UNREST IN the valley. Competition Refresher. 12, 8; 
1994, August; 16, 147. 
Comments on the Central government's 
comprehensive plan involving the army, the Police and 
the Border Security Force to check growing militancy in 
the Doda region of J&K. Highlights Rajesh Pilot's 
statement for taking strict measures to check and 
eventually eliminate terrorism in the area. The 
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Government has to supplement the strength of the 
security forces in the area and the proposal to declare 
Doda as a disturbed should be considered. Discusses 
Pilot's idea of treating Doda and neighbouring Himachal 
areas as a single security unit to prevent the 
migration of Doda's population to Himachal areas. 
Provides an overview of 800 BJP workers led by L.K. 
Advani marching towards Jammu as the party's 14-day 
jail bharo movement. 
, , COMMUNALISM 
78. VINAYAK (Ramesh). Jammu: Resisting militancy. India 
Today. 18, 10; 1993, May 31; 42-3. 
States that a pragmatic policy which exploits 
the existing feeling against militancy in the Jammu 
region should be devised and implemented in Jammu and 
Kashmir. Doda is the only district in the whole region 
which has helped in the rise of militancy. BJP-RSS-VHP 
combine are demanding to declare Doda as a disturbed 
area and handing it over to army. Gives brief 
statements of Saidullah Tantray, Gh. Qadir Wani, 
Caudary Mohd Hussain and Bashir Ahmad Lone. Concludes 
that the political process in the state should be 
started, but the militancy should be replaced first to 
make any political initiative meaningful. 
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, CORRUPTION, HAWALA 
79. MASOOD HUSSAIN. Hawala comes to Kashmir. Radiance. 31, 
17; 1996, March 31-April 6; 14. 
Discusses the investigations of the Union Home 
Ministry into the payments made to 42 different leaders 
of the separatist movement in Kashmir which includes 
National Conference leaders also. Accuses the Home 
Ministry of bringing the Hawala to fore to silence the 
leaders of the All Party Hurriyat Conference. Expresses 
the reactions of Moulvi Umar Farooq, Syed Ali Shah 
Geelani, Abdul Ghani Lone, Shabir Ahmad Shah, Yasin 
Malik and Azam Inquilabi to the notice given to them. 
Comments on the arrest of Professor Ghulam Mohammad 
Sheikh of JVMC (Jhelum Valley Medical College) and 
Mufti Meraj, , Additional Advocate General of the 
State, carrying with a huge amount for Kashmiri 
militants. Concludes the exercise of serving notices to 
the Hurriyat leaders as futile one. Accepts that the 
militant movement is difficult to run on the meagre 
donations collected by the separatists or collected 
through extortions. 
, , ELECTIONS 
80. OR^OI (Surinder Singh). Kashmir needs extraordinary 
statesmanship. Valley Reporter. 2,13; 1995, December;6. 
Describes the vows of Kashmiri separatist 
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leaders to sabotage the elections in the valley who 
observed a complete shutdown when a team of Election 
Commission headed by Chief Election Commission T.N. 
Seshan visited the valley. Highlights the open-ended, 
broad-based, unconditional, without any parameters 
sincere dialogue as the need of the hour. Discusses 
Justice Bahauddin Farooqi's rejection of Election 
Commission of India having any power and jurisdiction 
to hold elections in Kashmir. Criticises Governor K.V. 
Krishna Rao who commits the holding of free and fair 
elections as the endeavour of his administration. 
Suggests Rao government to possess an extraordinary 
statesmanship and moral authority regarding Kashmir. 
Concludes that the operative words should be openness, 
generosity, modesty and respect for the popular will 
which in Kashmir the administration lacks. 
, , , LOK SABHA ,1996 
81. FAZILI (Ehsan). Jammu and Kashmir electionsrBattle for 
survival. Week. 14, 21; 1996, May 12; 27. 
The former militants are fighting a different 
kind of battle in the troubled state after throwing 
away their AK-47s and petrol-bombs. As the National 
Conference has boycotted the polls, the Congress, 
Janata Dal, BSP and the Panthars Party would face a 
stiff challenge from the former militant leaders and 
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their supporters who floated their own outfits to 
fight the elections. Briefly discusses the suspension 
of publication by the local dailies. Concludes that 
Ghulam Nabi Azad is the brain behind the People's 
Patriotic Front which fielded a number of candidates 
for the elections to be held in three phases on May 7, 
23 and 30. 
82. FAZILI (Ehsan). Jammu and Kashmir: Voters are wary. 
Week. 14, 23; 1996, May 26; 42. 
The voters are hesitant on going to polling 
booths for casting their votes as they seem to be 
caught between the militants and the reformed elements. 
Following the National Conference's decision to keep 
off elections, the prominent former militants are 
contesting from Anantnag. Highlights the spirit of 
voters on May 7 at Rajouri and Poonch who came out in 
significant numbers to caste their franchise braving a 
general strike called by the All-Party Hurriyat 
Conference. Concludes that the third and the last phase 
of elections will end on May 30 when Srinagar and 
Udhampur-Doda go to polls. 
83. JHA (Padmanand). Kashmir polls: In the shadow of the 
gun. Outlook. 2, 16; 1996, April 17; 14-5. 
Discusses the political problems in Jammu and 
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Kashmir . Highlights the decision of National 
Conference to keep it away from the poll exercise. 
Describes the new political groups jumping into the 
poll fray belonging to Kukka Parrey's Awami League and 
Wali Mohammad Wani's Awami Tehreek Party. 52 candidates 
are contesting for three constituencies of the Kashmir 
from the recognised political parties. The refusal of 
Abdul Aziz Zargar to contest from Anantnag has paved 
the way for Taj Mohi-ud-din. Abdul Qayoom expresses the 
party's decision to contest despite the situation looks 
unripe. The poll talk in the valley is resolving around 
who or which party to win. 
84. MACCUNE (Dalip). J&K: Electoral game. Rashtriya Sahara. 
3, 12; 1996, April; 17-9, 21. 
Describes that the revival of political process 
and the holding of parliamentary elections is a great 
miracle and a big gamble. Analyses the opinion poll 
conducted in the valley which reveals that 94 percent 
are against elections and 92 percent are fully 
supporting azaadi. Javed Mir, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, Syed 
Ali Shah Geelani and Maulana Abbas Ansarihave rejected 
the possibility of any candidates filing of paper for 
nominations. Ghulam Rasool Kar disagrees with them and 
asserts the people's keenness for a peaceful early 
elections in the state. Dr. Farooq Abdullah is 
demanding for the restoration of pre-1953 status as a 
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pre-conditions to participate in the elections. The 
holding of free and fair elections in the valley by the 
government would be a feather in its cap but if it 
fails, the situation will certainly take a tsit-spin 
creating further problems. 
85. MAHESHWARI (Anil), New beginning. Hindustan Times 
Sunday Magazine. 72, 145; 1996, May 26; 1. 
Analyses the position of different parties 
including National Conference, Congress, Praja Sa'biha in 
the elections of the past. The scars of poll rigging 
starts bleeding when the election time in the valley 
came closer, even in the times of Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah. Examines the state of elections to be held in 
May, the various players and the possibilities. 
Highlights the calls to boycott the elections by the 
All-Party Hurriyat Conference, National Conference and 
the Panun Kashmir. Ghulam Rasool Kar and Taj Mohiuddin 
have organised public meetings and padyatras in the 
valley with the tracitsupport of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon. 
Both Kar and Taj Mohiuddin who used to praise these 
militants have started expressing apprehensions by 
saying that the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon was not different 
from other terrorist groups as soon as Awami League 
decided to enter into the fray. Concludes that the 
people want their democratic rights and a 
representative government back. 
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86. OPPORTUNITY FOR peace. Statesman. 137, 124; 1996, May 
25; 8. 
The turnout of voters in the Lok Sabha 
Constituencies of J&K undermining the claim of 
disaffection with the democratic process is common 
throughout the State. Abdul Ghani Lone and Shabir Shah 
are feeling that the BJP government would be in a 
position to resolve the dispute despite its hardline 
stance on abrogation of Article 370 of the 
constitution. Criticises the Congress governments at 
the Centre which kept Sheikh Abdullah out of power for 
years which made a travesty of the electoral process 
and isntalled highly corrupt regimes in Srinagar. Any 
government is to be better than a Congress government 
to Kashmiris. Concludes that the Assembly elections are 
mooted by the Election Commission to enlarge the 
opportunity for peace opened by the Kashmiris. 
87. ZAFAR MERAJ. Kashmir: More question marks. Outlook. 2, 
17; 1996, April 24; 56. 
Those who are in favour of elections are 
obviously banking on the 'Punjab experiment' where the 
polls have been proved as a harbinger of peace. 
Describes that Farooq Abdullah's staying away is a 
definite setback to the efforts to infuse an element of 
credibility to the contest and another blow came by 
12B 
forcing Congress to field a little known party-
functionary Ghulam Mohammad Magami, since Mian Bashir 
has refused the Congress Party's mandate from Srinagar. 
Briefly discusses the joining of three anti-insurgency 
groups in the fray. The Awami League of Kukka Parrey is 
a leading one. Concludes that the decision to hold the 
elections, at least in the second and third phase might 
not be final. 
, , , , , CRITICISM 
88. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Voting undercoercion. India 
Today. 21, 11; 1996, June 15; 68-70. 
Criticises the way in which the parliamentary 
elections were held in the valley when security forces 
herded the voters to the polling stations and 
threatened them to vote and inspected marks on the 
fingers. The elections have repeated the Kashmir's 
history of 1987 when the government run by Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah overboard to defeat the Muslim United Front 
candidates. Polling staff which was brought in from 
Delhi, Punjab, Haryana and other states reveals that 
the Kashmiri voters were willing to put the ink mark on 
their finger nails. Explains National Conference's 
boycott and rejection of the contesting surrendered 
militants by the voters. Concludes that elections would 
be of no use until the new government at Centre opens a 
dialocc^ ne or reopens the delicate issue of autonomy. 
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89. SIDDIQUI (Rana A). J&K elections: Undemocratic in every 
sense. Mainstream. 34, 27; 1996, June 8; 4-5. 
Eyewitness accounts of an observers team 
discloses what really happened in Kashmir in the name 
of the elections. The holding of polls in an 
undemocratic way is the murder of democracy. States 
that most of the candidates participated in the fray 
were from the camps of the surrendered militants and at 
some places a few Congress or Janata Dal candidates 
were pitted against the military backed candidates and 
the veteran leaders who represented six constituencies 
in the State last time did not participate in this 
election. People were blood stained and shouting 
slogans like Azaadi and Allah-ho-Akbar and the 
candidates having no interest in their victory were 
stating themselves as small cogs in the wheel. 
Concludes that only seven Lok Sabha elections have been 
held so far since 1957, all the six elections are said 
to have been rigged and characterises 1996 election as 
undemcoratic in every sense of the term. 
90. SWAMI (Parveen). Surprise in Kashmir: The myth of 
coercian at large. Frontline. 13, 11; 1996, June 14; 
114-20. 
Discusses the second phase of elections in 
Baramulla and Anantnag on May 23. The high turnout is 
130 
the outcome of the coercian. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation correspondent David Loyn reports that the 
voters were being herded like cattle to the polling 
booths by the Army parsonnel. Abdul Rahid Misgar is 
hopeful to become Anantnag's representative in 
Parliament with the backing of the Awami League.Both 
Taj Mohiuddin in Anantnag and State Congress Chief 
Ghulam Rasool Kar in Baramulla are running effective 
campaigns aided by the support of some National 
Conference supporters. Syed Ali Shah Geelani asserts 
that the election is a farce and the government of 
India having been completely discredited. 
» ' ' ' , SELF DETERMINATION 
91. TASH (Abdul Qader). Self-determination: The key to 
Kashmir issue. Muslim World League Journal. 23, 11; 
1996, April; 8-9. 
Criticises India's stubborn policy in Kashmir 
and its refusal to grant the Kashmiris the right to 
self-determination. Highlights Farooq Abdullah's 
refusal for participating in thp elections and calling 
for a greater autonomy for the people of Kashmir. 
Farooq Abdullah alone has not opposed elections but the 
independent Election Commission too has voiced its 
opposition to the government plan. Mir Waiz Umar Farooq 
desires the members of the US Congress and other 
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American political institution to resolve the Kashmiri 
dispute peacefully. The key to a peaceful solution lies 
in India's recognition of the Kashmiri people's right 
to self determination. 
' ' ' ' , STATE TERRORIS^ f 
92. NOORANI (AG). Kashmir elections under Delhi-sponsored 
terrorists. Economic and Political Weekly. 31, 31; 
1996, August 3; 2059-60. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah has denounced the 
parliamentary polls in the State as a concocted and 
rigged exercise. Mohammad Maqbool Dar has alleged 
Delhi for sponsoring terrorists with the specific 
purpose of making it possible to hold at least a rigged 
election. States that the technique of State sponsored 
terrorist groups, being used by Latin American 
dictators to put down dissent, is now being used in 
Kashmir by a democratic government in New Delhi to 
create conditions for a free election. Highlights Dar's 
statement of gross excesses on the common people by 
Delhi-sponsored militants. The situation in Kashmir is 
not having improved to the extent but the contribution 
of these counter insurgent groups has wreaked havoc in 
the state. 
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STATE ASSEMBLY.1987, ALLIANCE, 
CONGRESS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
93. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. Challenge to the fundamentalists. 
Link. 29, 33; 1987, March 22, 15-6. 
Describes the Congress and the National 
Conference Alliance set to face a trial in the coming 
Assembly poll which predictably shaped into direct 
confrontation between the two ideologically opposite 
forces. The seriousness of anti-alliance is a challenge 
growing day by day with Islamic fundamentalists joining 
hands under the umbrella of Muslim United Front in the 
valley and the BJP in Jammu region. Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah's strategy of going for offensive against 
fundamentalists than allowing himself to be thrown on 
defensive as his detractors wanted to seem to be paying 
desired dividends for the alliance. The present 
scenario sharply contrasts with Farooq Abdullah who got 
bottled up in the valley. Concludes that the BJP is the 
only rival to the ruling alliance in Jammu region. 
94. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. Emergence of a new balance of forces. 
Link. 29, 28; 1987, February 15; 26-7. 
The assembly poll being held in the state on 
March 23 formalises new balance of political forces 
brought about by recent alliance between National 
Conference and the Congress. Discusses the dissolvation 
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of state assmebly in 1983 by Governor Jagmohan. The 
sixteen members of the National Conference broke away 
and formed their rival National Conference (Khalida) 
faction leading to the downfall of Farooq government 
and installation of short lived CM. Shah Government 
with the support of Congress. The National Confarence 
and the Congress is expected to yield some seats to 
each other from their respective strongholds in the 
coming elections. Analyses the party positions in all 
the three divisions of the State-Kashmir, Jammu and 
Ladakh. G.M. Shaw returned to active politics by 
joining hands with Muslim United Front. 
, , . , 1996 
95. BUTT (Ghazanfar). New Alignments. Nation and the World. 
6, 118; 1996, September 1; 14-5. 
Describes Mufti Syeed's exit from Janata Dal and 
joining Congress. Discusses the visit of Harkishan 
Singh Surjeet to J&K where he presented the formula of 
maximum degree of autonomy contained in the common 
minimum programme of the United Front. Mian Bashmir and 
Moulvi Iftikhar Ansari are unable to agree with G.R. 
Kar as the Pradesh Congress Committee president. The 
electoral fight will be fought between National 
Conference, Congress, BJP, CIP(M), CPI, Panther's party 
and some other newly formo'i outfits of reformed 
134 
militants. Azam Inquilabi alleges Hurriyat Conference 
leaders for the embezzlement of huge amounts of money 
received from abroad for looking after the victims of 
violence. Suggests the people to ensure the opportunity 
presented by the elections to install their own 
government. 
96. DEMOCRACY ON trial. Competition Master. 38, 3; 1996, 
October; 204. 
The suspension of elections for nearly a decade 
in the troubled State of J&K has amounted to denial of 
democracy. The Con'/gress-National Conference Coalition 
led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah is responsible for instances 
of ultras raising slogans in favour of Pakistan and 
hoisting the national flag of that country. Describes 
the elections as a chance for the political parties to 
feel the pulse of the people, apply the healing touch 
to their psychic hurts, pull them out oftheir trauma 
and shape their destiny. APHC is highly suspected party 
as its leaders are speaking their master's voice. 
Concludes that the Union government's dangled bait for 
quantum of autonomy to be decided by the elected 
representatives in the assembly is a big blow to the 
self-proclaimed messiah of the masses Dr. Abdullah. 
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97. KHARE (Harish). Colours of Kashmiri alienation. Hindu. 
119, 218; 1996, September 11; 10. 
The Kashmiris are finding the same Farooq 
Abdullah, the Mufti Sayeed and Ghulam Rasool Kar who 
compelled the youth to pick up AK-47 by their corrupt 
and crooked ways of the politics. The long lines 
outside the polling booths in the valley should not be 
interpreted as a rejection of the idea of militancy nor 
as any kind of reaffirmation of Kashmir as an integral 
part of India. Asserts that the Kashmiris have an 
agonising time to convince themselves for a 
democratically elected government in Srinagar. The APHC 
leadership may have squandered away its credibility but 
has not gone entirely unheard for what it preached all 
these years. Suggests that any autonomy package worked 
out for J&K must be designed to address not only the 
substance but also the psychology of alienation. 
98. RASHID AHMAD. Ground reality: The political process in 
the valley gains momentum. Sunday. 23, 28; 1996, July 
14-20; 34-6. 
Highlights the get together of leaders of a 
number of political parties at a function organised 
by the Kashmir unit of CPI(M) at the state owned 
Banquet Hall in Srinagar. The high point of the meeting 
on 22 June was to float a United Front comprising all 
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political parties under the leadership of Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah. Expresses the statement of Dr Farooq Abdullah 
to drop the demand for more autonomy for Kashmir as a 
pre-condition for participating in the polls. The 
alliance of National Conference and Congress in 1986 
was the greatest blunder committed by Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah in his political career. Comments on the 
relationship between National Conference and the Janata 
Dal. Dr. Farooq Abdullah has to forgive all his enemies 
and forget all differences of opinion only to wrest the 
initiative from the APHC. 
, , , , , PLEBISCITE 
99. FIRENGI. Kashmir: The great illusion. Hindustan Times. 
72, 264; 1996, September 22; 12. 
The only election Kashmiris are craving for 
would be plebiscite on whether they want to stay with 
India or secede. Dismisses Harish Khare's view that the 
Kashmiri voters have given one more chance to prove 
that the Indian polity retains the collective capacity 
to learn from its past mistakes. Asserts that 
India should know that the Kashmiris have not casted 
their votes because they wanted the return of normalcy 
and stability in the State. The Kashmiris are never 
going to surrender their aspiration towards independent 
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Kashmir. Concludes that the both Kashmirs will prelude 
to an eventual reunification of India and Pakistan in a 
loose confedration. 
, , , STATE TERRORISM 
lOO.JEELANI (Mustaq A). State terrorism in Kashmir. Islamic 
Future. 12, 59; 1996, August; 11-2. 
Criticises Indian tactics of counter-insurgency 
operations by promoting Kashmiri on Kashmiri violence 
in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir which in 
similar to black-on-black violence under the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. Describes the role of counter-
insurgent outfits Muslim Liberation Army, Ikhwanul-
Muslimoon and Muslim Mujahideen presently operating in 
Kashmir. Ghulam Rasool Kar has invited the former MLA 
Choudhary Jalaluddin to contest State elections as a 
Congress candidate. Discusses the death warrants of 
Nabi Azad against Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul Ghani 
Lone. Following the rejection of the offer of 
necessary security cover, APHC leaders have suggested 
that the recruitment of personnel be left to them. 
Concludes that the on-going struggle is eternal and 
Kashmiris are determined to achieve freedom or die in 
its pursuits. 
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, , PARTY 
101. CHOWDHARY (iRekha) . Politics and political actors in 
Kashmir. Kashmir Times. 49, 190; 1996, July 12; 4. 
The coming back of the political parties, which 
had been declared irrelevant and the political leaders 
who had gone into hybernation, in the valley are 
pursuing their business of politics with earnest. 
Comments on the NC's blame to centre in general and 
Congress in particular for the debacle in Kashmir. 
Congress blames Janata Dal for mismanaging the 
situation in 1989 and BJP puts the blame on all other 
parties for pusuing the policy of appeasement. This 
history of politics of discontent in Kashmir datesback 
to the 'New Kashmir Movement' and people have been 
forthcoming to support any leader or group who shows 
some promise and commitment in changing their lot. 
Concludes that the post-militancy politics has to face 
many challenges in bringing the people to mainstream 
of democratic politics. If political parties will fail 
to respond to the need of the hour, the present 
turning point may have to be turning point at all. 
, , , APHC, AUTONOMOUS COMMISSION 
102. KHARE (Harish). Kashmir Commission mooted. Hindu. 119, 
216; 1996, September 9; 11. 
Reports the most traditional political leaders 
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and Government functionaries congratulating themselves 
on the successful completion of the first phase of 
polling in J^K. APHC is satisfied of having registered 
its opposition to the electoral exercise. Provides the 
suggestion of Mahaz-e-Azaadi leader Azam Inquilabi for 
the formation of an autonomous commission consisting 
of eminent persons which could provide a bridge 
between freedom fighters and the Government of India 
to start a genuine process of political dialogue. 
Comments on Inquilabi's hopes about the nefarious 
motives to not again undo the promise made to the 
Kashmiris for restoring the lost autonomy. Concludes 
it as a matter of real politics that the authorities 
in New Delhi to not allow the pro-Pakistan forces time 
to regroup themselves to confront the new civilian 
government in Srinagar. 
, , , , AUTONOMOUS HILL COUNCIL LADAKH 
103. HARI OM. Is Hurriyat working for its disintegration. 
Daily Excelsior. 31, 326; 1995, November 25; 4-5. 
Criticises Hurriyat Conference, which 
consistently vouches for the separation of J&K from 
India and establishment of Nizame Mustafa, for staging 
a band and presenting a memo to UN General Secretary 
against the Leh Autonomous Hill Council. Highlights 
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S.A.S. Geelani, Omar Farooq, Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah 
threatening to teach Ladhakis a lesson by disrupting 
the supply line between Leh and the rest of the 
country. Sheikh Abdullah violated all norms ruthlessly 
and manipulated for the valley as many as 43 seats in 
75 member Legislative Assembly in 1951 to establish 
Kashmir's hegemony over the state politics, 
administration and economy. Suggests the Hurriyat 
Conference and Kashmiri leaders of Congress and NC to 
realise the formation of LAHC and loud clamours in 
Jammu for full political, administrative and economic 
powers to be the manifestations of the anger of the 
people of Jammu and Ladakh against the process of 
Kashmirization of State polity^ and economy. 
, , , , CONFLICTS 
104. DISUNITY IN Hurriyat. Muslim India. 14, 156; 1996, 
January; 25. 
States that the APHC is passing through a 
difficult phase and cracks looks apparent within it. 
Muslim Conference's vice-president Ghulam Nabi Sumzi 
is in favour of Kashmir's annexation with Pakistan, 
while Jammu be merged with India and Ladakhis should 
be asked to decide their fate. The main reason behind 
APHC's apparent crack would be the lack of unity where 
some parties are favouring Kashmiri's annexation with 
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Pakistan and some of them are supporting the demand of 
independent Kashmir. Shahid-ul-Tslam alleged some 
leaders of APHC as manipulators and are using the 
ongoing movement for their own political gains. 
Concludes that the serious crisis are brewing in APHC 
about the accountability of foreign funds directly 
paid to them. 
, DILEMMAS 
105. NOORANI (AG). Where do we go from here"? Frontline. 12, 
11; 1995, June 2; 108-11. 
Presents the views of Abdul Ghani Lone, Shabir 
Abnad Shah, Maulvi Umar Farooq,, Maulana Abbas Ansarl, 
Professor Abdul Ghani Bhatt and Azam Inquillabi in 
favour of tripartite talks involving the Government of 
India, the Governemnt of Pakistan and representatives 
of the Kashmiri people. All the leaders assert to 
recognise Kashnir as a territory under dispute which 
needs to be solved by peaceful means taking into 
consideration the genuine aspirations of the 
Kashmiris. Yasin Malik says that both India and 
Pakistan must withdraw their troops and the militants 
must surrender to a U.N. peacekeeping force so that 
both parts of the State would be completely under the 
control of U.N. Stresses on the need of a referendum 
under U.N. auspices to elect representatives who would 
participate in the talks. 
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106. SAWHNEY (Rairan R) . Dilemmas of the 'new' Kashmiri 
leadership. Kashmir Times. 49, 193; 1996, July 15; 4. 
Discusses the role of new leaders like Shabir 
Shah, Omar Farooq and Yasin Malik to play in resolving 
Kashmir problem. Some leaders are talking in terms of 
secularism and independence rather than merger with 
Pakistan. Shabir Shah is well placed to break the 
log iam which prevents the Hurriyat from talking to the 
Centre and an important part of any initiative to 
begin direct talks to reach a political settlement is 
based on maximum autonomy. Suggests younger leaders to 
respond to their people's yearning for peace without 
necessarily ending up as soft targets for the gunmen. 
Shabir Shah and other Hurriyat leaders shold become 
the bridge between India and Pakistan. Concludes that 
Shabir Shah, Omar Farooq and Yasin Malik will have to 
display sagacity beyond their years and act as 
statesmen by rising above of the pretty politics to 
resolve their dilemmas alongwith those of the people 
of Jammu and Kashmir. 
, , , , ELFCTTONS 
107. MALLA (Vijay). J^K: Crucial juncture. Rashtriya Sahara 
?, 7; 1995, November; 47-8. 
Describes that the State of JScK is once again 
agog with the speculations of electoral process. 
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Asserts the pertinent question of holding elections 
being discussed in all the political circles in the 
State. States the trade of unity of all the outfits in 
the shape of APHC now being exposed as the directions 
of the APHC leaders being openly spunned . Exprersses 
the revol*- of Tkhwan-ul Muslimoon against the 
atrocities committed by Pak-trained militants and 
foreign merceneries on the Kashmiris as the most 
noteworthy feature of the present political scenario. 
Reports the holding of the public meetings in 
Baramullah, Srinagar and Pulwama by the Congress and 
expects similar meetings under the auspices of 
National Conference and Janata Dal in the valley. 
Concludes the government having a political will to 
capitalise on the present scenario which seems quite 
favourable for the beginning of electoral process. 
, , , , , LOK SABHA, 1996 
108. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: A risky gamble. India 
Today. 21, 10; 1996, May 31; 108-110. 
The administration is counting the elections to 
deal a blow to militancy even as people in the valley 
are fearing to be caught between militants and 
security forces. Describes the first phase of election 
on May 7, when the All Party Hurriyat Conference was 
called for a hartal and on being forced to open their 
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shops, the shopkeepers raised slogans of no selection, 
no election, only freedom. Abdul Ghani Lone asserts 
that by forcing the shopkeepers to open up, the troops 
have only gave away their larger game plan for 
election day. Ghulam Rasool Kar demands the friendly 
militants should be disarmed. BJP has played its 
demand for the abrogation of Article 370. Reports 
discussions within the Tkhwan-ul-Muslimoon over the 
issue of distribution of funds. 
109. FAZILI (Ehsan). Morale-booster. Week. 14, 26; 1996, 
June 16; 22-3. 
Describes that despite frequent threats from 
militants and boycott by two major political parties, 
the National Conference and the Jamaat-e-Tslami, Lok 
Sabha elections ended successfully in the State after 
a gap of seven years. The elections to the six seats 
held in three phases was marked by sparring between 
the authorities and the All-Party Hurriyat Conference. 
The security forces threatened the people to come out 
and vote. APHC dubbed the elections as a fa-pee. Abdul 
Ghani Rhatt claims absence of voluntary participation 
of the people and asks that the credibility of the 
results is questionable. Concludes that the Congress 
has faced lit up once the results started coming out 
and bagged Srinagar, Baramulla, Ladakh and Jammu seats 
while the results of Anantnag and Udhampur have to 
i^ ^\m r\ ^\t 
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110. FLORY (Keith). Polls in J&K: The other side of the 
story. Statesman. 137, 136; 1996, June 8; 9. 
Lok Sabha polls in J&K have dispelled many 
misconceptions about conditions in the troubled region 
as the officials of both the Central and State 
Governments asserts. The people being tired of 
militant violence have realised the militant's promise 
of azaadi as an empty. The attracting - degree of 
popularity of contesting has forced the APHC to ease 
of their campaign of election boycott. The United 
Front Government is more flexible than its immediate 
predecessors on granting greater powers to the States. 
It may be more inclined to concede the package as Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah has demanded before he takes his party 
back to the political arena. The Congress is not in 
favour of Dr. Farooq Abdullah being given something 
substantially more that what P.V. Narasimha Rao 
offered. Concludes that the Kashmir watchers are 
anxiously awaiting an indication of the priority the 
United Front Government attaches to the restoration of 
popular rule in Kashmir. 
111. JOSHI (Binoo). Large Muslim turnout worries separatist 
groups. Statesman. 137, 112; 1996, May 11, 9. 
A large number of Muslim voters in Kashmir 
valley come forward to exercise their franchise 
despite a bandh call by the Murriyat Conference. 
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Senior Hurriyat leaders Syed AT i Shah Ceelam' Abdul 
f^ ham* Lone and Shabi r Shah were corapaigning from house 
to house in Sopore town as part of an effort to ensure 
the success of i-heir boycott call. Syed Ali Shah 
Heelani was talking *-he residents of Sopore about 
their each vote to be a betrayal of the cause of 
freedom and of the ^0 000 martyrs who laid down their 
lives. "^ he Congress anH the Awami League have 
organised a few rallies. Concludes that atleast a 
dozen rallies were being held by the candidates in 
different parts of the valley every day. 
11? KATT j^  i'Shiyam) . Poll atmosphere hotting up in valley. 
National Herald. 28, 46; 1PQ6, April 21; ^. 
Describes the valley in the grip of an election 
fever like the rest of the country. The straight fight 
is between the candidates contesting and the parties 
striving to create hurdles. National '"onference 
workers are compaigning to dissuade the people from 
casting their votes. Criticises All-Party Hurriyat 
Conference for opposing all efforts for restoration of 
democratic process. The setting up of counter 
insurgency Awami League is an insult to the injury of 
APHC leadership. Kukka Parrey dismisses the 
possibility of putting down his gun until he 
liquidates the enemies of Kashmir, Kashmiris and 
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Kashmiriyat. There will be no surprise if APHC and 
other anti-Tndia militant groups unleash a chain of 
disruptive actTvi<--ies with the support and backing of 
the TJakistani Government and its agencies. 
, , , , , STATE ASSEMBLY, 1996 
1,1?. J^K ASSEMBLY Polls. Sentinel . 14, 146; 1 ^ 9^6, September 
'9; 4. 
Describes the first phase of the Assembly polls 
in Jammu and Kashmir providing a clear indications of 
the way the political wind is turning in the State. 
Asserts the Hurriyat "Conference not given up their 
fight for azaadi and the people of Jammu and Kashmir 
not all happy to throw in their lot with India. 
Highlights the assurance of New Delhi of a much higher 
level of autonomy for the State being accepted as a 
pragmatic alternative to completely break with the 
Indian TTnion. The politicians of India and J8cK should 
learn from the past mistakes and make amends for the 
succession of administrative blunders committed 
earlier. Concludes it to be hardly surprising if more 
than half the electorates turn up at the hustings in 
the remaining phases. 
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114. SATlVANND. Give peace a chance. SaTook. 1, 8; 1996, 
September; 5-8. 
High!ights Kul Jamat Hurriyat Conference 
alongwith their Pak masters stepped up their 
activities to sabotage the poll process by upgrading 
the level of violence and intensifying lobbying with 
anti-India forces. Asserts the Huriyat leaders terming 
:^he proposed elections as farce when they met with 
foreign diplomats including US Ambassador in India 
Frank Wisner and a US Senator Hank Brown. Provides a 
brier view of a survey conducted by a Kashmiri 
expatriate leader in various districts of the valley 
which indicates that most Kashmiris still desire the 
right of self-determination and many turned pragmatic 
and felt the granting or autonomy to be a step towards 
their dream of Azaadi. Describes the Assembly 
elections to be the right opportunity for the people 
of J4K to elect their representatives who would have 
the necessary authority to negotiate with the 
Government of India of any package to all concerned. 
Concludes the Assembly elections as watershed which 
the people hope will not only bring normalcy but give 
them peace and dignity. 
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, HAZRATBAL CRISES 
115. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Unexpected advantage. 
India Today. 18, 23; 1993, December 15; 55, 57. 
The Centre's euphoria will be short-lived unless 
it exploits its gain by working out a new strategy to 
end the Hazratbal crises and that of Kashmir also. 
Throws lights on the package worked out with middleman 
Idris, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front's 
military advisor. Expresses All-Party Hurriyat 
Conference's effort to consolidate its position which 
barred people from going into Hazratbal shrine until 
the BSE moves out of the area. Discusses Home Minister 
S.B. Chavan's call for all party talks on Kashmir. 
Gives the statements of a senior Hurriyat leader 
Maulana Abbas Ansari in favour of talks without any 
preconditions and not within the framework of Indian 
constitution. Concludes with a discussion on confusion 
and disarray among militant organisation and states 
that the Hazratbal anticlimax came as disappointment 
for the common Kashmiris who lent support to a 35-day 
hartal called by All-Party Hurriyat Conference against 
the seige. Also claims the relatively moderate 
Hurriyat leaders no longer be scoffed at a irrelevant 
to Kashmir's politics. 
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, KASHMIR AWARRENESS BUREAU 
116. BUTT (Ghazanfar). Hurriyat Conference: More glass than 
substance. Daily Excelsior. 31, 322; 1995, November 
21; 4. 
Discusses the decision of the Kul Jamaat 
Hurriyat Conference to open a Kashmir Awarreness 
Bureau in New Delhi. The purpose of opening Kashmir 
Awarness Bureau is to inform the people of India about 
the demands of Kashmiri's and the role of the Hurriyat 
Conference. Highlights the agreement being made after 
nine months of deliberations that the Hurriyat 
Conference has to work for the liberation of Kashmir 
from India leaving the issue of its accession to 
Pakistan or independence. Hurriyat was unable to 
establish peace among among the bickering groups after 
the peaceful resolution of the Hazratbal crisis in 
November 1993. Concludes that the Hurriyat leaders 
should have a more realistic view after their exposure 
to the rest of India and the world. 
, , , , PEACE PROCESS 
117. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Peace bombshell. India 
Today. 21, 4; 1996, February 29; 72-3. 
The four separatist leaders Babar Badar, Bilal 
Lodhi, Imran Rahi and Mohi-ud-Din are throwing a 
direct challenge at the Hurriyat as they announce 
their willingness to hold unconditional talks with the 
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centre. The four leaders, in their criticism of the 
Hurriyat, articulated and echoed the views of the 
common Kashmiri increasingly disenchanted with the 
visibly affluent life style and the rigid politics of 
the Hurriyat leadership. While Ghulam Rasool Kar and 
Yousuf Tarigami welcomes the offer of talks, Shabir 
Ahmad Shah a senior Hurriyat leader claims it a 
governmental conspir:acy and Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
decides not to make any statement. Concludes that the 
lending of a patient ear to the four commanders by 
the Government will provide ammunition to the 
Hurriyat and pro-Pak militants. 
118. BUKHARI (Shujaat). Offer for talks. Frontline. 13, 4; 
1996, February 24-March 8; 34. 
Describes the offer by militant leaders to 
start unconditional bilateral talks with New Delhi as 
the most important political development in Kashmir 
since the guns started sounding in 1988. Criticises 
APHC's stand which requires Pakistan's participation 
in any resolution of the dispute. Gives a brief view 
of the career and the credentials of the four leaders 
Imran Rahi, Bilal Lodhi, Babar Badar and Ghulam 
Mohiuddin Lone. Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Yasin Malik 
asserts that the four leaders have diluted their 
position and could not fulfil the people's 
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aspirations. Concludes that the issue of talks 
remains at the centrestate of Kashmiri politics for 
many months to come. 
119. BUTT (Ghazanfar). Hurriyat trying to swim against 
tide. Daily Excelsior. 32, 62; 1996, March 3; 4. 
The offer made by four militant leaders caught 
both New Delhi as well as the 36-member organisation 
APHC by surprise. Describes S.B. Chavan's welcome of 
the offer and Home Secretary's approval of the 
Centre to be ready for talks. Azam Inquilabi 
considers Hurriyat to be a complete failure and 
urging leaders of different organisations to steer 
clear of Hurriyat and try to find a solution to the 
problem through dialogue. Highlights JKLF's proposal 
for allowing the APHC leaders to visit POK to prepare 
ground for tripartite talks. The courage of 
conviction by Babar Badar and his friends deserves 
the support of all political parties in the state. 
Suggests Harkat-ul-Ansar and the Hurriyat Conference 
to realise the turning tide and stop to swifn against 
it. 
120. BUTT (Ghazanfar). Peace process gathers momentum. 
Daily Excelsior. 31, 30; 1995, January 30; 4. 
The militant leaders of J&K are making the 
right assessment that the people of the state, with 
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very few exceptions, desire an early return of peace. 
Shabir Shah, Azam Inquilabi and Yasin have underlined 
the need for militants to give up the gun and start a 
dialogue to find a solution to the problems in the 
state. Describes the proposals made by Shabir Shah 
for a merger of all the different groups represented 
in the Hurriyat Conference. The people in the Kashmir 
Valley are increasingly fed up with the incidents of 
robbery, extortion and molestation indulged in by the 
militant groups. Syed Salahuddin expressed Hizbul 
Mujahideen's commitment to continue gun battle to 
fulfill the expectations of Kashmiris. 
121. FAZILI (Ehsan). Language of peace. Week. 14, 11; 
1996, March 3; 21-2. 
Describes the offer to hold unconditional talks 
with the Centre by the ' four former-militant 
commanders Babar Badar, Imran Rahi, Bilal Lodhi and 
Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din. Several militant groups including 
the All-Party Hurriyat Confereence came out against 
the move by the militant leaders. Master Ahsan Dar 
appealed for support for the new initiative. Four 
militant leaders accused APHC for failure in its 
objectives as being formed to represent the 
aspirations of the Kashmiris. APHC chairman Mirwaiz 
Umar Farooq asserts to represent the aspirations of 
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the people but never compromise its internationally 
recognised stand on Kashmir issue. The centre is 
catious to the offer because of its keenness on 
holding the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir, 
the offer is a great promise towards an era of peace. 
122. GEELANI (Syed Ali Shah). Paradise on earth now 
Martyrs' graveyard. News from India. 2, 48; 1995, 
December 4 3-6. 
The present movement for the right of self-
determination should not be dubbed as anti-national 
or separatist. India's first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru on August 7, 1952 has asked for 
plebescite for the people of Kashmir. Describes that 
Kashmir is a continuing tragedy for last forty eight 
years as the most bloody conflict. All kinds of 
excesses are being committed on its unfortunate 
people. All kinds o^ excesses are being committed on 
its unfortunate people. The APHC leadership is 
working day and night to find a peaceful solution to 
the Kashmir problem to save people in India and 
Pakistan from a nuclear disaster. Concludes that the 
leaders are thinking around their nose and deluding 
themselves into self-deception by advocating resump-
tion of political process or elections as an answer 
to the dispute. 
123. KALOO (Fayaz Ahmed). Under control. Pioneer. 6, 76; 
1996, March 19; 11. 
The dialogue between the Home Minister and 
militant leaders is a major breakthrough for the 
Government. Describes the stand of Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah for the restoration of the 1952 positions 
for the State which worries the Centre. Describes 
APHC as an arrangement between different secessionist 
politicians who have been bitter opponents till the 
beginning of the strife holding divergent views about 
the prospects of the state in future.The shrinking of 
APHC to the Valley and non-participation of people 
from Jammu and Ladakh regions in it are two big 
stumbling blocks for the APHC. Highlights the hostage 
drama involving four foreigners and the developments 
in this drama have swung between guarded hope and 
total despair. Concldues that the hostages have been 
shifted back to thie valley from Doda district will be 
prelude to their possible release. 
124. KAQL (Shyam). Changing outlook in Kashmir. National 
Herald. 28, 105; 1996, June 23; 5. 
The political parties and politicians should 
prefer to forget their earlier perceptions, 
appraisals and attitudes especially in view of the 
inpending State Assembly elections. National 
Conference is ruing its decision to staying away of 
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elections until the internal autonomy to the State in 
keeping with the 1952 Delhi Aggreement not to be 
granted. G.R. Kar says that the National Conference 
stayed away from the Lok Sabha polls only because of 
the wrath of the anti-India insurgents. APHC Chairman 
Maulvi Umar Farooq says APHC's willingness to 
participate in the elections if held to choose true 
representatives of people. The success of Assembly 
elections will provide a base for Kashmir to enter in 
an era of peace and prosperity. 
125. PILLAI (Ajith). Kashmir: A mood for change. Outlook. 
2, 9; 1996, February 28; 14-6. 
Highlights the offer by four militant leaders 
to talk to the government which reflects the 
Hurriyat's declining influence. It is the indication 
of the feeling of Kashmiris that a beginning has to 
be made to put an end to the violence. The four 
leaders asserts that the APHC lacks initiative and 
restricted itself to staging dharnas to gain the 
maximum media attention. They also accused them of 
lacking political vision and having succumbed to 
five-star culture and driving around in fancy cars 
rather than giving a thought to the people of 
Kashmir. Criticises the assertions of the APHC 
leaders who dubbed the four militant leaders as 
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traitors. Yasin Malik, Azam Inquillabi and Abu 
Junaid described APHC's contribution to settling the 
Kashmir issue as zero. Concludes that the four 
leaders have received a positive signal so far as the 
centre is concerned. 
126. SINHA (Aditya). Moment of reckoning. Pioneer. 6, 78; 
1996, March 21; 11. 
Since four militant leaders have made their 
peace initiative on February 7, the Hurriyat 
Conference has not only denounced the offer but has 
termed the militant leaders as renegades. The 
Hurriyat Conference is still insisting on tripartite 
talks between India, Pakistan and the representatives 
of Kashmir to resolve theKashmir issue. Considers 
Shabir Shah as the only leader to make use of recent 
turn of events and the current juncture will be a 
watershed moment in his nascent political career. 
Shabir Shah is the Nelson Mandela of the Valley who 
has built up an image of mythical proportions because 
of his extended stint in jail. Shabir Shah's highly 
publicised visits to other regions of J&K with aims 
to enlist the support of the people of those regions 
to style himself as a political successor of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah. Concludes that the politics is an 
art of the possible and a true leader will be one who 
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feels the pulse of his people. The present movement 
is moment of reckoning for Shabir Shah. 
, , , , SFT.F DETERMINATION 
127. HARI OM. J&K does not qualify for right to self-
determination. Daily Excelsior. 31, 109; 1995, April 
20; 4. 
Discusses the stand of top ranking Hurriyat 
leaders for the right of self-determination as 
promised under the UN resolutions. Criticises 
Hurriyat Conference for attracting tremendous 
publicity and attention on a global scale owing to 
their recognition by the QIC and other inimical to 
India. Hurriyat is making frantic efforts to somehow 
make New Delhi accept their insistence on right to 
self-determination and the Hurriyat- New Delhi 
dialogue. All the religious and political 
organisations have been divided into four factions 
and are clamouring for the state's independence from 
both India and Pakistan, merger with Pakistan, 
pre-1953 constitutional position and the state's 
closer integration with India. Suggests Hurriyat to 
participate in the democratic process and then avail 
themselves of people to review the existing 
Centre-State relationship and inter-regional 
relations. 
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, PUBLIC DISENCHANTMENT 
128. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: New disenchantment. India 
Today. 20, 24; 1995, December 31; 74-5, 77. 
Describes the public opinion towards different 
political parties in Jammu and Kashmir since 
independence. Gives a brief overview of the policies 
of Jamaat-e-Islami, People's Conference, People's 
League and other parties merged together in All Party 
Hurriyat Conference. Briefly explains the popularity 
of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhatt, 
Professor Abdul Ghani Lone, Yasin Malik, Shabir Ahmad 
Shah in the court of the public. Dr. Abdullah with 
his rigid stand on autonomy may wean away some 
Hurriyat members. A section of the Hurriyat 
Conference leadership is coming under increasing 
public criticism with questions being raised about 
its commitment and trappings of ostentation. 
Concludes that the Hurriyat is seeking to fill the 
political vaccum with talks of self-determination but 
the public disenchantment with them is rising. 
, , , , SEPARATIST MOVEMENT 
129. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Bracing for showdown. 
India Today. 21, 7; 1996, April 15; 64-6. 
The shootout at the Hazratbal following the 
talks between the Government and the militants marks 
the beginning-of a potentially troubled run up to the 
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polls. New Delhi was bungled by failing to take the 
State government into confidence regarding the talks 
with the Forum for the Permanent Resolution of Jammu 
and Kashmir led by Babar Badar. A senior member of 
the Hurriyat Conference has condemned the dialogue 
and election politics. The demand of the Forum to 
disarm surrendered militants will not be acceptable 
to the BSF and the army. Farooq Abdullah isbovmd to 
retract from his stated position of not participating 
in any election till the pre-1953 position on 
autonomy will be restored. The state administration 
is facing shortcomings to contain with the violence 
and poll hurdles and the run-up to the polls is 
likely to be marked by violence and protests instead 
of campaign rallies and speeches. 
130. FAZILI (Ehsan). Farewell to arms. Week. 14, 15; 1996, 
March 31; 26. 
The government is happy to provide cash 
incentives to the militants who will join the 
national mainstream and shun the path of gun. Top 
militant leaders are still insisting on their basic 
demand of the right for self-determination. Operation 
Balakote leader Azam Inquillabi has favoured talks of 
a peace process between India, Pakistan and the 
Kashmiris. Ansarul Haque and Hilal Hyder criticises 
the All-Party Hurriyat Conference on its failure to 
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come up to the expectations of the people. Describes 
that the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon's supreme commander 
Jamsheed Shdirazi alias Kukka Parrey is a new force 
to reckon with in Kashmir with his fight against 
Jamaat-e-Islami and its armed wing Hizbul Mujahideen 
attributes the increased number of killings in inter-
group rivalry clashes and observes them only because 
of the security cover to the surrendered militants of 
Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon. 
131. KAPUR (ML). Jammu and the Hurriyat Conference. 
Kashmir Times. 46, 27; 1995, January 28; 4. 
Kashmir is passing through very hard times for 
some years. Some eminent Kashmiri leaders of the 
Hurriyat Conference are becoming very keen to seek 
the help of the people of Jammu in their distress. 
Describes the Hurriyat Conference known to consist of 
heterogeneous elements with anti-India attitude. 
Shabir Shah has stressed upon the unity of command 
for the myriad constituents of the Hurriyat 
Conference by taking the people of Jammu and Ladakh 
with the Kashmiri's in the struggle for self 
determination. Sayeed Ali Geelani says that the 
people of Doda, Poonch and Rajouri are supporting for 
the restoration of their birth right of self- determi-
nation. Sums up that a pre-requisite to any talks 
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with New Delhi on the problem would be a dialogue 
between the representatives of Jammu, Kashmir and 
Ladakh to arrive at an agreed political and 
administrative framework for the State. 
132. PRO-PAK GROUPS of Kashmir. Patriot. 33, 329; 1996, 
March 16; 4. 
Comments on the Hurriyat leaders and other 
hotheads who are flexing their trigger-fingers on a 
misguided mission waited for the proxy war to 
escalate. The people of Kashmir having caught in the 
maze of violence are wretchedly disillusioned with 
the promises of Pakistan's intervention in the 
valley. APHC has showed signs of collapsing in an 
untidy heap under the weight of conflicting 
ambitions. The offer of four pro-Pakistan militant 
leaders to talk to New Delhi without being cramped by 
Hurriyat's wish-bone of Pakistan is of much 
significance distancing themselves from terrorists 
theme song of succession. Concludes that Chavan's 
offer to keep the doors open even for those groups 
which have definite links with Pakistan will be a 
bold move. 
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133. RAMACHANDRAN (Shastri). Can we hold onto Kashmir'? 
Illustrated Weekly of India. 108, 22; 1993, May 29-
June 4; 28-31. 
The political and militant leaders, while 
sweeping in their condemnation of the Government of 
India have repeateldy asserted one of their slogans 
as to leave Kashmir, free India. Highlights the 
police revolt and a strike by government employees 
coincided with a host of other protest actions. 
Prof. Abdul Ghani Lone and Maulvi Abbas Ansari claims 
that the National Conference is non-existent in Jaramu 
and Kashmir. Prof. Abdul Ghani Lone asserts that 
except militarily, in what way does the Indian 
government control us? Every Kashmiri, would be a 
militant fighting for freedom and the right to self-
determination. Concludes that all Kashmiri leaders 
praise for the human rights groups in the country and 
their concern is proof of the Indian people's support 
for their right to self-determination. 
,DEATH WARRANTS 
134. WANI (Izhar). Hurriyat leaders reject death threat as 
a poly. News from India. 3, 10; 1996, March 4; 7. 
Describes the death warrants issued by the 
militants against four top leaders of the Hurriyat 
Conference as a poly of the government to eliminate 
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alledging the government and its agents making 
attempts on their lives. Also presents Javed Mir and 
Qazi Ahadullah of Jamaat-i-Islami stressing to take 
the ongoing struggle to its logical end. Discusses 
the statement of Maulvi Umar Farooq which says the 
security agencies having taken renegrade militants 
into fold and urging them to kill Kashmiris and their 
leaders. Provides Abdul ghani Lone's statement which 
urges the world community to pressurise India to 
stop the represssion in Kashmir. Concludes with the 
statement of Maulvi Umar Farooq which warns the 
separatist group against calling for a general 
strike. 
, , , AWAMI LEAGUE, ELECTIONS, LOK SABHA, 
1996 
135. KARP (Jonathan). Sleeping with the enemy. Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 159, 21; 1996, May 23; 19-20. 
Describes the elections in the valley to be 
farce. It was not smooth when the Muslim dominated 
Kashmir valley went to the polls on May 23 and May 
30. The newly pro-India groups are helping the 
security forces to gain the upper hand in their fight 
against a six-year-old separatist uprising in the 
Himalayan state. Syed Ali Shah Geelani states that 
the last weapon to damage the Jamaat-e-Islami by 
counter insurgents supported by security forces will 
fail.A hew political party Awami League backed by 
Kukka Parrey has fielded its candidates for all six 
parliamentary seats in the State. Reveals how the 
counter-insurgency movement took shape when India 
began freeing detained militants and offering 
incentives for guerrillas to surrender. 
136. PILLAI (Ajith) and ZAFAR MERAJ. Kashmir: The danger 
from within. Outlook. 2, 20; 1996, May 15; 14-6. 
States that with the National Conference, the 
Awami League has emerged as the Congress main rival. 
Congressmen are finding it hard to come to terms with 
the presence of the Awami League and fear it will use 
gun power to get votes. Chamanlal Gupta states no 
elections till the terrorism is brought to an end. 
Asserts that Doda is a dangerous zone and demands the 
right kind of security for compaigning in the zone. 
Discusses Hurriyat Conference's threat to launch an 
anti-election awareness campaign among the voters. 
Concludes that the Congress for the first time in its 
history will be fighting a group sponsored by the 
Home Ministry in Delhi. 
, , , , , , , PEACE PROCESS 
137. BEDI (Rahul). Army can never ring in peace in Kashmir 
Pioneer. 6, 150; 1995, June 1; 10. 
Describes Kashmir's cynical, unending cycle of 
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violence which the security forces claims to have 
been brotight down to acceptable levels to make the 
parliamentary elections possible. The elections will be 
complex and deadly game of Chinese whispers being 
played out. Delhi's only Indian in Kashmir is Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah living sadly in South-end-on-sea in 
England. Asserts Kukka Parrey's newly formed Awami 
League party for all its worth is merely confirming 
the old age adge that never believe anything till 
denied. Kukka Parrey has to be sufficiently 
politicised to rescue Kashmir and to dismiss the 
indispensability of the mercurial Abdullah. Concludes 
that Kashmir should be accepted as disputed to be 
settled down diplomatically. 
, , , , , STATE ASSEMBLY, 1996 
138. PUSHKARNA (Vijaya). Give peace a chance. Week. 14, 
38; 1996, September 8;27-30. 
Criticises the government for not disarming the 
renegade militant's political group Awami League 
campaigning for their candidates with openly carrying 
guns. Awami League has posed a democratic challenge 
to the National Conference if not acted like pro-Pak 
militants. Dr. Farooq Abdullah criticised Indrajit 
Gupta's statement for making Jammu a separate state 
and Leh a Union Territory. The elections will be a 
measure of sincerety of the government at a time when 
the UN is planning to drop the Kashmir resolution 
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from the Security Council agenda. Expresses the 
people having no trust in any political party even 
the Hurriyat. For them the elections will be 
pointless and the politicians to be selfish and 
corrupt in J&K. The choice before the people will be 
between Indian National Conference, more Indian 
Congress and Janata Dal and most Indian Awami 
League. 
> , , BJP, AUTONOMY 
139. PURI (Balraj). J&K comes alive to sound of autonomy. 
Times of India. 159, 218; 1996, September 13; 12. 
The BJP, which is consistently opposed to the 
demand for regional autonomy ever since raised in 
early 50's is now supporting the idea of regional 
councils as its main plank. National Conference, BSP, 
CPM and Jammu Autonomy Front are the main supporters 
of the regional autonomy. Congress and Janata Dal 
have yet to define their stand on the issue. UF has 
no definite Jammu policy except an assurance to meet 
the aspirations of all the regions of the state. BJP 
is trying to transcend its upper caste, urban, Hindu 
character by providing tickets to some Muslim, Sikh 
and Schedule caste c'andidates. The recent promise of 
greater autonomy to the State by the UF government 
has enthused voters to participate in large numbers 
in the valley. The people will be certainly happier 
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and serving the cause of democracy if the choice of 
parties and issues in the coming elections would be 
wider. 
, , , , , ARTICLE 370 
140. MALKANI (KR). No debates. Illustrated Weekly of India. 
108, 22; 1993, May 29-June 4; 33. 
States that it is only the BJP which could 
solve the Kashmir problem because of having a clear 
and consistent view of the Kashmir problem. The 
introduction of Article 370 in the Constitution has 
given a special, separate and separatist status to 
the State and has planted the idea of an independent 
Kashmir in the mind of Sheikh Abdullah. Discusses the 
movement launched by Praja Ihr'ishad in 1952 supported 
by Jana Sangh for full integration of the state in 
the dominion of India. Criticises the exit of Bakhshi 
Ghulam Mohammad as Chief Minister of the State under 
Nehru's mysterious Kamraj Plan which encouraged 
^^ icistan to play games in Kashmir. The VP Singh 
government has capitulated to the extremists when it 
released notorious terrorists to secure the release 
of Rubaiya Sayeed. 
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141. VERGHESE (BG). Autonomy for Kashmir: Form and 
content. Indian Express. 63, 357; 1995, October 28; 
8. 
Discusses the talks of political settlement in 
J&K. Derives the discussions on the quantum of 
autonomy to be conceded to or won by the troubled 
state of J&K. Criticises BJP for advertising the 
abrogation of Article 370 in order to integrate J&K 
fully with India. There is no reason which favours 
not to restore the J&K flag or to let the State print 
its own currency notes and postage stamps. The J&K 
has been accorded with the right to review the 
extension of Central laws on welfare measures, 
cultural matters, social security, personal law and 
procedural laws on any matter relatable to the 
concurrent list after 1953. P.V. Narasimha Rao is 
willing to discuss autonomy short of independence 
within the framework of Article 1 Schedule 1 and the 
Delhi Agreement. 
, , , , COMMUNALISM 
142. SURANA (Pannalal). Strengthen brotherly ties withp'eopli 
of Kashmir. Janata. 45, 32; 1990, November 4; 82. 
Asserts that the BJP is making ground for its 
axe of communalism by shouting that Hindus are being 
harassed and stating Muslims in the valley as 
170 
traitors. The problemm has arised when the militants 
started indiscriminate firing and the victims were 
both Hindus and Muslims. Criticises the demand of BJP 
to protect Hindus in the valley. Mentions Jagmohan's 
crookedly behaviour in retaliation to the demand. The 
demand is totally based on communalism making the 
problem more difficult to be faced and settled down. 
Jagmohan has pulled out as many Hindu families as 
possible from the valley to Jammu and ordered 
security forces to embark upon a combing operation in 
the valley. 
, , , , , ARMY RJLE 
143. NAULAKHA (Gautam). India turns clock back. Economic 
and Political Weekly. 28, 21; 1993, May 22; 1017-8. 
Highlights the decision to impose army rule in 
Kashmir, which represents a tragic turn of policy as 
much for India as for the people of Kashmir. The 
government has been moving in precisely the 
directions of BJP and the Hindu chauvinists. The 
militancy must be fought politically by weakening the 
bond between the masses and the militants. 
Dismantling of the regime of terror will alone 
restore the political process and allow healthy 
contention between divergent objectives of various 
political groups within Kashmir to come to fore. 
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, EKTA YATRA 
144. BAZAZ (Sajjad). Boomerangs. Mountain Valley Kashmir. 
1, 2; 1992, March; 9-10. 
Provides an overview of the Ekta Yatra 
organised by BJP led by Dr. Murali Manohar Joshi to 
hoist the Indian Flag in the historical Lai Chowk 
with Kashmiris participation. Criticises BJP for 
exploiting the sentiments of the people of the 
country in the name of Hindu Rashtra. Analyses the 
impact of yatra which proved to be fruitful for the 
Kashmir freedom struggle and a political death of 
the BJP. Yatra has united the front line militant 
outfT*-?5 like Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and 
the Hizbul Mujahideen. One of the officers of CRPF 
says that these bloody politician have ruined the 
country just for their goal of achieving the seat of 
power. Concludes that the reversals suffered by the 
entire Indian political set up in Kashmir is a loss 
which no amount of complacency and egotism will 
compensate. 
145. NOOR-UL-QAMRAIN. Dangerous drift. Mountain Valley 
Kashmir. 1, 2; 1992, March; 24-5. 
Ekta Yatra of BJP has not only proved an 
adhesive for unification of the militant ranks but 
also has galvanised the mass support in favour of 
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the militants. The situation is the worst one ever 
seen. The decision of the government to form a ground 
for the political activities is a jeopardy. Evaluates 
the governments' indication of the possible release 
of hundreds of detenues including Shabir Ahmad Shah 
of People's League and Syed Ali Geelani of Jamaat-e-
Islami. Killings by the security forces has only 
added fuel to the fire and deepening the wedge 
between the government and the masses. Concludes that 
the events between Ekta Yatra of BJP and Peace March 
of JKLF proved a catalyst for further degenerating 
the situation. 
, , , , , TEMPLES 
146. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir temples: Damaging lies. 
India Today. 18, 4; 1993, February 28; 24-8. 
Highlights the statement of L.K. Advani that 
all the political parties should raise the voice 
against the temples broken in Kashmir. Criticises the 
statements of Advani and BJP leaders by making 
investigations backed by photographic evidence. BJP 
and its leadership is using big lies in order to 
score political points. The effect of the withdrawal 
of support of Rajiv Gandhi's government to G.M. 
Shah's government in J&K was followed by communal 
riots. Provides a list of temples which according to 
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BJP have been broken or damaged. Also provides a 
brief interview of L.K. Advani. 38 places of worship 
which have been damaged between 1989 and 1991 
includes 16 mosques or mosques related property. 
Concludes that the story is BJP's propaganda which 
should be demolished. The big lies can fool some of 
the people some of the time but not all of the people 
all of the time. 
, , , , DELIMITATION COMMISSION 
147. HARI OM. J&K delimitation. Daily Excelsior. 31, 70; 
1995, March 11; 4. 
Discusses BJP's demand for the appointment of a 
new delimitation commission for the purpose of 
redrawing the boundaries of the assembly segments 
based on population,area and nature of terrain. The 
charge of the BJP and the Panthers Party about the 
recommendations of the delimitation commission is 
highly irrational. Describes the demand of Budhists, 
Gujjars and Bakarwals for the reservation of a 
certain number of constituencies under the schedule 
tribe category. Highlights the conflict between T.N. 
Seshan and Governor K.V. Krishna Rao over the 
recommendations of the commission. Criticises Union 
Law Ministry for concluding recommendations to be 
well balanced which has compounded the situation and 
led to protests and litigation. Centre should ask 
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the State Government to redraw the boundaries of the 
assembly segments in a manner which gives Jammu, 
Kashmir and Ladakh due legitimate. 
, MIGRANTS 
148. MATTOO (Amitabh). How green was my valley. 
Illustrated Weekly of India. 108, 3; 1993, January 
16-22; 18-9. 
The diaspora of the Kashmiri Pandits have no 
parallel in the recent Indian history. The community 
is living in self-imposed exile •>" tent-sin camps in 
Nagrota, Udhampur and Jammu. Shiv Sena, BJP and RSS 
demands that migrants should be sent back to the 
valley as soon as possible. Highlights the killing of 
state BJP unit Pandit leader Tikka Lai Taploo for 
reasons other than being a Hindu. Describes the 
reasons according to Pandits which acted as the 
catalysts for their leaving from Kashmir. Pandits are 
feeling insecure since 1986 when Congress engineered 
communal riots and led to social boycott of the 
Pandits in the state. Rajesh, a young engineer, hopes 
to begin negotiations with the JKLF and the Hizbul 
Mujahideen and is willing to join any movement for 
the rights of all Kashmiris. 
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, CONGRESS, ATfTONOMOUS HILL COUNCIL 
LADAKH 
149. JAMMU ^ KASHMIR: Autonomous Hill Council for Ladakh. 
Current Topics. 19, 1; 1993, January; 13-4. 
Comments on Rajiv Gandhi's idea of setting up 
of an Autonomous Hill Council for Ladakh in 
coordination with Ladakh Buddhist Association which 
dropped its earlier demand for granting of Union 
Territory status to Ladakh. The framework being 
worked out at a tripartite meeting between Buta 
Singh, Ladakh Budhist Association leaders and Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah in 1989 has resulted in signing of an 
agreement on 29th October, 1989. Highights S.B. 
Chavan's visit to Leh suggesting the Budhists and the 
Muslims in the district to end the social boycott of 
each other before the demand could be acceded to. 
Concludes that the Council have both legislative and 
executive powers in the matter of district affairs 
with 50 members in all of which 44 will be elected 
and six will be nominated to give representation to 
the minorities and women. 
, , , , AUTONOMY 
150. FAZAL MFHMOOD. Rao's Kashmir legacy for the next ^M. 
Daily Excelsior. 31, 355; 1995, December 24; 4. 
The valley have no political formation in 
absolute control of the situation with the Congress, 
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the National Conference, the People's League, the 
JKLF and the Hurriyat in the political arena. Yasin 
Malik of JKLF was holding the spotlight but over a 
period of time the top slot goes to Shabir Ahmad Shah 
of the People's League. Highlights the bitterness 
between the Congress and the National Conference 
since 1984 when Mrs. Gandhi dismissed Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah's regime and installed G.M. Shaw as the 
Chief Minister of the State. Evaluates the Rajiv-
Farooq accord which came into being in November 1986 
and called the fresh elections in March 1987 usually 
rigged by National Conference as in 1983. Suggests 
P.V. Narasimha Rao to bring together the Governor, 
the intelligence agencies, the forces and the cadres 
represented by Shabir Shah, Yasin Malik and the 
National Conference for final negotiations. 
151. HART OM. Dr. Abdullah and 'Burkina Feso package'. 
Daily Excelsior. 31, 312; 1995, November 11; 4. 
Discusses P.V. Narasimha Rao's autonomy package 
for the J&K empowering its democratically- constitued 
legislative assembly to review the Central Laws 
extended to J^K after 1953 and to amend the State 
Constitution to provide for the titles of Wazir-e-
Azam and Sadar-e-Riyasat. It is the habit of Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah and other Kashmiri politicians to 
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rabble-rouse and suppress the facts about J^. 
Describes the report of G.M. Shaw and G.N. Kochak 
recommending the withdrawal of Central laws which are 
squarely responsible for the erosion of internal 
autonomy granted to the State under Article 370 of 
the Indian Constitution. Highlights the threat of BJP 
to launch a nation-wide agitation to force P.V. 
Narasimha Rao to withdraw his autonomy package. The 
State is requiring a democratically-elected political 
set-up but not the autonomy package announced by 
Narasimha Rao. 
, , , , CHARAK-E-SHARIEF, BURNING 
152. MUSHAHTD HUSSATN. India's Sikh solution for Kashmir. 
Concept. 15,6 ; 1995, June; 37-8. 
Describes the mid-night storming of the Charare 
Sharief shrine in Kashmir which lies just 25 miles 
from the Capital. It was well timed to coincide with 
the Eid holidays so that the focus of attention of 
the Muslims would be more on a religious holiday 
than on resistance to Indian occupation. Coincides 
the incident with the demolition of Babri Mosque and 
asserts that it was the second holiest shrine for the 
Muslims in Kashmir after Hazratbal seize. Presents a 
brief view of the storming of the Golden Temple in 
Amritsar at the hight of the Khalistan movement. 
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Criticises Indian National Congress for being a party 
of anti-Muslims protecting and preserving the Hindu 
character of India by using force. Concludes that it 
is time for Pakistan to pursue a strong, hard-headed 
policy on Kashmir whose on epoint agenda should be 
aimed at foiling the Indian design of imposing a 
Sikhs solution on Kashmir. 
, , , , ELECTIONS 
153. BOSE (AC). Implications of imposing elections on J^K. 
Kashmir Times. 46, 138; 1995, May 19; 4. 
Criticises the decision of Prime Minister P.V. 
Narasimha Rao for holding elections in the State 
before the expiry of President's rule on 18 July 
1995. Evaluates certain questions that haunt the 
Kashmir watchers on how to conduct convincingly fair 
elections in the valley and in parts of Doda district 
and the likely outcome of imposing elections on a 
defiantly unwilling electorate. With fewer Muslim 
votes being polled usually for either the Congress of 
the N.C. , the overall advantage will go to the BJP, 
adding to the political polarisation in the State 
with voices getting louder for the abrogation of 
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The 
government may persuade or pressurise young virtual 
non-entities to race both the lime-light and risk. 
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The exercise may be like the stunt men replacing 
the heroes in particular scenes in a movie and the 
next assembly may be stuffed with many elected non-
representatives . 
, , , , , AUTONOMY 
154. RAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: Putting a lid on the 
fracas. India Today. 19, 22; 1994, November 30; 78-9. 
Comments on the statement by Rajesh Pilot made 
on October 24 in Jammu that a greater autonomy will 
be provided to Jammu and Kashmir after the elections. 
Criticises the disagreeing views of Rajesh Pilot and 
S.R. Chavan over the appointment of advisors, 
Hazrathat 1 seize, negotiations with various groups in 
the valley, the holding of elections, Farooq Abdullah 
and on when and how much autonomy the state be 
granted. Tired of the bickering and one-upmanship 
between S.B. Chavan and Rajesh Pilot over Kashmir, 
the prime minister himself has taken the charge of 
the issue. The holding of elections in the strife 
torn region and the release of Shabir Ahmad Shah is 
the gameplan of prime minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. 
Concludes that Rao has to prove himself on the 
question of elections in Jammu and Kashmir. 
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, FACTIONALISM 
155. FAZILI (Ehsan). Truce, for the nonce. Week. 14, 4; 
1996, January 14; 25-6. 
Proviees an overview of the two-day training 
camp organised by the State Congres. The forthcoming 
elections have made the warring faction leaders 
Ghulam Rasool Kar and Mian Bashir Ahmad to bury the 
hatchet and unite at prospect of polls. Highlights 
Ghulam Nabi Azad's statement which termed the 
Congressmen in the state as intelligent and besides 
fighting for five years reunite on the eve of the 
elections to save the day for the party. Main Bashir 
Ahmad is having the support of a dozen ministers and 
majority of former legislators including the backing 
of Kashmiri Shia leader Iftikhar Hussain Ansari. 
Describes the announcement of a 40-member campaign 
committee headed by Mian Bashir Ahmad by the party 
high command. The elections was a favourite subject 
among many speakers. Ghulam Nabi Azad and Manmohan 
Singh favoured an elected government as the only 
substitute of the current crisis. 
156. MALIK (Mustafa). Film makers ''ndefence of India's 
viewpoint on Kashmir. Concept. 14, 7; 1994, July; 
23-4, 36. 
Discusses the show of a documentary entitled 
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'The Kashmir Story' on April 8 at the CSIR, 
Washington. The show was attempting to deflect 
attention from the crimes that Indians have committed 
in Kashmir. India's ruling Congress Party is playing 
off one Kashmiri political faction against another 
and engineering dismissal of Kashmiri governments and 
collugding inthe rigging of the state's elections. 
Highlights the unleashing of military and 
paramilitary forces on the Kashmiri's revolt in the 
valley by the government and shutting down of its 
eyes on the hair-raising brutalities. Suggests a 
preference for Independence should be provided to the 
Kashmiris to solve the Kashmir tragedy and other 
centrifugal movements. Highlights Indian economic 
and trade policies and also the inflation being 
dropped. Suggests it all could be reversed by new 
ethnic and religiious convulsions and seccessionist 
movements. 
, , , , , LOK SABHA, 1996 
157. EN^ t OF militancy? Statesman. 137, 134; 1996, June 6; 
8. 
The Congress victory in Srinagar and Baramulla 
is surprising in view of the party's record in the 
State. Any election will be better than no election 
at all for a substantial majority of Kashmiris even 
it slap in the face for Hurriyat, the militants and 
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their Pakistani mentors and a mandate for peace for 
the newly elected representatives of the people. 
Suggests the regional aspirations should work their 
way to fulfilment through a political dialogue and 
seek accomodation within the framework of the 
Constitution. The dangerous feeling of taking gun 
should not be allowed to develop in the first place. 
Suggests the United Front Government to hold 
Assembly elections and the scope and range of 
participation in the democratic process be expanded. 
158. J&K POLLS vindicate Congress stand. National Herald. 
28, 87; 1996, June 5; 4. 
The good performance of the Congress in the Lok 
Sabha polls in J8cK is heartening as the significance 
of the poll in the State's fight was against 
militancy. Describes the clean sweep of the Pradesh 
Congress in Raramulla, Jammu, Ladakh and Srinagar. 
The holding of polls has vindicated the judgement -of 
the Congress Government about the people's mood and 
their feelings of anger and disgust against the ways 
of the militants. The voters have defied the threats 
of the militants as well as the boycott call of the 
All Party Hurriyat Conference. Taslimuddin asserts 
that the new Central Govenment's priority in 
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sensitive areas like Kashmir will be to fight 
terrorism and ensure peace and harmony. 
159. KASHMIR OUTCOMF. Hindustan Times. 72, 154; 1996, June 
- 4; 13. 
The victory of Congress in Jammu and Kashmir 
must be seen as a tribe to the short-sightedness and 
opportunism of the National Conference in choosing 
not to participate in the election. Asserts that the 
unprecedentedly large number of candidates are ready 
to enter the fray as soon as the elections will be 
announced confirms the pent-up desire of the people 
for the return of the political process. Describes 
the National Conference's decision against 
participation in the parliamentary elections to 
pressurise the Centre to offer it an economic and 
political package to give the party a head-start in 
any electoral race. Suggests National Conference to 
contest the forthcoming Assembly elections to 
establish its representative character and then argue 
in favour of any package. 
160. SWAMI (Parveen). Kashmir's vote and the political 
implications. Frontline. 13, 12; 1996, June 28; 
50-55. 
Evaluates the allegation of Jammu and Kashmir 
184 
Congress (l) chief Ghulam Rasool Kar for capturing 55 
of 60 polling stations in one area by the Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimoon militia. Comments on the votes polled, 
demonstrations and protests in different parts of the 
valley. Criticises the house arrest of Hurriyat 
leaders. Many people in the valley have invalidated 
their votes as an act of resentment at the pressure 
and force being brought to bear upon them to vote 
against their will. Analyses the party position in 
all the six parliamentary constituencies after the 
final results declared. Advocates Mohammad Yousuf 
Tarigani that the success of parliamentary elections 
provides a step towards creating some democratic 
space to solve the grand problem of Kashmir. Suggests 
Farooq Abdullah to stop asking for things he cannot 
have and accept a realistic assurance of autonomy or 
risk political oblivion. Concludes that an 
accountable and effective government in Srinagar is 
the United Front's Central task in Kashmir. 
, , , , , , , FACTIONALISM 
161. PCC POLL politics. Kashmir Times. 49, 93; 1996, April 
4; 4. 
Comments on the refusal of Mian Rashir Ahmad 
and Maulvi Iftikhar Ansari to participate in the 
polls. Ghulam Rasool Kar's nomination for the 
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Baramulla seat will be a windfall for hitn. Describes 
the decision of ATCC that heads of the state party's 
unit will not be considered for poll mandate. 
Expresses the role of Taj Mohiuddin played in support 
of Ghulam Rasool Kar during the peace march in 
Kashmir. Highlights the shifting of Janak Raj Gupta 
from the Jammu-Poonch Lok Sabha constituency to 
Udhampur-Doda constituency. The reshuffeling of 
candidates will be in the interest of Narasimha Rao 
who wants the maximum returns from all the peripheral 
states to make up possible losses elsewhere in the 
country. 
, , , , , PEACE PROCESS 
162. SUBRAMANTAN (NV). Will polls give peace a chance' 
Sunday. 22, 45; 1995, November 12-18; 12-5, 7. 
Narasimha Rao and his think-tank are agreed on 
the need for elections in Kashmir. Leaders in the 
valley have warned the exercise to only add to the 
current problems. Dr. Farooq Abdullah's demand of 
restoring pre-1953 position is the only condition of 
his party to participate in the elections. Presents 
the political and statistical view of Srinagar, 
Anantnag, Budgam, Baramulla, Pulwama, Kupwara, Doda, 
where the turnout of voters may be very less. Syed 
Ali Shah Geelani asserts that the Congress party 
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wants elections in J&K in 1995 to get votes in 1996 
in India. L.K. Advani of the BJP opposes any turning 
of the clock referring to Abdullah's demand of 
pre-1953 position and adds that the state should be 
integrated with India with the scrapping of Article 
370. Ghulam Rasool Kar is keen to do all they can to 
accommodate Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the only hope of the 
centre. 
, STATE ASSEMBLY 
163. KARP (Jonathan). Promises, promises. Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 158, 46; 1995, November 16; 18. 
Comments on the decision of P.V. Narasimha Rao 
to hold legislative assembly elections in J&K in 
December by considering it to be a better time to 
call elections with the guerrila movement splintered 
and Kashmiris weary of violence. BJP is favouring a 
hardline policy on Kashmir denouncing the autonomy 
offer of Narasimha Rao as a surrender to separatist 
forces. Threat of an election boycott by National 
Conference is the biggest blow to Rao. Farooq 
Abdullah says that Central government is promising 
everything but after elections and is doing the same 
with him as they did with Sheikh Abdullah referring 
to a moribund 1974 pact between Sheikh Abdullah and 
Indira Gandhi Concludes by highlighting Rao's visit 
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to Oimgadougou, capital Burkina Faso where he taped 
his speech. T^ ao' s Kashmir election plan will go down 
in history as the Ougadougou offer. 
164. SPOILED BALLOT. Economist. 337, 7940; 1995, November 
11; 33-4. 
P.V. Narasimha Rao asserts that flawed election 
will be better than rjo election when he announced 
State election to be held in J&K in December. Asserts 
that anybody standing as a candidate or even voter 
have to risk death with most parties are likely to 
boycott the elections. The soldiers have failed to 
stamp out terrorism or win over the Muslims who 
account for two-thirds of the population. Suggests 
Rao to feel it a good time to restart politics in the 
State when the mountain passes to Pakistan will be 
blocked by snow in December and cutting supplies to 
the militants. Farooq Abdullah will be the probable 
winner of the elections because of the party's 
popularity headed by his father Sheikh Abdullah. 
Farooq Abdullah has discredited himself by joining 
hands with the Congress party to rig the 1987 
elections. Concludes that Farooq Abdullah's demand of 
greater autonomy for Kashmir has to show his standing 
among Kashmiris. 
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, KAMRAJ PLAN 
165. KAMRAJING J&K. Kashmir Times. 46, 102; 1995, April 
13; 4. 
Comments on the Kamraj plan proposed by PCC 
president Ghulam Rasool Kar. Any operation of the 
kind of Kamraj plan can only endeavour to change the 
ruling establishment and bring about changes seen to 
be necessary in the state unit of the Congress over 
which Kar's high command exercises the required 
jurisdiction. Kar wants the present ruling 
establishment immediately Kamrajed and replaced by 
one to be acceptable to Congress and other like 
minded parties. Briefly discusses the Kar's 
invitation to Shabir Ahmad Shah to participate in the 
State's assembly elections. Any decision on 
constituting a Kamrajed JKPCC lies with Narasimha Rao 
who has been authorised to take necessary steps to 
revamp the party. 
, , , , NATIONAL CONFERENCE, ELECTIONS, 
LOK SABHA, 1996 
166. CHOWDHARY (Rekha). Parliamentary elections: 
Implications for National Conference and Congress. 
Kashmir Times. 49, 119; 1996, May 3; 4. 
Describes that National Conference and Congress 
are the two major political parties of the State. It 
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is a difficult proposition to go ahead with any 
election without their active participation, atleast 
in the valley. The decision of National Conference to 
withdraw itself from the parliamentary elections is a 
subject of controversy. The new political forces are 
acquiring a part of the political space and thereby 
challenging the hegemony of NC and Congress in the 
electoral power politics of the State. The situation 
is much complicated for NC and Congress because of 
the fear of gun and also due to the presence of new 
political forces. The National Conference and 
Congress have to play a more meaningful role when 
there would be a sufficient scope for dissent and 
opposition and potentiality for circulation of power 
from one group to another. 
, , , , , , STATE ASSEMBLY, 1987 
167. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. TTgrooq scores over Congress. Link. 
29, 31; 1987, March 8; 6-7. 
Farooq Abdullah has not performed better and 
the Congress worse than the way they went about 
formulating their lists of party nominees for the 
next month's assembly poll. Highlights that unlike 
Farooq's balanced and cohesive list of candidates, 
the Congress list is lopsided and based on factional 
and caste considerations. The BJP and the Panthers 
party are posing a challenge to the Congress in about 
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half a dozen seats in the Jammu region. The National 
Conference has to face the Muslim United Front in 
Kashmir valley. Concludes that former Chief Minister 
G.M. Shah leading the remnants of National Conference 
(Khalida) has pulled him out of the fray at the 
eleventh hour. 
, SADABHAVANA YATRA 
168. YATRA POLITICS. Kashmir Times. 49, 6; 1996, January 
6; 4. 
The Congress and the BJP are sharing the 
dubious distinction of lacking a popular base in 
Kashmir. Congress is adopting the double standards 
for partisan political ends. Comments on the denial 
of permission to BJP to launch Parivartan yatra and 
at the same time Uri-Qazigund Sadbhavana Yatra of the 
Congress has received the direct patronage of the 
government of India on its very first day. All 
political parties have a right to formulate their 
respective strategies to achieve their objectives the 
situation is ideal when both the traditional and the 
new elements opt for the democratic course of going 
to the people in an atmosphere free from any kind of 
fear Concludes that the Congress party leadership may 
be highly optimistic about Yatra politics considering 
the secessionist militancy on the wane in the border 
state. 
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, SEPARATIST MOVEMENT 
169. MUKHTAR AHMAD. Valley erupts again. Illustrated 
Weekly of India. 108, 35; 1993, August 28-September 
3; 23-6. 
Criticses P.V. Narasimha Rao's statement that 
Kashmiris are being fed up with the prolonged turmoil 
and are cooperating with the militants only under 
threat of the gun. The killing of a family of three 
by a BSF sub-inspector in Daribal has led to massive 
demonstrations and has given a new life to the 
separatist movement. Asserts that the problem is very 
deep-rooted being further complicated by a corrupt 
bureaucracy, a brutal military, political machina t-i ons 
and a lack of coordination at the administrative 
level. Discusses the visit of Rajesh Pilot to 
Chashmeshahi to seek petition for the release of some 
youths from their parents. G.R. Kar and Mohd. Shafi 
Butt were trying to take advantage of the captive 
crowd. To find any solution to the Kashmir imbroglio 
India must come to terms with reality in Kashmir. 
, , , IKHWAN-UL-MUSLIMOON 
170. RASHID AHMAD. Stop press. Sunday. 22, 32 1995, August 
6-12; 76-7. 
Discusses the formation of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimoon 
and accused them of operating under the cover of 
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security forces. APHC leaders Syed Ali Shah Geelani 
and Prof. Abdul Ghani Lone have accused Jamsheed 
Sheerazi alias Koka Parrey for being a government 
agent. Aekari Ithad Forum has imposed ban on 
publication of statements issued by Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimoon. Provides the overview of the press 
conference summoned by Koka Parrey where he predicts 
himself not a politician and threatened the assembled 
journalists to obey his directions. The local 
newspapers have to carry nothing other than 
statements of various parties besides some 
situational reports. Concludes that the journalists 
are eager to stop playing spokesperson to either the 
militants or the government. 
' ' » » ELECTIONS* LOK SARHA, 1996 
171. NAYAR (Kuldip). Elections, Sarkari Militants and 
Rules of Law. Mainstream. 34, 29; 1996, June 22; 3-4. 
Comments on the crude use of violence by the security 
forces and the militants which converted Kashmir into a 
blood stained tragedy. The sarkari militants are 
victimising human rights activists, independent 
journalists and critics of new Delhi. Criticises the 
attempt on the lives of two veteran leaders of the All 
Party Hurriyat Conference Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Abdul 
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Ghani Lone. The new government's first priority should be 
to re-establish the dignity of law so that the people 
should not be bumped off by the elements above law. 
Concludes that the Deve Gowda governments' undertaking on 
more autonomy will get no response if the Kashmiris come 
to believe their leaders elimination physically, but not 
politically. 
, , , JANATA DAL 
172. WELCOME STEP. Suargam. 2, 26; 1996, July 7-13; 2. 
Comments on the induction of Janata Dal leader 
Maqbool Dar from Jammu and Kashmir into the Union Cabinet. 
Highlights the socialistic and secular character of Dar. 
His approach to the solution of the present turmoil in the 
valley is quite different from his other ministerial 
colleagues. Suggests the Union government to open new 
avenues of employment, provide loans to the youths 
interested in establishing their own business, stop the 
discrimination on political lines and provide 
opportunities of equal development to every one 
irrespective of caste, creed and colour. Dar is fully 
abreast of the problems of the people and to work on the 
issue so that the era of peace and prosperity returns in 
the valley once again. 
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, ELECTIONS, STATE ASSEMBLY, 1996, 
PEACE PROCESS. 
173. PEACE FIRST, then polls in J&K. Blitz. 56, 29; 1996, 
July 20; 2. 
Criticises the government's announcement of 
assembly elections in beleaguered Jammu and Kashmir 
in September-October. Maqbool Dar has ruled out 
discussions with Dr. Farooq Abdullah's National 
Conference on the issue of autonomy. Discusses the 
litany of staggering terrorist onslaughts when they 
killed 10 Hindu Labourers in Kupwara and Syed Ahmad 
Syed a close associate of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah on 
July 11 PitNarbal. Suggest? Gowda regime to adopt a 
deterrent stance against the forces of 
destabilisation. Concludes that the government is 
likely to do well to delve into the wider conspiracy 
behind the Kashmiri struggle. 
, , , JKLF 
174. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: A calculated gamble. 
India Today. 19, 11; 1994, June 15; 67, 69, 71. 
Describes the release of Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front Chief and one of the founders of the 
militant movement in Kashmir Yasin Malik. His release 
is a hope of reviving a political dialogue. The JKLF 
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still commands popular support and Malik is able to 
rally the people around him. Asserts that after the 
welcome and reception Malik received, t'pe officials 
wonders Malik to scale down his demand for 
independence. Briefly explains the differences 
between Malik and Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference. 
Expresses fear of Yasin Malik that the use of Mujahid 
Manzil as his headquarter provides a point to fuel 
the rumour of Malik's league with the Centre, because 
both Sheikh Abdullah and Farooq Abdullah have used it 
for all major political activities. A political 
dialogue will be better than the f i i"# fighting 
operations continually witnessed by Kashmiris for the 
last four years. 
, , , , CONFLICTS 
175. RASHID AHMAD. Divided they st-and. Sunday. 22, 41; 1995, 
Ocober 15-21; 32-3. 
Describes the split of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front in Kashmir when Shabir Siddiqui 
announced the formation of parallel JKLF at the 
Hazratbal shrine..Shabir accused Malik for being a man 
without any comm'tmen«-to the cause of azaadi and 
declared Basharat Ahmad as he chief of political body 
of JKLF. AllParty Hurriyat Conference has recognised 
Malik as the leader of the real JKLF and accused the 
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keenness of the militant group on ensuring the 
hegemony of the gun over people's lives and all such 
designs. 
, , , NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
177. BHANDARE (Namita). Teeing off. Sunday. 21, 17; 1994, 
Aprn 24-30; 28-33. 
Describes the different aspects of Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah's life and his political career. States that 
as a heir of the Sher-e-Kashmir Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah has inherited an enormous amount of 
goodwill. The government is keen to restart the 
political process in Kashmir which made Prime 
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to call Abdullah up. Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah was first sworn in as Chief Minister 
on September 8, 1982, nominated by ailing Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah as his successor on 23rd January 
1981. Highlights his dismissal by Governor Jagmohan 
in 1984 and his brother-in-law CM. Shaw replaced him 
as the new Chief Minister, but after two years he 
again returned to office after agreeing to share 
power with the Congress. Farooq Abdullah is an 
important factor to start any political process in 
the State. 
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Government of India for engineering the revolt 
against v^sin Malik. Yasin's supproters are in favour 
of giving the Centre a chance to find a sttlement to 
the Kashmir dispute and declines any possibility of 
JKLF's participation in the proposed elections. The 
birth of one more militant outfit has added the 
problems of the Centre which is trying to push 
through assembly polls in the State. 
, , , , HAZRATBAL CRISES 
176. HAZRATBAL AGAIN. Hindustan Times. 72, 84; 1996, March 
26; 11. 
Comments on the encounter between half a dozen 
members of a faction of JKLF and security forces when 
the former tried to sneak into the Hazratbal shrine. 
Such exercises are against he spirit- of the religious 
traditions and practices of the local Muslim 
population. States that whenever the signs of a 
return of normalcy in he valley emerges and the talks 
of holding the elections started, the armed militants 
turn their attention to the religious shrines. The 
fresh dates for holding parliamentary elections have 
been announced. Militant groups would create more of 
such critical situations with the hope to render the 
process of normalistion extremely difficult. The 
Government must act in anticipation to defeat the 
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178. NATIONAL CONFERENCE in Decadence. United India Pride. 
1, 30; 1996, July 29; 2. 
Comments on the decadence of National 
Conference under family rule for a long time just as 
Indian National Congress decayed under family rule 
of Jawaharlal Nehru's dynasty. Dr. Abdullah's rigid 
attitude on greater autonomy for the state for NC's 
participation in polls is a clear indication that NC 
may boycott the election again. Highlights the 
magnificient political role of BJP in valley in 
plunging into election for the Lok Sabha in a big way 
and breaking mental barriers of other national 
parties including Congress Party. Suggests NC to 
change its strategies carefully relying on the 
direction and momentum given by Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah. NC has to open a fresh account as a 
political party treating previous account as lapsed 
and to rebuilt the party cadre from men of honesty 
and integrity. 
179. WAJEHUDDIN (Md). Abdullah's ire. Nation and the World 
3, 92; 1995, August 1; 58. 
Mentions Dr. Farooq Abdullah's disappointment 
when P.V. Narasimha Rao made an effort to start the 
mythical political process in the valley and sent 
minister of state Bhuvanesh Chaturvedi to Srinagar to 
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take stock of the situation. He chose not to consult 
Farooq Abdullah in this regard. Highlighs Abdullah's 
angriness on the silence on a poli fi cal package for 
J&K and his hope for somethi'njt su^ sta'-'t-'aTfrom New 
Delhi to mollify Kashmiris. Suggests Farooq Abdullah 
to share some of the blame for being sidelined by 
Congress leadership because elections were rigged 
during his regime. Concludes that like most 
politicians, Farooq Abdullah reminding Nero was 
fiddling while Rome was burning. 
, , , , AUTONOMY 
180. HARI OM. Sharp contradictions in Jammu and Kashmir 
Kashmir Times. 49, 164; 1996, June 15; 4. 
Evaluates the descript-i on of existing political 
system as anti-Kashmiriat by Dr. Farooq Abdullah and 
Saif-ud-Din Soz. Discusses their formula of the 
withdrawal of the Central laws and instiutions from 
the State All Kashmiri leaders of the Congress, 
Janata Dal, CPI and the CPI(M) are endorsing National 
Conference's contentions. The demand of the people of 
Jammu for reorganisaion of the State's poliy on a 
regional basis is the demand of therieht-s t.alculaed 
to disinegrate the Sate. Gives a brief overview of 
Praja Parishad Movement 1952-53, sudents flo;i lation 
Movement 1966-67, and Poonch revolt 1978-79 which 
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left the government with no option but to appoint 
commissions to look into the people's accusations 
Concludes that the valley leaders should recognise 
the fact that the Kashmiri dominated unitary 
consituional set-up has only benefitted he valley and 
its people. 
181. KAUL (PN) . Autonomy or black mail. Daily Excelsior. 
32, 28; 1996, January 29; 4-5. 
Criticises Farooq Abdullah for not accepting 
anything short of autonomy and would not trust 
Government of India any more as National Conference 
always being ditched at this point in the past. 
Farooq Abdullah was admitting to the Centre to 
initiate talks with the Hurriyat leaders and ensure 
autonomy for all he regions but greater autonomy for 
Kashmir valley. The grant or otherwise of autonomy to 
J&K needs a national debate and should be accepted or 
rejected in a National referendum. The talks with the 
Hurriyat leaders will be futile enough but Hurriyat 
Conference should shed its sectarian credo and come 
to terms with the unalternable reality of accession. 
Suggests NC and its leadership to realise 
independence, autonomy, secession to be acceptable to 
the Indian people and the people of Kashmir. Farooq 
Abdullah is following the footsteps of his father 
Sheikh Abdullah in pursuit of State power. 
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182. PANDITA (KN). NC's fatal attraction for autonomy. 
Daily Excelsior. 31, 339; 1995, December 8; 4. 
National Conference is historically fqif more 
significant than any other political party in Jammu & 
Kashmir. National Conference leadership was bogged 
down more in the political mess by loosing envision 
in its programme of Naya Kashmir. National Conference 
is demanding an Accord after every confrontation 
which results in 1952 Nehru-Sheikh Accord, 1975 
Indira-Sheikh Accord and 1986 Rajiv-Farooq Accord. 
Criticises Farooq abdullah for not making autonomy 
the issue of his resignation from Chief Ministership 
in 1990. Suggests Farooq Abdullah to prepare himself 
for a situation in which autonomy package will not be 
forthcoming. 
, , , , DARBAR MOVE 
183. MOHAMMAD SAYEED. Darbar move: A legacy in trouble. 
Link. 29, 36; 1987, Arpril 12; 32. 
Describes Dr. Farooq Abdullah's move to 
discontinue pre-independence practice of annual 
shifting of Sta'^ e government headquarters between 
Jammu and Srinagar. Assumes sensitive emotional, 
political and economic dimensions which appears to be 
running into rough weather with even section of the 
ruling alliance joining the opposition crescendo 
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against it. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi blessed the 
Farooq's idea wrhen he visited snowbound Kashmir 
valley. Durbar move is legacy of he erstwhile 
administrative sphere, '^ts dimensions has increased 
manifold over the years. In case ministers and 
secre*"arT es of departments left untouched, T^ a^ bar move 
wold continue to exist with the minor difference. 
Concludes that most of the moving employees seem to 
be enjoying being in Kashmir during summer and in 
Jammu during winter to escape extreme climatic 
conditions. 
, , , , DELHI AGREEMENT 
184. BALDEV SINGH. Do we know plebescite or pre 1953 
position'? Daily Excelsior. 31, 295; 1995, October 25; 
4. 
Comments on the political stand of the National 
Conference for restoration of pre-1953 position of 
the State. The early 50' s are of great importance 
particularly of J&K on the political scenario of 
India. Highlights the three points resolution adopted 
by the Constituent Assembly of the State between 1952 
and 1953. It is common with the valley leaders to 
claim and demand pre-1953 position when out of power 
and to hail when in power. Criticises. Dr. Farooq 
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Abdullah for never claiming pre 1953 position while 
remaining in power twice as Chief Minister of the 
State. Analyses the results if the State be allowed 
to go to pre 1953 condition as loudly claimed by the 
National Conference leaders. Dismisses the demands of 
plebescite taste or of pre 1953 position and states 
that both demands are impracticable, against the 
interests of '-intion and needs no consideration at any 
cost. 
, , , , ELECTIONS 
185. CHOPRA (Prem). Elections in Kashmir. Daily Excelsior. 
31, 229; 1995, October 29; 4. 
Signals of Dr. Farooq Abdullah to take part in 
elections in the "^ i-ate is a welcome shift. Farooq 
Abdullah and NC has to take the lead in bringing all 
anti-secession parties to a common platform in 
support of an adequate measure of autonomy. 
Criticises Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao for 
discussing the extent of the autonomy to be provided 
to the State after the elections. A clear and sincere 
understanding must be reached about how to decide it. 
Analyses the Sheikh-Nehru accord of 1952 and Sheikh-
Indira accord of 1975. Farooq Abdullah strongly 
speaking against the Govt, of India is right to ask 
the Prime Minister to take steps to restore 
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confidence among the people. The Conference and 
Congress may join hands if anti-India parties will 
participate in elections but compete with each other 
to maximise their vote in case of their boycott. 
186. NOORANI (AG). Poll in J&K. News from India. 2, 32; 
1995, August 7; 5-9. 
Describes the pronouncement of Kashmiris to let 
Farooq Abdullah to walk around the streets of 
Srinagar without bodyguards, without the Army to have 
an election. The idea of fair and free elections 
which Seshan prescribed for Bihar does not apply to 
Kashmir. It was the rigging of 1987 elections which 
led to dienchantment with the electoral process and 
triggered of armed militancy. Highlights the first 
election in Kashmir after independence in October 
1951 when the ruling National Conference won all the 
75 seats and 73 of its candidates returned unopposed 
when nominantions closed on August 30. Analyses all 
the elections held in Kashmir since 1951 and states 
all of them being rigged at large. Concludes that a 
dialogue with the leading figures in the State is the 
need of the hour. Elections is no substitute for 
reconcilia^'°"and will only widen the gulf. 
2C5 
187. POINT, COUNTERPOINT. Kashmir Times. 46, 93; 1995, 
April 4; 4. 
Comments on the Dr. Farooq Abdullah statement 
that National Conference has no reservations on 
participating in the proposed assembly elections in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Indicates National Conference's 
demand for the restoration of 1952 status in the 
state's constitutional relationship with the rest of 
the country. Provides the demand of a major economic 
package for the state for educational, health and 
other facilities adversely affected in the last five 
years of secessionist militancy. Criticises the 
declaration by Yasin Malik, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, 
Abdul Ghani Lone and Shabir Shah of their firm 
resolve to prevent the holding of assembly elections. 
Concludes that the National Conference will be the 
first among the representatives of traditional 
political elements to take advantage of the 
administration's offer of utilising official media 
for the projection of their views on the situation of 
the state. 
, AUTONOMY 
188. HARI OM. Kashmir autonomy: Free and fair poll only 
solution. Statesman. 137, 9; 1996, January 10; 8. 
Discusses Dr. Farooq Abdullah's statements on 
2 06 
the issue of autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir. 
Dismisses the National Conference and former Chief 
Minister as power-hungary and unscrupulous. The 
Central Government should negotiate with APHC for a 
political settlement before the elections. The policy 
planners should study the Kashmir autonomy issue and 
evolve a solution which does not only unite Jammu, 
Kashmir and Ladakh and the rest of the country in 
closer bonds but will also restore democracy in the 
State. Dr. Abdullah's demand is nothing but a revised 
version of the pre-independence. The people of 
Kashmir are safe in the secular and democratic India. 
The ongoing separatist movement is the fallout of the 
misrule and pro-elitist, pro-business and pro-urban 
policies of Sheikh Abdullah. 
, , , , , LOK SABHA, 1996 
189. BOSE (AC). Road to rigged elections? Kashmir Times. 
49, 115; 1996, April 27; 4. 
in 
Barring the one in 1977,elections/Kashmir have 
always been a crucial joke cracked in the name of 
democracy. National Conference has opted out of the 
fray because of their opinion that fair and free 
elections will not be possible in the valley. 
Criticises the recognising and rearming of the 
surrendered militants to set up their own Awami 
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League and contesting in the coming elections. 
Evaluates the threat of Congress (I) leaders to opt 
out of the fray and to praise the National Conference 
for its decision. The govt, is under pressure from most 
parties in the electoral fray to disarm 
every civilian in the valley before the elections. 
Concludes that every political party agrees on the 
point that free and fair elections will be the only 
long term remedy of the present malady in Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
190. BUTT (Ghazanfar). Is Farooq committing Harakiri? 
Daily Excelsior. 32, 101; 1996, April 12; 4-5. 
Criticises National Conference decision for not 
participating in the parliamentary elections claiming 
the situation not conducive for the exercise. 
Analyses the position of the aspirants for the 
parliamentary elections from Congres, JD, BJP and 
Awami League floated by Kukka Parrey. Describes the 
Pak plans of advising the militants and mercenaries 
not to waste the ammuuiition and conserve it till the 
announcement of elections. Highlights JKLF Shabir 
Siddiqui group's assumption of playing the role of 
defending the shrine from the onslaughts of Jamaat-e-
Islami. The militant organisations and their 
political leaders should give up the gun, opt for 
peace and support the demcoratic process. 
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191. NC DECISION. Kashmir Times. 49, 88; 1996, March 30; 
4. 
The National Conference decision against 
participating in the ensuring Lok Sabha elections is 
surprise for those who thought that the party chief 
Farooq Abdullah would go by the advice of Govrnor 
K.V. Krishna Rao. NC would be guided by the CPM 
warming that poll abstention would land it in an 
inglorious state of isolation at a crucial period of 
the state history. Highlights BJP's participation 
inspite of violent disagreement with the situation 
being conducive for the elections. The Congress party 
is feeling assured of bagging all the three valley 
seats alongwith Ladakh seat and the possibility of 
retaining the two Jammu seats. Concludes that the NC 
decision will not affect the thinking of other 
parties but they must consider the credibi 1 i*-y of poll 
exercise '^n the prevailing si •'nation. 
192. NC SHIES away. Hindustan Times. 72, 90; 1996, April 
1; 11. 
Comments on the decision of the National 
Conference to boycott the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections in Jammu and Kashmir at the end of a three-
day meeting of the party's working committee in Jammu 
on Friday. Evaluates the statement of party president 
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political front of their own to take on to National 
Conference led combination. Concludes with a survey 
which predicts National Conference plagued by paucity 
of good candidates may just fall short of five or six 
members to form the government. 
194. J&K: Historic poll ahead. Tribune. 116, 220; 1996, 
August 9; 8. 
The people of J&K will have yet another taste 
of democracy next month after the recent successful 
parliamentary elections. Describes the most sensitive 
districts to have elections on separate dates with 
Doda in the last phase on September 30, being the 
target of trigger-happy militant groups. Farooq 
Abdullah is coming out openly and asking the people 
not to succumb to any pressures and cast their votes 
without fear to defeat the nefarious designs of the 
internal and external enemies. Farooq's voice is 
sanity which may prompt other Kashmiri leaders to 
strike bold plastures. The people of J&K have genuine 
grievances against the Centre. Suggests them to shun 
the path of violence and muster courage to call a 
spade a spade for sorting out the old and new 
problems. 
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195. MATTOO (Amitabh). September is the surreal month. 
Telegraph. 15, 58; 1996, September 3; 12. 
Only the most optimistic can escape the feeling 
of foreboding about Kashmir when the surreality of 
the electoral process looks most frightening. It will 
be 1987 once more with the same petty political 
machinations, the very same opportunists and the near 
certainty of Farooq Abdullah to be the next chief 
minister. Abdullah is playing political acumen and 
maturity by aligning only with the Bahujan Samaj 
Party. Farooq Abdullah may be hoodwinked again both 
by his own men and the Centre. Evaluates the betrayel 
of the Centre after the 1975 accord with Sheikh 
Abdullah, when the promise of autonomy scuttled 
through his political skulduggery. Concludes that the 
most important task before the National Conference 
will be to ensure an effective devolution of power 
and to restore the state's autonomy to what prevailed 
in 1952. 
196. PILLAI (Ajith) and ZAFAR MERAJ. Poll tempo picks up. 
Outlook. 2, 36; 1996, September 4; 20-22. 
The positive response to election is largely 
attributed to the Farooq Abdullah's National 
Conference. Highlights the Prime Minister H.D. Deve 
Gowda's assurance of a free and fair elections and 
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his Government's commitment to give autonomy to the 
state after an elected regime. Asserts the people 
being tired of violence hopes the elections to bring 
a semblance of peace and prosperity. National 
Conference will come with a thumping majority from 
Kashmir Valley but BJP and Congress seems to be 
stronger in Jammu divisions. Discusses the Congress 
leader Iftikhar Ansari's campaigning for National 
Conference's victory being very critical of Mufti 
Sayeed. The scales seems to be titled in the NC's 
favour unless some drastic change takes place in the 
minds of electorate. 
197. PUSHKARNA (Vijaya). Star campaigner. Week. 14, 38; 1996, 
September 8; 35-7. 
Describes Dr. Farooq Abdullah in a full spin 
and looking for place to hide from the 
ticket-seekers. The tempting of Dr. Karan Singh's son 
into the National Conference is the Farooq Abdullah's 
smart political move. Farooq Abdullah is thrilling in 
the electoral hustle-bustle after what seems ages to 
him. Farooq Abdullah is the star campaigner for his 
party to do a whistle-stop tour of the entire state 
and touch all the constituencies, driving small 
distances, getting into commercial flights wherever 
necessary and go helicopter-hopping for the rest of 
it. National Conference is contesting from all the 
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assembly seats in the valley with the understanding 
with BSP in about eight seats in the Jammu division. 
Concludes with Farooq Abdullah's commitment to be the 
father of errant sons if they come back to the 
mainstream. 
198. SWAMI (Parveen) . Assembly round: Options before the 
National Cosnference. Frontline. 13, 13; 1996, July 
12; 49-51. 
Describes the decisions of the working 
committee meeting of the National Conference on Aine 
9 and 10 at Nehru Park, on the banks of the Dal Lake, 
Highlights the demand of the National Conference to 
make concrete devolution package as a precondition 
for engagement in the electoral process. The meeting 
of H.D. Deve Howda and Dr. Farooq Abdullah in New 
Delhi has confronted National Cosnference with a 
stark political choice to participate in the assembly 
elections, opening itself to charges of compromised 
stand on autonomy or risk political oblivion. Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah says that the delinking questions of 
elections and 1952 status with the credible 
assurances of free and fair polls is an essential 
precondition for participation in the assembly 
elections. Dr. Farooq Abdullah meeting with Prime 
Minister Deve Gowda and former Prime Minister is 
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encouraging and extremely positive. Concludes that 
political engagements of National Conference are 
necessary and possible to show its credibility as a 
representative of the State's people. 
199. ZAFAR MERAJ. All aboard the pollwagon. Outlook. 2, 
34; 1996, August 21; 14-5. 
Discusses the National Conference's decision of 
joining in the electoral process after the Centre 
has announced a spate of welfare packages. NC is 
being the moderate party with the largest mass base 
in the state and its participation to lend 
credibility to the poll exercise. Suggests the NC to 
go on its own with restoration of the State's 
autonomy as its political agenda. Asserts the 
possibility of NC to accommodate JD President Abdul 
Qayoom, CPM State Secretary Yusuf Tarigami and two 
dissident Congress leaders Mian Bashir and Moulvi 
Iftikhar Ansari. All the mainstream parties are 
welcoming the elections but the APHC is dismissing it 
as just another military exercise to further 
aggravate the Kashmir problem rather than solve it. 
Kukka parrey and Nabi Azad of Awami League are 
considering their participation in the elections as 
meaningless. Concludes by analysing the final touches 
being given to the security arrangements for the 
ensuing polls. 
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, PEOPLE'S LEAGUE, AGENDA 
200. JHA (Prem Shankar). Political process in Kashmir. 
News from India. 2, 12; 1995, March 20; 8-9. 
The renewed political activity is spontaneous 
and hectic and not envisaged by the Central leaders 
or the National Conference Cadre timidly coming out 
of abscurity. Describes a hero's welcome to the 
valley to the People's League leader Shabir Ahmad 
Shah by over thousands of people congregated in broad 
day light. Reports the difference in perceptions of 
Jamaat-e-Islami stand for the merger of Kashmir with 
Pakistan with Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik who stand 
for its consolidation and ascertain in the face of 
pressures from both India and Pakistan. The political 
agenda of both the People's League and the JKLF is 
reflecting an awareness of Kashmir's pluralism. The 
situation today is bearing strong resemblance to what 
Sheikh Abdullah faced in 1947. Kashmiris will never 
forget the insult to their self respect in 1977 and 
1983, casually snuffed out by Indira Gandhi in 1984. 
, , , , DIALOGUE 
201. GUJRAL (IK). Way out in Kashmir. Nation and the World, 
3, 87; 1995, May 16; 39-40. 
Provides an overview of Shabir Ahmad Shah's 
visit to Delhi and his willingness to discuss and 
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listen to the views of the others which offers a ray 
of hope particularly when he minced no words in 
distancing himself from the gun cult and those who 
use the places of worship for political purposes. 
Highlights his perceptions regarding resolution of 
the knotty problem transcend ethnic boundaries of the 
valley including Jammu, Ladakh and POK. Describes his 
disbelief in the electoral process which emanates 
from the sad tale of rigged polls in the past. He 
asserts to order a poll to test popularity but not 
for formation of a government. Points to 
Gandhi-Bhutto talks at Shimla, when Bhutto accepted 
the LOG as a final line of division of Kashmir and 
Mrs. Gandhi conceded merger of the northern areas and 
POK in Pakistan, still be the best way to end agony 
and turmoil being inflicted on people of the state. 
202. KAK ( M L ) . Include Kashmiris in talks: Shah. News from 
India. 2, 4; 1995, January 23; 15-6. 
Shabir Ahmad Shah suggests Delhi and Islamabad 
to move a step forward for resolving the Kashmir 
imbroglio. Shabir Shah is the only separatist leader 
toured various places in the three regions of the 
State and having firm opinion to grant the right of 
self-determination to the people of the State. Shabir 
Shah is favouring the gun to be continued as a part 
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of the ongoing struggle for freedom and opposing the 
misuse of the gun by those not committed to Jehad. 
The National Conference, the Congress and other 
mainstream political parties are irrelevant in 
today's Kashmir. Concludes that neither Farooq 
Abdullah nor Ghulara Rasool Kar could stem the rot. 
, , , , MERGER PROPOSAL 
203. SHABIR SHAH's proposals. Kashmir Times. 46, 4; 1995, 
January 4; 4. 
Comments on Shabir Shah's proposal of merging 
all the Hurriyat constituents into one single party 
working under one leader. Highlights the Hurriyat 
Constituents for making no indication of their 
willingness or otherwise to consider the merger 
proposal. Describes the proposals envisaging the 
involvement of the representatives of Jammu and 
Ladakh regions in the Hurriyat besides the merger of 
individual constituents. Discusses Shabir Shah's 
repeated concern over the growth of vested interests 
and feeling highly disturbed at the activities of 
certain elements claiming to be engaged in the 
ongoing freedom movement in Kashmir. Shah is firm on 
maintainibg the integrity of the State instead of 
witnessing its balkanisation. 
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, RSS, ACCESSION, HISTORY 
204. BATURA (RC). RSS role in the accession of Kashmir to 
India. Organizer. 44, 47; 1993, June 27; 9-10. 
The tragedy of Kashmir is a story of egoes of 
leaders of India as well as of Kashmir. Mentions 
Jawharlal Nehru's dislikeness of Maharaja Hari Singh 
who had not allowed him to enter Kashmir and arrested 
him on June 20, 1949. Expresses Sheikh Abdullah's 
call to Maharaja Hari Singh to quit Kashmir. The 
launching of a movement against the Maharaja by NC 
resulted in the arrest of many of its leaders. 
Sheikh's release on the condition to left the valley 
set him dead against the Maharaja and he left for 
Gwalior for some time. Maharaja Hari Singh was 
equally against Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah whom Nehru 
wanted as interim Prime Minister following accession. 
, , , UNITED FRONT, AUTONOMY 
205. GOOD DECISION. Suargam. 2, 29; 1996, August 4-10; 2. 
Comments on the political and economic package 
announced by Prime Minister Deve Gowda for strife 
torn Jammu and Kashmir and states it as a welcome 
step. Deve Gowda government should be prepared to 
hold talks with militants for the solution of the 
Kashmir problem. Stresses the grant of B-2 status to 
Jammu which cherished desire of people especially the 
employees who at least will get some special perks. 
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If Gowda Government will remain sticked to their 
stand, then Kashmir, will again leap to progress and 
forces of devastation and destruction will loose 
their grip. Suggests Maqbool dar, the sole 
representative of the state in the UF Government, to 
take personal interest in getting the orders 
implemented. 
206. PILLAI (Ajith). Peace offering at last. Outlook. 2, 
25; 1996, June 19; 14-5. 
The promise of United Front Government of 
maximum autonomy is a positive signal to end the 
strife in the valley and restore peace. Highlights 
the statements of different leaders from All-Party 
Hurriyat Conference, National Conference and Awami 
League. Describes the pattern of votes polled in the 
parliamentary elections as a pointer and the voters, 
left with no choice, exercised their franchise 
arbitrarily. Gives a brief overview of the 
discussions between former prime minister V.P. Singh 
and a senior Hurriyat leader Shabir Ahmad Shah. 
Indicates Captain Tickoo's allegations of poll 
irregularities and stuffing of ballot boxes. Analyses 
the role of surrendered militants, which made the 
elections possible. Concludes that surrendered 
militants should be disarmed to ensure free and fair 
polls in the valley before the assembly elections. 
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207. SUHRAWARDY (Saeed). Squint-eyed on Kashmir autonomy. 
Hindustan Times. 72, 244; 1996, September 2; 12. 
Criticises the three part article on Autonomy 
for Kashmir by Jagmohan which finds fault with the 
view of Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda expressed in 
the Lok Sabha on July 12, 1996. The economic packages 
announced by the Prime Minister have no bearing on 
autonomy for the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The worst 
mistake committed by the Central leaders was Rajiv-
Farooq Accord in 1987 which played a crucial role in 
the movement of the people against the autocratic 
rule of the Maharaja. Describes the people of Kashmir 
led by Sheikh Abdullah strongly supporting Kashmir's 
that 
accession to India. Concludes/Kashmiris should be 
left to elect their representatives and to evolve a 
strategy to defeat the elements working against their 
interests. 
, , , , ELECTIONS, STATE ASSEMBLY, 1996 
208. BAWEJA (Harinder). Kashmir: The election trail. India 
Today. 21, 14; 1996, July 31; 53. 
Describes the first visit of H.D. Deve Gowda to 
the war-wearing valley which sets the tone for the 
revival of the political process in Jammu and 
Kashmir. Highlights the demand of National Conference 
for the abrogation of Article 356 and Article 249. 
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Expresses the discussion between Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
and H.D. Deve Gowda and other union ministers. Gives 
a brief information about the maximum autonomy 
promised by Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda to Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah after the assembly elections to be 
held by the end of September. Concludes with a brief 
discussion, on. disarming the surrendered militants which is 
opposed by the Army. 
209. BUTT (Ghazanfar). Sooner the Assembly polls, the 
better. National Herald. 28, 87; 1996, June 5; 4. 
The major decision the new government has to 
take would be about the holding of Assembly elections 
in J&K, sooner or later. Highlights the ample 
confidence of the political leaders, the state 
government and the people to go through the Assembly 
elections in the State. Asserts the participation of 
high percentage of the state officials in election 
arrangements. It will be difficult for the Central 
government to get down to negotiations with the 
leaders of the state on the extent of autonomy 
desired by them. The best course is to schedule the 
Assembly polls soon, before the confidence and 
enthusiasm generated by the parliamentary polls 
dissipates. 
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210. SWAMI (Parveen). Playing for power: Politics in 
Kashmir as election approach. Frontline. 13, 15; 
1996, August 9; 41-3, 45-6. 
Discusses the first assembly elections in 
Jammu and Kashmir after a long gap of nine years. 
H.D. Deve Gowda's visit to Srinagar on July 6 
illutrates his Government's commitment to a 
meaningful dialogue on Kashmir's future, by providing 
United Front's promise in its (^ ommon Minimum 
Programme (CMP) of maximum autonomy for Kashmir. 
Maqbool T^ ar states that the Government saw no role 
for Kashmir's traditional party NC-f^laims Abdullah's 
awareness about the group of 74 people sent into 
Pakistan for insurgency training. National 
Conference's rigging of 1987 elections is the root 
cause of the rise of terrorism. 
, , , , PEACF PROCESS 
211. PUNJABI (Riyaz). Kashmir: Challenge and opportunity. 
Politics India. 1, 2; 1996, August; 26-8. 
Highlights the visit of Prime Minister H.D. 
Deve Gowda to Kashmir which reflects the urgency and 
seriousness on the part of the present government 
to restore peace in the strike-torn valley of 
Kashmir. It will be worthwhile to draw some parallels 
on the visit of Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 and Deve Gowda 
after eight years in order to learn some lessons and 
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redeem Kashmir society from the ongoing seige of 
violence and turmoil. Discusses the alienations of 
the people guilefully hyjaked by Pakistan to 
challenge the territorial sovereignty of India in the 
absence of proper democratic avenues. Criticises the 
Central governments for communal polarisation in the 
three parts of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh from the 
very beginning. 
, , ROLE OF MUFTI SAYEED 
212. FRANKMAN. Mufti factor in Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir 
Times. 49, 215; 1996, August 5; 4. 
Discusses the potential of Mufti Mohammad Syed 
of ^carrying with him different persons with 
divergence of interests and also his habitlessness of 
issuing statements which create problems. States the 
sponsorship of Mufti against Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah 
by Indira Gandhi as a requirement in national 
interest, necessitated by the approach adopted by 
National Conference within the valley and part of 
Jammu. Mentions Mufti's speech in a close-door 
meeting held in Srinagar, when Indira Gandhi got 
defeated in Centre, which turned the meeting 
emotional and a large number of Congress workers got 
their names registered. Concludes Mufti as always 
representing a shade of thought and any decision 
taken regarding Jammu and Kashmir while ignoring him 
will be staging a play without its Hero. 
224 
2t3. MUFTT'S ROLE. Suargam. 2, 28; 1996, July 28-August 3; 
2. 
Comments on the resignation of former Home 
Minister and Chairman Parliamentary Board of Janata 
Dal, Mufti Syed from the primary membership of the 
party. The militancy was surfaced in J&K State due to 
the arch rivalry between NC led by Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah and State Congress-I led by Mufti Mohammad 
Syed. Mufti's failure to reconcile with the situation 
after Rajiv-Farooq accord in 1987 has resulted in his 
resignation from Congress. Kashmir is passing through 
a crucial phase at present. If Mufti is of the view 
to make Hurriyat to participate in the polls, he must 
not ignore the National Conference which has still 
strong cadre in the valley. Suggests Mufti to forget 
the old enmity with NC and share a common platform 
with its leaders for restoration of peace and 
normalcy. 
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